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The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) imposes procedural requirements on agencies for the purpose of protecting the
interests of parties affected by agency action.' When the agency
action in question is a regulation, or in APA terms a "rule," section
553 of Title 5 of the United States Code (APA section 553) imposes
procedures including but not limited to public notice and opportunity for comment, otherwise known as notice-and-comment rulemaking. 2 The purpose of these procedures is to encourage public
participation in the rulemaking process.3 "In enacting the APA, Congress made ajudgment that notions of fairness and informed administrative decisionmaking require that agency decisions be made only
after affording interested persons notice and an opportunity to comment." 4 Agencies that fail to follow the procedural requirements of
APA section 553 run the risk that courts will invalidate their rules and
5
regulations.
In the tax context, the Treasury Department has a strange relationship with the APA's notice-and-comment rulemaking require1 PETER H. SCHUCK, FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 53 (2d ed. 2004); see
also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (2000 & Supp. IV
2004).
2
See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000); see also 1 RIcHARDJ. PIERCE,JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 7.1 (4th ed. 2002).

3

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

ATrORNEY GENERAL'S

MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEDURE ACT 26 (1947) [hereinafter ATroRNEY GENERAL'S

MANUAL].

4 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316 (1979).
5 See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 57 F.3d 1136, 1142-43 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (invalidating rule for inadequate notice); Am. Water Works Ass'n v. EPA, 40
F.3d 1266, 1274-75 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (same); Lloyd Noland Hosp. & Clinic v. Heckler,
762 F.2d 1561, 1566-67 (11th Cir. 1985) (invalidating rule for inadequate basis and
purpose statement); cf Cent. & S.W. Servs., Inc. v. EPA, 220 F.3d 683, 692 (5th Cir.
2000) (remanding rule for failure to address comments in statement of basis and
purpose).
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6

Treasury annually adopts, modifies, and removes hundreds of
pages of Treasury regulations interpreting the Internal Revenue Code
(I.R.C.). 7 Treasury acknowledges that APA section 553 governs its
various regulatory efforts. 8 Treasury also contends, however, that
most Treasury regulations are interpretative in character and thus
exempt from the public notice and comment requirements by the
APA's own terms. 9 In individual rulemaking efforts, Treasury has
explicitly asserted the APA's good cause exception from notice and
comment.1 0 Notwithstanding these claims, Treasury purports to utilments.

6 The Internal Revenue Code delegates authority for promulgating regulations
to the Secretary of the Treasury. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1502 (West Supp. 2006); I.R.C.
§ 7805(a) (2000). The Treasury Department formally issues all Treasury regulations
interpreting the Internal Revenue Code, and Treasury's Office of Tax Policy is significantly involved in reviewing and drafting Treasury regulations. Historically, however,
the Office of Chief Counsel of the IRS has performed the function of initially drafting
most Treasury regulations. See I.R.S., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 32.1.1.4.4, (Aug.
11, 2004), http://www.irs.gov/irm [hereinafter INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL]; see also
LEANDRA LEDERMAN & STEPHEN W.

MAZZA, TAX CONTROVERSIES §

1.04 (2d ed. 2002)

(comparing Treasury and IRS involvement in regulation drafting); Paul F. Schmid,
The Tax Regulations Making Process-Then and Now, 24 TAX LAw. 541, 542-46 (1971)
(describing historic procedures for promulgating Treasury regulations). Accordingly,
reference to Treasury and its practices in the course of this Article generally include
both Treasury and the IRS.
7 Tax professionals tend to refer to the Internal Revenue Code as "the Code"
rather than "the I.R.C." In this Article, however, I will use the latter to avoid confusion between the Internal Revenue Code, the U.S. Code, and the Code of Federal
Regulations, all of which are cited regularly herein.
8 See Treas. Reg. § 601.601 (a) (2) (as amended in 1987) ("Where required by 5
U.S.C. [§] 553 and in such other instances as may be desirable, the Commissioner [or
the Director, as applicable,] publishes in the Federal Register general notice of proposed rules ...."); INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 6, §§ 32.1.2.3, ("Several
Federal administrative laws and procedures apply to the regulatory process .... The
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires agencies to publish Notices of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRMs) in the Federal Register and permit the public to submit comments."); see also id. § 32.1.5.4.7.5.1 (making similar statement).
9 See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 32.1.5.4.7.5.1 ("Interpretative
rules are not subject to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. [§] 553(b), (c), and (d). Although
most IRS/Treasury regulations are interpretative, and therefore not subject to these
provisions of the APA, the IRS usually solicits public comments on all NPRMs."); see
also id. § 32.1.2.3 (articulating similar position).
Temporary Regulations; Guidance Under Section 1502; Treatment of
10 See, e.g.,
Loss Carryovers From Separate Return Limitation Years (T.D. 9155), 69 Fed. Reg.
51,175 (Aug. 18, 2004), 2004-2 C.B. 562; Final and Temporary Regulations; Effect of
Elections in Certain Multi-Step Transactions (T.D. 9071), 68 Fed. Reg. 40,766 (July 9,
2003), 2003-2 C.B. 560, 561; Temporary Regulations; Distributions of Interests in a
Loss Corporation From Qualified Trusts (T.D. 9063), 68 Fed. Reg. 38,177 (June 27,
2003), 2003-2 C.B. 510, 511; see also infra Part III.A.3 (discussing the good cause
exception and its application.
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ize notice-and-comment rulemaking in promulgating most Treasury
regulations. II
While a few scholars have noted certain aspects of Treasury's
practices as potentially inconsistent with APA requirements, 12 to date
no one has undertaken to study Treasury's APA compliance empirically. This Article documents a study of 232 separate regulatory
projects interpreting the I.R.C. for which Treasury published Treasury
Decisions (T.D.s)l 3 and notices of proposed rulemaking (NPRMs) in
the Federal Register between January 1, 2003 through December 31,
2005. In connection with this study, this Article compares Treasury's
actual practices and exemption claims with current doctrinal trends in
courts evaluating compliance with APA requirements across administrative agencies. The Article concludes that Treasury often fails to
adhere to APA rulemaking requirements and thus leaves many of its
regulations, including some of its most complex and controversial
efforts, open to legal challenge on that basis.
Almost as often as not, Treasury does not follow the traditional
APA-required pattern of issuing an NPRM, accepting and considering
public comments, and only then publishing its final regulations.
Established statutory exceptions from APA reulemaking requirements
do not generally apply to excuse this noncompliance. Contrary to
11 See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 32.1.2.3 ("[A]Ithough
most IRS/Treasury regulations are interpretative, the IRS usually publishes its NPRMs
in the Federal Register and solicits public comments."); see also id. § 32.1.5.4.7.5.1
(making similar claim).
12 See Michael Asimow, Public Participationin the Adoption of Temporay Tax Regulations, 44 TAX LAW. 343, 369-70 (1991) (concluding that "Treasury's practice of adopting temporary regulations thus leaves in doubt the validity of numerous temporary
and final regulations"); John F. Coverdale, Chevron's Reduced Domain:Judicial Review
of Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REv. 39, 69-70
(2003) (noting Treasury's use of temporary regulations and questioning Treasury's
basis for doing so); Juan J. Lavilla, The Good Cause Exemption to Notice and Comment
Rulemaking Requirements Under the Administrative ProcedureAct, 3 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 317,
341 (1989) (describing the IRS's comparative misuse of the good cause exemption as
"particularly remarkable");Juan F. Vasquez, Jr. & Peter A. Lowy, ChallengingTemporary
Treasury Regulations: An Analysis of the Administrative Procedure Act, Legislative Reenactment Doctrine, Deference, and Invalidity, 3 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 248, 252-54 (2003)
(describing Treasury's practice of issuing temporary regulations as "obliterat[ing] the
APA's notice-and-comment procedures" and "an abuse of the process as well as an
abuse of discretion").
13 Treasury Decisions are the format that the Treasury Department uses to adopt
legally binding Treasury regulations. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note
6,§ 32.1.1.4 (describing Treasury regulations as "the most authoritative form of published guidance" interpreting the tax laws); Coverdale, supranote 12, at 67-68 (recognizing binding nature of Treasury regulations).
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Treasury's position, most if not all Treasury regulations are legislative
rather than interpretative in character when considered in light of
modern doctrinal standards for distinguishing those categories. Consequently, Treasury regulations generally do not qualify for the interpretative rule exception from the APA's public notice and comment
requirements. The procedural rule exception from notice and comment may apply occasionally, but not in most cases. Treasury may on
occasion have a reasonable basis for claiming good cause; but Treasury's reliance on the good cause exception is typically poorly justified
and often misplaced in light ofjurisprudential trends. Thus, although
Treasury usually does solicit public comment in the course of promulgating final regulations, Treasury's rulemaking practices are frequently inconsistent with APA requirements, or at least skirt doctrinal
lines.
To support these conclusions, Part I of the Article briefly surveys
the APA's rulemaking requirements generally and Treasury's
rulemaking authority specifically. Part II outlines the study of Treasury's actual practices and its findings. Part III compares Treasury's
practices with prevailing legal doctrine to demonstrate the weaknesses
in Treasury's practices. Part IV offers a theory of why Treasury's practices so often deviate from APA rulemaking requirements. Part V discusses the implications of Treasury's actions.
This project raises at least as many questions as it answers. For
example, in other areas of administrative law, regulated parties and
public interest groups stand ready to challenge virtually any perceived
failure to satisfy APA procedural requirements. If so many Treasury
regulations are susceptible to legal challenge on such grounds, then
why have so few taxpayers raised such claims?' 4 Also, and perhaps
relatedly, in many other areas of administrative law, regulated parties
challenge regulations immediately post-promulgation. The courts
thus have the opportunity to review and remand regulations before
they govern regulated party behavior. Tax historically has been an
area of post-enforcement litigation only, meaning that the cases
require the courts to reach some conclusion as to the litigant taxpayer's tax liability. Under such circumstances, what remedy can the
courts offer taxpayers for procedurally challenged regulations? These
and other interesting questions raised by this Article will simply have
to wait for another day.

14

See, e.g., Hosp. Corp. of Am. & Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, 348 F.3d 136, 145 n.3

(6th Cir. 2003) (noting taxpayer's choice not to challenge temporary Treasury regulation as violation of APA section 553 and therefore not reaching that issue).
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APA's RULEMAKING REQUIREMENTS AND TREASURY'S
RULEMAKING AUTHORITY

APA section 553 imposes several procedural requirements upon
agencies engaging in rulemaking. The I.R.C. in turn gives Treasury
the authority to promulgate rules. It is well established that Congress
may and often does include in an organic statute like the I.R.C. provisions deviating from APA requirements. Although Treasury's
rulemaking efforts generally fall within the APA's scope, the I.R.C.
includes a few tax-specific provisions that deviate from administrative
law norms. To provide a context for comparing Treasury's actual
practices to the APA's rulemaking requirements, therefore, this Part
will summarize briefly APA section 553 and the I.R.C. provisions granting rulemaking authority to Treasury and dictating how Treasury may
exercise that power.
A.

General Rulemaking Requirements of the APA

APA section 553 does two things. First, it imposes a series of
default procedural requirements for agencies to follow in promulgating rules. 15 Second, APA section 553 provides several exceptions from
16
some or all of those requirements.
Beginning with the default procedures, APA section 553(b) first
requires an agency to provide public notice of its proposed rulemaking through publication in the Federal Register.1 7 Among other
things, such notice must specify the legal authority under which the
agency is proposing to promulgate rules.18 In addition, the notice
must offer "either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a
description of the subjects and issues involved."'19 Consequently, the
courts generally do not allow agencies to promulgate final rules with
20
Put
provisions not "sufficiently foreshadowed" by an NPRM.
another way, final rules must be a "logical outgrowth" of those
21
proposed.
15 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2000).
16 Id. § 553(b)(A), (B).
17 See id. § 553(b).
18 See id.
19 Id.
20 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 279 F.3d 1180, 1187-88 (9th Cir.
2002); Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 168 F.3d 1344, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also 1 PIERCE,
supra note 2, § 7.3, at 428-29 (discussing the "sufficiently foreshadowed" test).
21 See, e.g., Envtl. Integrity Project v. EPA, 425 F.3d 992, 996 (D.C. Cir. 2005);
NaturalRes. Def. Council,279 F.3d at 1186; Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Mine Safety & Health
Admin., 116 F.3d 520, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also 1 PIERCE, supra note 2, § 7.3, at
428-29 (equating the "logical outgrowth" test and the "sufficiently foreshadowed"
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Next, APA section 553(c) commands the agency pursuing the
rulemaking process to offer interested persons an opportunity to participate through the submission of written comments. 2 2 Then, upon
issuing final regulations, the agency must include a "concise general
statement of their basis and purpose." 23 Legislative history indicates
that Congress intended this statement to explain the final regulations
promulgated; 24 and the courts rely heavily on the statement to facilitate judicial review. 25 Hence, to satisfy judicial expectations, preambles to final regulations tend to be more comprehensive than concise,
including detailed discussions of the regulations' goals and methods,
26
negative comments received, and the agency's responses thereto.
Finally, a rule will not be effective until at least thirty days after it
is published in the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.).27 The reason for this delay is to give affected parties time to conform their contest); Phillip M. Kannan, The Logical Outgrowth Doctrine in Rulemaking, 48 ADMIN. L.
REv.213, 217 (1996) (same).
22

See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).

23 Id.
24 S. Doc. No. 79-248, at 20 (1946) (specifying that the concise statement of basis
and purpose should be "fully explanatory of the complete factual and legal basis as
well as the real object or objects sought"); see also Schiller v. Towner Semiconductor
Ltd., 449 F.3d 286, 302-03 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm.
v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); United Mine Workers v. Dole, 870 F.2d
662, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting same); Tanker Owners, 809 F.2d at 852 (quoting
APA legislative history).
25 Alvarado Cmty. Hosp. v. Shalala, 155 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Mt. Diablo Hosp. v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1226, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 1993), amended by 166 F.3d
950 (9th Cir. 1999)); see also Simms v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 45 F.3d
999, 1005 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d
330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968)). Courts engaging in such review must take care not to
impose procedural requirements beyond those required by the APA. See Vt. Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 541-48 (1978)
(rejecting additional procedures imposed by Court of Appeals as necessary "to ventilate the issues"). But see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1983) (supporting "hard look" review of agency process under
the arbitrary and capricious standard of APA section 706(2) (A)).
26

Richard Pierce describes the typical statement of basis and purpose as one
in which the agency refers to the evidentiary basis for all factual predicates,
explains its method of reasoning from factual predicates to the expected
effects of the rule, relates the factual predicates and expected effects of the
rule to each of the statutory goals or purposes the agency is required to
further or to consider, responds to all major criticisms contained in the comments on its proposed rule, and explains why it has rejected at least some of
the most plausible alternatives to the rule it has adopted.
1 PIERCE, supra note 2, § 7.4, at 442.

27

See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d).
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duct to the mandates of the new rule. 28 The language of APA section
553(d) allows agencies to postpone effectiveness for more than thirty
days; and the courts occasionally require longer waiting periods. 29
Proposed rules offer guidance as to the agency's interpretation of
the relevant statute but are not legally binding on regulated parties,
the courts, or even necessarily the agency itself.30 Final rules may be
legally binding, but if so they take effect only after the prescribed
thirty-day period. Known collectively as notice-and-comment rulemaking, the requirements of APA section 553 anticipate a process by
which an agency will issue proposed regulations and solicit public participation in the rulemaking process before issuing regulations with
legally binding force.
APA section 553 grants four principal exceptions from the public
notice and comment requirements of APA section 553(b) and (c): for
interpretative rules, procedural rules, policy statements, and good
cause.3 1 As is discussed at length in Part III, whether Treasury complies with APA rulemaking requirements depends largely upon the
extent to which these exceptions apply to many or most Treasury regulations. The APA does not define interpretative rules, procedural
rules, or policy statements. Consequently, as is discussed at length in
Part II1, the courts have struggled in applying the exceptions for interpretative and procedural rules. 32 The good cause exception applies
when notice and public comment would be "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." 33 APA section 553(b) also
directs an agency asserting the good cause exception to do so
expressly and to explain its reasoning when issuing the related final
28 See I PIERCE, supra note 2, § 7.3, at 424.
29 See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Indep. Television Producers & Distributs. v. FCC, 502
F.2d 249, 254-55 (2d Cir. 1974) (deeming eight-month waiting period inadequate).
30 See United States v. Springer, 354 F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Sweet
v. Sheahan, 235 F.3d 80, 87 (2d Cir. 2000)); Tedori v. United States, 211 F.3d 488, 492

& n.13 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833, 845 (1986) ("It goes without saying that a proposed regulation does not
represent an agency's considered interpretation of its statute and that an agency is
entitled to consider alternative interpretations before settling on the view it considers
most sound.").
31 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). APA section 553 also provides blanket exceptions for rules
involving military or foreign affairs and rules "relating to agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts." Id. § 553(a).
These exceptions are not relevant for the purposes of this Article.
32 See generally Robert A. Anthony, "Interpretive"Rules, "Legislative"Rules and "Spurious" Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. Am. U. 1, 2-6 (1994) (discussing the difficulty); John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 CEO. WASH. L. REv. 893, 893-97
(2004) (same).

33 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B).
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regulations. 34 APA section 553(d) (3) separately allows an agency to

invoke the good cause exception to avoid the thirty-day advance publi35
cation period for final rules.

B.

Treasury's Rulemaking Authority

The requirements and exceptions of APA section 553 only apply
when an agency is engaged in rulemaking. The I.R.C. expressly contemplates that Treasury will engage in rulemaking in administering its
provisions. The I.R.C. also includes a few specific procedural provisions that supplement APA section 553.
The I.R.C. explicitly grants Treasury broad interpretative authority over the I.R.C.'s provisions.3 6 Frequently, that power is conveyed
through a specific authorization or mandate to promulgate regulations to fill a congressionally identified statutory gap.3

7

In fact, the

I.R.C. contains several hundred specific authority grants. 38 I.R.C.
§ 1502 may be the broadest of these, giving the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to develop whatever regulations he deems necessary
to reflect clearly the income tax liability of groups of affiliated corporations filing a single return, whether or not such regulations differ
from those that apply to corporations filing separately. 39 Most specific
authority grants are more limited, as for example with I.R.C. § 23(i),
which calls for implementing regulations to effectuate detailed statu40
tory language providing a tax credit for qualified adoption expenses.
Additionally, I.R.C. § 7805 (a) grants Treasury the general rulemaking
authority to develop "all needful rules and regulations for the enforce34

Id.

35

Id. § 553(d)(3).

36 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1502 (West. Supp. 2006); I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2000); see also discussion supra note 6 and accompanying text.
37 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 163(i)(5), 167(e)(6), 357(d)(3), 453(j)(1), 952(d), 1502
(West Supp. 2006). A search conducted on February 23, 2007 on Westlaw's "Federal
Taxation-U.S. Code Annotated" database for specific authority delegations derived
from just one common phrasing, "Secretary shall" /s "prescribe" /s "regulations,"
resulted in 293 hits.
38 See, e.g., id. §§ 163(i) (5), 167(e) (6), 357(d)(3), 453(j)(1), 952(d), 1502; see also
N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N TAX SECTION, REPORT ON LEGISLATIVE GRANTS OF REGULATORY

2-6 (Nov. 3, 2006), available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/Content
Groups/SectionInformationl/TaxSectionReports/l121rpt.pdf (claiming and categorizing more than 550 specific authority grants) [hereinafter N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N

AUTHORITy

REPORT].

39

See I.R.C. § 1502.
40 See I.R.C. § 23(i) (West Supp. 2006); see also N.Y.
supra note 38, at 2-6 (listing numerous examples).

STATE
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ASs'N REPORT,

1736

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 82:5

ment of' the I.R.C. 41 Treasury has utilized both specific and general
42
rulemaking authority to adopt thousands of pages of regulations.
Treasury, the courts, and the tax bar all regard general as well as specific authority Treasury regulations to be legally binding on the gov43
ernment as well as on taxpayers.
The I.R.C. does not specify particular procedures for Treasury to
follow in promulgating its regulations. Treasury generally acknowledges that the APA applies for this purpose; 44 and under APA section
553, Treasury must utilize notice-and-comment rulemaking to promulgate Treasury regulations unless one of the available exceptions
applies. The Internal Revenue Manual maintains that "most" Treasury regulations are interpretative rules exempt from the APA's public
notice and comment requirements, even though Treasury "usually
publishes its NPRMs in the Federal Register and solicits public comments. '4 5 The Internal Revenue Manual also discusses the possibility
that the good cause exception may sometimes apply to its rulemaking
efforts. 4 6 Thus, two unresolved questions are whether Treasury is correct that most of its regulations fall into the interpretative category
and the extent to which other exceptions from APA rulemaking
requirements such as the good cause exception might apply.
Congress has adopted a few tax-specific procedural rules which
must be reconciled with the APA's rulemaking procedures, however.
The first involves the effective date for Treasury regulations. As
already noted, APA section 553(d) generally requires regulations to
be published in the Federal Register thirty days before they become
effective. 47 This delay in effective date is coupled with a general pre41
42

I.R.C. § 7805(a).
A recent check demonstrated that Treasury regulations interpreting the I.R.C.

consume twenty volumes of the Code of Federal Regulations.
43

See, e.g., Haffner's Serv. Stations, Inc. v. Comm'r, 326 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2003)

(recognizing binding force of Treasury regulations); Suzy's Zoo v. Comm'r, 273 F.3d
875, 881 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (same); INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 6,
§ 32.1.1.4 (same); Coverdale, supra note 12, at 66-69 (discussing binding nature of
Treasury regulations); Irving Salem et al., ABA Section of Taxation Report of the Task
Force on JudicialDeference, 57 TAX LAW.717, 737-44 (2004).
44 See discussion supra note 8 and accompanying text.

45

INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL,

supranote 6, § 32.1.2.3; see also id. § 32.1.5.4.7.5.1

(noting that "most IRS/Treasury regulations are interpretative, and therefore not
subject to these provisions of the APA").
46 Id. § 32.1.5.4.7.5.1 (noting that APA section 553(b) and (c) "do not apply if
the agency finds that publishing an NPRM is impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary
to the public interest," and providing sample language "[i]f the agency determines
that notice and comment is contrary to the public interest").
47 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (2000); see also supra text accompanying note 35.
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sumption against retroactive rulemaking "unless that power is conveyed by express terms" by statute. 48 By contrast, I.R.C. § 7805(b) (1)
states explicitly that a Treasury regulation may apply to a taxable
period ending on or after the earliest of three dates: (1) the date that
Treasury files the final regulation with the Federal Register, (2) the
date on which Treasury filed with the Federal Register any proposed
or temporary regulation to which the final regulation relates, or (3)
the date on which Treasury publicly issued any notice describing the
expected contents of the regulation. 49 I.R.C. § 7805(b) further allows
full retroactivity under specified circumstances: for regulations involving internal Treasury procedures, for regulations that correct procedural defects of prior regulations, for regulations issued within
eighteen months after Congress enacts the related statutory provision,
and for regulations "to prevent abuse." 50 Finally, I.R.C. § 7805(b)(7)
gives Treasury the authority to allow taxpayers to elect to apply regulations to periods earlier than the dates specified in I.R.C.
§ 7805(b) (1). 5 1
The precise relationship between I.R.C. § 7805(b) and APA section 553(d) is unclear. A few courts have suggested that, as a specific
grant of authority, I.R.C. § 7805(b) takes precedence over the more
general APA § 553(d).52 However, the cases addressing this issue all
considered an earlier version of I.R.C. § 7805(b) that required Treasury to state affirmatively the extent to which a regulation would not
be applied retroactively-the opposite of the current statutory presumption. 5 3 Congress adopted the present, more prospectively-oriented language of I.R.C. § 7805(b) in 199654 out of fairness concerns
and to limit Treasury's discretion in making its regulations retroactively applicable.5 5 On its face, I.R.C. § 7805(b) (1) gives Treasury substantial discretion to apply regulations retroactively at least to the date
48 Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 204 (1988).
49 I.R.C. § 7805(b)(1)(A)-(C) (2000).
50 Id.§ 7805(b)(2)-(5).
51 Id.§ 7805(b) (7).
52 See, e.g., Stamos v. Comm'r, 95 T.C. 624, 637-38 (1990) (suggesting that I.R.C.
§ 7805(b) takes precedence over APA section 553(d)), affd, 956 F.2d 1168 (9th Cir.
1992); see also Redhouse v. Comm'r, 728 F.2d 1249, 1253 (9th Cir. 1984) (same).
53 See I.R.C. § 7805(b) (1994) ("The Secretary may prescribe the extent, if any, to
which any ruling or regulation, relating to the internal revenue laws, shall be applied
without retroactive effect."); see also Redhouse, 728 F.2d at 1250-51 (discussing the
presumption in favor of retroactivity that the pre-1996 language raised).
54 See Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452, 1468-69 (1996).
55 See BenjaminJ. Cohen & Catherine A. Harrington, Is the InternalRevenue Service
Bound By Its Own Regulations and Rulings?, TAx LAW., Summer 1998, at 675, 697-701
(discussing the history of the 1996 amendments to I.R.C. § 7805(b)).
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of proposal, while the other language in I.R.C. § 7805(b) articulates
5 6
limited circumstances permitting even further retroactive effect.

Any exercise of such discretion would render APA section 553(d)
superfluous as a practical matter. Yet the potential for retroactive
application is not necessarily inconsistent with the general rule of a
delayed effective date. The reasons for amending I.R.C. § 7805(b) in
1996 may support a narrower interpretation of I.R.C. § 7805(b) that
coordinates more closely with APA section 553(b) and gives effect to
both statutes, for example by requiring Treasury to show good cause
before invoking its authority under I.R.C. § 7805(b).
The I.R.C. more clearly deviates from APA section 553 with I.R.C.
§ 9833. In that section, Congress expressly gave Treasury limited
authority to issue "interim final rules" to carry out the provisions of
Chapter 100 of the I.R.C. 5 7 Interim final rules are temporary but
legally binding regulations issued without notice and comment for
which an agency typically seeks post-promulgation public comment
prior to finalization. 58 Agencies may issue interim final or temporary
regulations under the APA, but only where one of the expressed
exceptions from notice and comment applies. 59 By contrast, I.R.C.
§ 9833 specifically authorizes interim final rules whether or not one of
those exceptions is available.
One could argue that I.R.C. § 7805(e), read broadly, represents a
6°
third I.R.C.-specific departure from APA rulemaking requirements.
I.R.C. § 7805(e) does two things. First, I.R.C. § 7 805(e) (1) states that,
56 A decision to make a regulation retroactively applicable pursuant to I.R.C.
§ 7805(b) would be subject to judicial review for abuse of discretion. See, e.g.,
Redhouse, 728 F.2d at 1251 (citing Auto. Club of Mich. v. Comm'r, 353 U.S. 180, 184
(1957); Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 2d 608,
620-21, 623 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
57 I.R.C. § 9833 (2000). I.R.C. § 9833 reads in its entirety as follows:
The Secretary, consistent with section 104 of the Health Care Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996, may promulgate such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this chapter. The Secretary may promulgate any interim final rules as the Secretary determines are

appropriate to carry out this chapter.
Id. Chapter 100 consists of a mere eight I.R.C. sections governing group health plan
requirements: I.R.C. §§ 9801-03, 9811, 9831-33 (2000); I.R.C. § 9812 (West Supp.
2006).
58 See Notice; Administrative Conference of the United States, Adoption of Recommendations, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,108, 43,111-12 (Aug. 18, 1995) (describing interim
final regulations).
59 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (B) (2000); Adoption of Recommendations, 60 Fed. Reg. at
43,111-12.
60 See Asimow, supra note 12, at 362-64 (acknowledging and rejecting this
argument).
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if Treasury issues a temporary regulation, it must also publish a corresponding NPRM. 6 1 Second, I.R.C. § 7805(e) (2) sunsets temporary
regulations after three years. 62 Because I.R.C. § 7805(e) clearly contemplates that Treasury will issue temporary regulations, one could
argue that I.R.C. § 7805(e), like I.R.C. § 9833, authorizes Treasury to
promulgate temporary regulations whether or not the APA section
553(b) exceptions apply.
Reading I.R.C. § 7805(e) thusly seems overly broad. I.R.C.
§ 7805(e) at best only implies such authorization to the extent it
acknowledges that Treasury in fact issues temporary regulations by
telling Treasury what to do if it does. Since APA section 553(b) allows
Treasury to issue temporary regulations if one of that provision's
exceptions apply, it is not necessary to read I.R.C. § 7 805(e) as independent authorization for temporary regulations in order to give that
provision effect. By comparison, the more explicit language of I.R.C.
§ 9833 demonstrates that Congress knows how to authorize temporary
or interim final regulations absent one of the APA section 553(b)
exceptions when it means to do so. Further, while Congress could
have addressed the problem of longstanding temporary Treasury regulations by barring them entirely, doing so would have rendered the
I.R.C. less flexible than the APA by precluding such regulations even
where Treasury can demonstrate that good cause or another APA section 553(b) exception applies.
Moreover, a narrow reading of I.R.C. § 7805 (e) better effectuates
the congressional purpose behind that provision. No meaningful legislative history explains Congress's intent with I.R.C. § 7805(e);63 but
scholars have documented the general understanding that Congress
sought to end Treasury's then-habit of adopting and never finalizing
temporary regulations and, correspondingly, to ensure that Treasury
at least sought post-promulgation public comment in response to temporary regulations. 64 If Congress adopted I.R.C. § 7 805(e) with an
eye toward facilitating public participation in Treasury's rulemaking
61 See I.R.C. § 7805(e) (1) (2000) ("Any temporary regulation issued by the Secretary shall also be issued as a proposed regulation.").
62 See id. § 7805(e) (2) ("Any temporary regulation shall expire within three years
after the date of issuance of such regulation.").
63 The Senate and Conference Committee reports merely reiterate the provisions
of I.R.C. § 7805(e) without offering further insight into congressional intent. See S.
REP. No. 100-309, at 7 (1988); H.R. RP. No. 100-1104, at 217-18 (1988), as reprinted
in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5048, 5048-54.
64 See Asimow, supra note 12, at 363-64 (discussing history of I.R.C. § 7805(e));
see also Vasquez & Lowy, supra note 12, at 254 (noting similar reasons for adopting
I.R.C. § 7805(e)).
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process, then a more narrow reading of I.R.C. § 7805(e) that still permits Treasury to adopt temporary regulations only when one of the
APA section 553(b) exceptions applies better accomplishes that goal.
In fact, one could and probably should read I.R.C. § 7 805 (e) as applying even to interim final rules issued pursuant to I.R.C. § 9833 for the
same reason.
The argument for reading I.R.C. § 7805(e) broadly as a tax-specific exception from APA rulemaking requirements is a plausible one,
but it stretches the text and ignores Congress's reputed concern for
public participation in the promulgation of Treasury regulations. In
sum, therefore, I.R.C. § 7805(b) may alter the thirty-day effective date
delay of APA section 553(d), and I.R.C. § 9833 provides a very limited
additional exception from the pre-promulgation notice and comment
requirements of APA section 553(b) and (c); but most Treasury regulations must either follow notice-and-comment rulemaking or qualify
65
for one of APA section 553(b)'s exceptions therefrom.
II.

EMPIRICAL STUDY: WHAT TREASURY ACTUALLY DOES

As already noted, Treasury claims generally to follow notice-andcomment rulemaking even as it characterizes most Treasury regulations as interpretative rules exempt from the requirements of APA section 553.66 As a regular reader of Treasury's T.D.s and NPRMs, my

own sense has been that Treasury's adherence to APA procedural
requirements is inconsistent and its claims to exemptions are exaggerated. The goal of this study was to test empirically the accuracy of
those impressions.
A.

Methodology

To evaluate Treasury's faithfulness to APA rulemaking requirements, the study reviewed 232 separate regulatory projects for which
65 Theoretically one might also argue that I.R.C. § 7805(b) and (e) together displace APA section 553 notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements entirely in the
tax context. Such an interpretation is simply implausible. The APA by its own terms
requires Congress expressly to adopt any exceptions from its requirements. See 5
U.S.C. § 559 (2000). "Exceptions from the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act
are not lightly to be presumed" given that explicit statutory requirement. Marcello v.
Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955); see also Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155 (1999)
(recognizing uniformity as a goal of the APA and requiring clear statutory intent to
deviate from that norm). While I.R.C. § 7805(b) and (e) clearly impose a tax-specific
gloss on APA notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements, I.R.C. § 7805 is insuffi-

ciently comprehensive to suggest an alternative procedural scheme for promulgating
regulations.
66 See discussion supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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Treasury published T.D.s or NPRMs in the Federal Register between
January 1, 2003, and December 31, 2005. I limited the study to three
years for manageability, and chose this period as the most recent and
thus the most indicative of Treasury's current practices. Although the
entire period studied falls within a single presidential administration,
the Treasury and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) positions most
directly responsible for promulgating Treasury regulations experienced substantial turnover during those three years. 6 7 Other scholars
documented similar practices almost twenty years ago; and informal
conversations with former Treasury and IRS officials and attorneys
likewise suggest that this period is not particularly aberrational. 68
Future research could ascertain whether or not this is the case.
Treasury published 203 T.D.s and 163 NPRMs in the Federal Register during the three years studied. 69 In almost all of these T.D.s and
NPRMs, Treasury relied on provisions of the I.R.C. as giving it the
authority to promulgate regulations. Four T.D.s that Treasury issued
during the period studied-T.D.s 9227, 9201, 9165, and 9086involved the exercise solely of rulemaking authority granted by other
statutes.7 0 While such regulatory projects bear upon the Treasury's
67 For example, Treasury's Office of Tax Policy and the Internal Revenue Service
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Tax Policy) heads Treasury's Office of Tax Policy.
In the three years studied, Mark Weinberger and Pamela Olson both served as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Tax Policy), Gregory Jenner held that position in an
Acting capacity, and Eric Solomon handled the regulatory guidance responsibilities of
the job beginning in December 2004 as Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy) and Deputy Assistant Secretary (Regulatory Affairs). Charles Rossotti and Mark
Everson both served as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and B. John Williams and
Donald Korb both held the position of I.R.C. Chief Counsel during the period
studied.
68 See discussion supra note 12 and accompanying text (citing corresponding
scholarly observations from the past twenty years); see also discussion infra Part V
(describing the evolution of Treasury's noncompliance with the APA and pursuit of
other objectives).
69 In particular, Treasury published T.D.s 9035 through 9236 and also T.D. 9238
in the Federal Register between January 1, 2003, and December 31, 2005. SeeTemporary Regulations; Guidance Under Section 7874 for Determining Ownership by Former Shareholders or Partners of Domestic Entities (T.D. 9238), 70 Fed. Reg. 76,685
(Dec. 28, 2005); Final and Temporary Regulations; Constructive Transfers and Transfers of Property to a Third Party on Behalf of a Spouse (T.D. 9035), Fed. Reg. 1534
(Jan. 13, 2003). Although Treasury released T.D. 9237 on December 30, 2005, Treasury did not publish that T.D. in the Federal Register until January 3, 2006. See Final
Regulations; Designated Roth Contributions to Cash or Deferred Arrangements
Under Section 401(k) (T.D. 9237), 71 Fed. Reg. 6 (Jan. 3, 2006). Accordingly, the
study did not include T.D. 9237.
70 T.D. 9227 addressed regulations concerning the IRS's employee performance
evaluation system issued pursuant to a provision in Title 5 of the U.S. Code granting
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efforts to administer the I.R.C. and taxpayers' attempts to meet their
tax obligations, because these T.D.s do not purport to exercise Treasury's authority to promulgate regulations under the I.R.C., I
excluded them from the study. I also eliminated T.D. 9166 from the
study due to its reliance on I.R.C. § 9833. 7 1 By contrast, I retained as
part of the study other T.D.s that relied upon I.R.C. § 7805(a)'s general rulemaking authority in conjunction with some other statutory
grant.

72

Considering each T.D. and NPRM independently is misleading.
Many T.D.s represent the culmination of Treasury's rulemaking proTreasury specific management authority over IRS personnel. Final and Temporary
Regulations; Balanced System for Measuring Organizational and Employee Performance Within the Internal Revenue Service (T.D. 9227), 70 Fed. Reg. 60,214 (Oct. 17,
2005), 2005-2 C.B. 924. Treasury issued T.D.s 9201 and 9165 in promulgating what
are known as the Circular 230 regulations, governing the practice by tax advisors
before the IRS. Final Regulations; Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service (T.D. 9201), 70 Fed. Reg. 28,824 (May 19, 2005), 2005-1 C.B.
1153; Final Regulations; Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue
Service (T.D. 9165), 69 Fed. Reg. 75,839 (Dec. 20, 2004), 2005-1 C.B. 357. Treasury
primarily exercised authority granted under Title 31 of the U.S. Code in developing
these regulations, and Treasury did not cite any provision of the I.R.C. as supporting
these regulations. Final Regulations (T.D. 9201), 70 Fed. Reg. at 28,824; Final Regulations (T.D. 9165), 69 Fed. Reg. at 75,840-41. Finally, T.D. 9086 adopted regulations
governing user fees charged in connection offers in compromise pursuant to the
Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1952, which is also codified at 31 U.S.C.
§ 1701 (2000). Final Regulations; User Fees for Processing Orders to Compromise
(T.D. 9086), 68 Fed. Reg. 48,785 (Aug. 15, 2003), 2003-2 C.B. 817.
71 See discussion supra note 57 and accompanying text (explaining the significance of I.R.C. § 9833). Issued by Treasury in conjunction with the Departments of
Labor and Health and Human Services, T.D. 9166 adopted final regulations implementing provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, 42 U.S.C.). Final Regulations; Health Coverage Portability for
Group Health Plans and Group Health Insurance Issuers Under HIPAA Titles I & IV
(T.D. 9166), 69 Fed. Reg. 78,720 (Dec. 30, 2004), 2005-1 C.B. 558. Although Treasury
also cited I.R.C. § 7805(a) and thus purported to exercise its general rulemaking
authority in T.D. 9166, I interpreted this reliance as secondary and thus less significant than Treasury's citation of I.R.C. § 9833.
72 For example, T.D.s 9070 and 9173 amend regulations charging a fee for copying exempt organization materials for purposes of I.R.C. § 6104 in accordance with
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
Final Regulations; Authority To Charge Fees for Furnishing Copies of Exempt Organizations' Material Open to Public Inspection (T.D. 9173), 70 Fed. Reg. 704 (Jan. 5,
2005), 2005-1 C.B. 557; Final Regulations; Authority To Charge Fees for Furnishing
Copies of Exempt Organizations' Material Open to Public Inspection (T.D. 9070), 68
Fed. Reg. 40,768 (July 9, 2003), 2003-2 C.B. 574. In promulgating these regulations,
Treasury relied upon regulatory authority granted to it by FOIA as well as I.R.C.
§ 7805(a).
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cess, issued either after Treasury issues an NPRM and collects and
considers public comments or when Treasury skips notice and comment altogether. 73 Where Treasury issued an NPRM and related subsequent T.D. both during the three-year period studied, I evaluated
these documents together as a single project. Often, however, Treasury puts out a T.D. with temporary regulations simultaneously with
the NPRM at the start of a project, then publishes another T.D. with
final regulations at the end of the project. 74 Where Treasury issued
two or more clearly related T.D.s during the three-year period, I evaluated them together as a single project to avoid double counting. Likewise, 102 of the 163 NPRMs that Treasury published in 2003, 2004,
and 2005 related to T.D.s issued in the same period. 75 I did not evaluate these NPRMs separately but rather grouped them with their
related T.D.s. Finally, Treasury occasionally issued more than one
NPRM in connection with the same regulatory project, typically as one
NPRM withdraws and replaces proposed regulations offered by

73 See, e.g., Final Regulations; Value of Life Insurance Contracts When Distributed
From a Qualified Retirement Plan (T.D. 9223), 70 Fed. Reg. 50,967 (Aug. 29, 2005),
2005-2 C.B. 591; Final Regulations; Electing Mark to Market for Marketable Stock
(T.D. 9123), 69 Fed. Reg. 24,071 (May 3, 2004), 2004-1 C.B. 907, 908; Final Regulations; Guidance Regarding the Definition of Foreign Personal Holding Company
Income (T.D. 9039), 68 Fed. Reg. 4916 (Jan. 31, 2003), 2003-1 C.B. 561.
74 See, e.g., Final Regulations, Temporary Regulations, and Removal of Temporary Regulations; Guidance Under Section 1502; Application of Section 108 to Members of a Consolidated Group (T.D. 9192), 70 Fed. Reg. 14,395 (Mar. 22, 2005), 20051 C.B. 866 (finalizing and removing temporary regulations issued in T.D. 9117, 2004-1
C.B. 721; T.D. 9098, 2003-2 C.B. 1248; and T.D. 9089, 2003-2 C.B. 906); Final and
Temporary Regulations; Information Reporting and Backup Withholding for Payment Card Transactions (T.D. 9136), 69 Fed. Reg. 41,938 (Jul. 13, 2004), 2004-2 C.B.
112 (finalizing and removing temporary regulations issued in T.D. 9041, 2003-1 C.B.
510); Final Regulations and Removal of Temporary Regulations; Excise Tax Relating
to Structured Settlement Factoring Transactions (T.D. 9134), 69 Fed. Reg. 41,192
(July 8, 2004), 2004-2 C.B. 70 (finalizing and removing temporary regulations issued
in T.D. 9042, 2003-1 C.B. 564); Final Regulations and Removal of Temporary Regulations; Tax Return Preparers-Electronic Filing (T.D. 9119), 69 Fed. Reg. 15,248
(Mar. 25, 2004), 2004-1 C.B. 825 (finalizing and removing temporary regulations
issued in T.D. 9053, 2003-1 C.B. 914).
75 See, e.g., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Sickness or Accident Disability Payments, 70 Fed. Reg. 12,164 (Mar. 11, 2005) (proposing regulations finalized in T.D.
9233, 2006-3 I.R.B. 303); Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Designated Roth Contributions to Cash or Deferred Arrangements Under Section 401 (k), 70 Fed. Reg. 10,062
(Mar. 2, 2005) (proposing regulations finalized in T.D. 9237, 2006-6 I.R.B. 394);
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Treatment of a Stapled Foreign Corporation Under
Sections 269B and 367(b), 69 Fed. Reg. 54,067, 54,070-72 (Sept. 7, 2004) (proposing
regulations finalized in T.D. 9216, 2005-2 C.B. 461).

1744

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 82: 5

another, earlier NPRM. 7 6 I considered related NPRMs together as
one project where they fit this pattern. Altogether, the study groups
the 198 T.D.s retained and the 163 NPRMs into 232 separate regula-

tory projects.
Finally, for each of the 232 projects, I reviewed any related T.D.s
or NPRMs published prior to the three-year period. 77 Treasury regularly issues a variety of other miscellaneous notices in the Federal Register in connection with its projects: e.g., notices scheduling or
canceling public hearings, or correcting amendments. 78 I reviewed

76 See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Application of Normalization Accounting
Rules to Balances of Excess Deferred Income Taxes and Accumulated Deferred
Investment Tax Credits of Public Utilities Whose Assets Cease To Be Public Utility
Property, 70 Fed. Reg. 75,762, 75,764-65 (Dec. 21, 2005) (withdrawing and replacing
proposed regulations issued with earlier Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Application
of Normalization Accounting Rules to Balances of Excess Deferred Income Taxes and
Accumulated Deferred Investment Tax Credits of Public Utilities Whose Generation
Assets Cease to be Public Utility Property, 68 Fed. Reg. 10,190 (Mar. 4, 2003)); Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking; Partnership Equity for Services, 70 Fed. Reg. 29,675 (May
24, 2005) (withdrawing and replacing proposed regulations issued with earlier Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking; Treatment of Property Transferred in Connection With
Performance of Services, 36 Fed. Reg. 10,787 (June 3, 1971)); Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking; Corporate Reorganizations; Transfers of Assets or Stock Following a
Reorganization, 69 Fed. Reg. 51,209 (Aug. 18, 2004) (withdrawing and replacing proposed regulations issued with earlier Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Corporate
Reorganizations; Transfers of Assets or Stock Following a Reorganization, 69 Fed.
Reg. 9771 (Mar. 2, 2004)).
77 For example, T.D. 9036 finalized temporary regulations adopted by T.D. 8968,
which were issued simultaneously with a notice of proposed rulemaking. See Final
Regulations and Removal of Temporary Regulations; Disclosure of Returns and
Return Information by Other Agencies (T.D. 9036), 68 Fed. Reg. 2695 (Jan. 21,
2003), 2003-1 C.B. 533; Temporary Regulations (T.D. 8968), 66 Fed. Reg. 64,351
(Dec. 13, 2001), 2002-1 C.B. 274; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Disclosure of
Returns and Return Information by Other Agencies. 66 Fed. Reg. 64,386 (Dec. 13,
2001). In evaluating the project represented by T.D. 9036, I reviewed T.D. 8968 and
the corresponding NPRM.
78 See, e.g., Correction to Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Public
Hearing; Application of Normalization Accounting Rules, 70 Fed. Reg. 76,433 (Dec.
27, 2005) (correcting Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Guidance on Public Utilities,
70 Fed. Reg. 75,762); Cancellation of Notice of Public Hearing on Proposed Rulemaking; Source of Income From Certain Space and Ocean Activities; Source of Communications Income, 70 Fed. Reg. 73,967 (Dec. 14, 2005) (cancelling hearing announced
by Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Public Hearing; Source of Income
From Certain Space and Ocean Activities; Source of Communications Income, 70
Fed. Reg. 54,859 (Sept. 19, 2005)); Correcting Amendment; Guidance Under Section
951 for Determining Pro Rata Share, 70 Fed. Reg. 67,905 (Nov. 9, 2005) (correcting
T.D. 9222, 2005-2 C.B. 614).
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these as published through December 31, 2005, for each of the 232
projects as well.
The first step in the analysis was to identify what steps Treasury
formally follows in promulgating regulations interpreting the I.R.C.
As noted above, APA section 553 anticipates a particular sequence of
events, with public notice and opportunity for comment preceding
the issuance of final regulations along with a concise statement of
basis and purpose. Consistent with this sequencing, Treasury regularly published a T.D. with final regulations and an explanatory preamble only after it first issued an NPRM and evaluated public
comments. Projects represented only by one or more NPRMs for
which Treasury had not yet issued any T.D. are also consistent with
APA section 553. As noted, however, for other projects, Treasury
issued one T.D. with temporary regulations in conjunction with an
NPRM prior to seeking public comment and another T.D. upon finalizing the temporary regulations; and Treasury occasionally skipped
notice and comment altogether in issuing a T.D. with final regulations. Accordingly, for each project with one or more T.D.s, I asked
whether the regulations issued were temporary or final and whether
Treasury issued an NPRM before the T.D., simultaneously therewith,
or not at all.
Relatedly, the study also tracked explicit claims of exception from
the APA's public notice and comment requirements. Every T.D. and
NPRM included a preamble that discussed various aspects of the final,
temporary, or proposed regulations being issued. Every preamble
contained a section entitled "Special Analysis" wherein Treasury typically, though not always, stated its conclusion regarding the applicability of APA section 553(b). As discussed above, APA section 553(b)
states particularly that an agency invoking the good cause exception
should do so explicitly and explain its reasoning. 79 Accordingly, for
each T.D. and NPRM, I noted whether Treasury claimed that the published rules were exempt from APA section 553(b), whether Treasury
expressly asserted a particular exception under APA section
553(b) (B) and, if the answer to both of these questions was yes, then
which exception Treasury invoked.
The next step in the study evaluated the sources of authority on
which Treasury relied in issuing each set of proposed, temporary, or
final regulations. APA section 553(b) requires each NPRM to identify
the legal authority supporting the rules proposed,8 0 and Treasury
79 See supra text accompanying note 34; see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (B) (2000)
(requiring a "brief statement of reasons therefor").

80

5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(2)
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included in every T.D. and NPRM that it published a reference to the
I.R.C. provision or provisions upon which it relied. 8' As I discuss further below, whether Treasury exercises specific or general authority in
promulgating its regulations may indicate whether Treasury means to
invoke the interpretative rule exception from notice and comment.8 2
Accordingly, for each project, I documented whether Treasury relied
solely upon its general authority under IRC § 7805, a specific authority grant, or both.
Finally, just because an agency invites public participation does
not necessarily mean that the public responds. If the public shows no
interest in participating in the regulatory process, then does it matter
whether Treasury only pursues taxpayer input on temporary regulations post-promulgation? If a tree falls in the woods and no one is
there to hear it, does it make a sound? Treasury invited written comments in every NPRM and many if not most of the T.D.s studied.
Treasury often scheduled public hearings on proposed regulations
regardless of whether Treasury simultaneously issued temporary regulations. 8-3 Treasury noted in all T.D.s issued after notice and comment
whether it held public hearings or received comments. 8 4 Often,
81
See, e.g.,
Final Regulations; Reduced Maximum Exclusion of Gain from Sale or
Exchange of Principal Residence (T.D. 9152), 69 Fed. Reg. 50,302, 50,304 (Aug. 16,
2004), 2004-2 C.B. 509; Final and Temporary Regulations; Constructive Transfers and
Transfers to a Third Party on Behalf of a Spouse (T.D. 9035), 68 Fed. Reg. 1534, 1536
(Jan. 13, 2003), 2003-1 C.B. 528, 531; Cancellation of Notice Public Hearing on Proposed Rulemaking; Revisions to Regulations Relating to Withholding of Tax on Certain U.S. Source Income Paid to Foreign Persons and Revisions of Information
Reporting Regulations; Hearing Cancellation, 70 Fed. Reg. 40,675, 40,680 (July 14,
2005) (setting forth 26 U.S.C. § 7805 (2000) as authority).
82 See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
83 See, e.g., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking by Cross-Reference to Temporary
Regulations and Notice of Public Hearing; Clarification of Definitions, 69 Fed. Reg.
49,840 (Aug. 12, 2004) (scheduling public hearing regarding temporary regulations
issued T.D. 9153, 2004-2 C.B. 517); Notice of Proposed Rulemaking by Cross-Reference to Temporary Regulations and Notice of Public Hearing; Limitation on Use of
the Nonaccrual-Experience Method of Accounting Under Section 448(d) (5), 68 Fed.
Reg. 52,543 (Sept. 4, 2003) (scheduling public hearing regarding temporary regulations issued T.D. 9090, 2003-2 C.B. 891); Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice
of Public Hearing; Obligations of States and Political Subdivisions, 68 Fed. Reg.
25,845 (May 14, 2003) (scheduling public hearing regarding proposed regulations
finalized with T.D. 9234, 2006-4 I.R.B. 329).
84 See, e.g., Final Regulations and Removal of Temporary Regulations; Electronic
Payee Status (T.D. 9114), 69 Fed. Reg. 7567, 7567 (Feb. 18, 2004), 2004-1 C.B. 589,
590 ("The IRS received written comments on the proposed regulations. A public
hearing was held on July 25, 2001."); Final Regulations; Definition of Guaranteed
Annuity and Lead Unitrust Interests (T.D. 9068), 68 Fed. Reg. 40,130, 40,130 (July 7,
2003), 2003-2, C.B. 538 ("No public hearing was requested or held, but one written
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though not always, Treasury responded to comments by modifying its
proposed regulations before finalizing them. 8 5 Accordingly, for each
T.D. issued after notice and comment, I documented whether Treasury actually held public hearings or otherwise received comments
and whether Treasury modified its proposed regulations in finalizing
them.
Each of the questions asked was objective and binary: for example, Treasury either did or did not cite IRC § 7805 in each T.D. or
NPRM; and Treasury either did or did not claim the good cause
exception in each T.D. or NPRM. Evaluating the data simply involved
comparing the number of "yes" versus "no" answers for each set of
questions.
These are not the only questions worth evaluating. For example,
well-established doctrine interpreting APA section 553(c) requires
agencies to respond to all significant comments in promulgating final
regulations. 86 Which comments are sufficiently important to require
discussion in the statement of basis and purpose, however, is a subject
of much litigation and debate.8 7 Treasury responds to comments in
comment was received."); Final Regulations; Amendments to Rules for Determination
of Basis of Partner's Interest; Special Rules (T.D. 9049), 68 Fed. Reg. 12,815 (Mar. 18,
2003), 2003-1 C.B. 685 ("No written comments were received in response to the
notice of proposed rulemaking, and no public hearing was requested or held.").
85 See, e.g., Final Regulation; Corporate Reorganizations; Guidance on the Measurement of Continuity of Interest (T.D. 9225), 70 Fed. Reg. 54,631, 54,631-34 (Sept.
16, 2005), 2005-2 C.B. 716 (acknowledging and discussing comments received and
related changes to final regulations); Final Regulation; Remedial Actions Applicable
To Tax-Exempt Bonds Issued by State and Local Governments (T.D. 9150), 69 Fed.
Reg. 50,065, 50,065-66 (Aug. 13, 2004), 2004-2 C.B. 514 (same); Final Regulations
and Removal of Temporary Regulations; Certain Transfers of Property to Regulated
Investment Companies [RICs] and Real Estate Investment Trusts [REITs] (T.D.
9047), 68 Fed. Reg. 12,817, 12,818-19 (Mar. 18, 2003), 2003-1 C.B. 676 (same).
86 See, e.g., Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal. v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455, 467-68 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (citing rule and cases). But see Thompson v. Clark, 741 F.2d 401, 408-10 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (explaining that APA section 553(c) "has never been interpreted to require
the agency to respond to every comment, or to analyze every issue ... no matter how
insubstantial.").
87 See, e.g., Cent. & S.W. Servs. v. EPA, 220 F.3d 683, 692 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting
that the agency must address comments where it has specifically requested comments
and numerous comments are received on the matter); Reytblatt v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 105 F.3d 715, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that agency need not respond
to late comments even if it indicated it would consider them); Am. Mining Cong. v.
EPA, 965 F.2d 759, 771 (9th Cir. 1992) (claiming the agency need only address comments relevant to proposed rule); St. James Hosp. v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1460, 1469-70
(7th Cir. 1985) (arguing that agency failed to respond to comments that the study the
agency relied on was flawed); Thompson, 741 F.2d at 408-10 (finding that agency need
not respond to comments that do not contain "any meaningful analysis or data refut-
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the preambles to its T.D.s. Whether or not Treasury adequately
addresses all significant comments is a different question, and a highly
subjective one. For reasons of manageability, this study leaves such
inquiries for future work. Frankly, the findings generated by the easy
questions raised enough cause for concern.
B.

Findings

With most of its regulatory efforts, Treasury at some point does
publish an NPRM in the Federal Register, request and consider public
comments, and issue its final regulations with a detailed explanatory
preamble. Treasury does not always comply with APA section 553 in
doing so, however.
In 95 of the 232 rulemaking projects during the surveyed threeyear period, or 40.9% of the total, Treasury did not follow the traditional APA procedures of issuing only a notice of proposed rulemaking with proposed regulations first, to be followed later by final
regulations after a period for public comments and Treasury consideration thereof.8 8 In 84 of those projects, or 36.2% of all projects, Treasury instead issued legally-binding temporary regulations
simultaneously with the NPRM, requesting public comments on the
temporary regulations as proposed regulations also.8 9 The typical pattern of these projects involves Treasury collecting public comments
and evaluating them in promulgating the final regulations some
ing the agency's conclusions" or that provide information the agency already
considered).
88 In determining that the 94 rulemaking projects represented 40.9% of the total,
I categorized all 58 of the rulemaking projects in which only NPRMs had been issued
during the three-year period as following the traditional APA model, rather than
tracking post-2005 activity with respect to those NPRMs. Treasury may have strayed
since or may yet deviate from the traditional model in these projects. See, e.g., Temporary Regulations; Computer Software Under Section 199(c)(5)(B) (T.D. 9262), 71
Fed. Reg. 31,074 (June 1, 2006), 2006-24 I.R.B. 1040 (adopting temporary regulations
under I.R.C. § 199 in response to comments received on earlier NPRM); Final and
Temporary Regulations; Determination of Basis of Stock or Securities Received in
Exchange for, or With Respect to Stock or Securities in Certain Transactions; Treatment of Excess Loss Accounts (T.D. 9244), 71 Fed. Reg. 4264 (Jan. 26, 2006), 2006-8
I.R.B. 463 (adopting temporary as well as final regulations in response to comments
received on earlier NPRM). Consequently, the 40.4% figure ultimately represents an
undercount.
89 Of the 84 projects in which Treasury issued temporary regulations simultaneously with a NPRM, using the date of the last T.D. issued for those projects with more
than one T.D., 20 occurred in 2003, 30 occurred in 2004, and 34 occurred in 2005.
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months or years after issuing the NPRM. The remaining 11 projects
saw Treasury skip the notice-and-comment process altogether.9 0
TABLE

1.

FOLLOWING THE STEPS Or

APA SECTION 553(b)

Description of Treasury Action Taken
Traditional APA process followed: NPRM,
then final regulations
Temporary regulations issued with NPRM
Final regulations issued without notice
and comment
Total

AND (C)

Number of
Projects
137

Percentage
of Projects
59.1%

84

36.2%

11

4.7%

232

100.0%

Regardless of whether or not it followed the traditional APA
steps, Treasury usually disclaimed the applicability of APA section
553(b). Altogether, in fully 216 projects, or 92.70% of the total, Treasury claimed explicitly that the rulemaking requirements of APA section 553(b) did not apply. In 190 projects, or 81.55% of the total,
Treasury failed to offer any basis for that position and instead offered
only a conclusory statement that, "[i]t has been determined that section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 5)
does not apply to this regulation," or something to that effect. 9 1 Trea90 Of the 11 projects for which Treasury skipped notice and comment altogether,
5 occurred in 2003, 2 occurred in 2004, and 4 occurred in 2005.
91 In the context of instructions regarding Regulatory Flexibility Act applicability,
the Internal Revenue Manual tells drafters of final regulations deemed interpretative
to include the quoted language in the Special Analysis section of the preamble. See
INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 32.1.5.4.7.5.4.3. Thus, it seems likely that
including such a statement regarding the inapplicability of section 553(b) implicitly
invokes the interpretative rule exception. See infra Part III.A.1. In three projects, the
NPRM included such a statement but the corresponding T.D. remained silent on the
matter. Compare Final Regulation; Source of Compensation for Labor or Personal
Services (T.D. 9212), 70 Fed. Reg. 40,663, 40,665 (July 14, 2005), 2005-2 C.B. 429, 431
(failing to mention section 553(b)), and Final Regulations; Exclusions From Gross
Income of Foreign Corporations (T.D. 9087), 68 Fed. Reg. 51,394, 51,399 (Aug. 26,
2003), 2003-2 C.B. 781, 787 (same), and Final Regulations; Golden Parachute Payments (T.D. 9083), 68 Fed. Reg. 45,745, 45,750 (Aug. 4, 2003), 2003-2 C.B. 700, 705
(same), with Withdrawal of Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking; Source of Compensation for Labor or Personal Services, 69 Fed. Reg.
47,816, 47,818 (Aug. 6, 2004) (including statement), and Withdrawal of Previously
Proposed Rules; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; and Notice of Public Hearing;
Exclusions From Gross Income of Foreign Corporations, 67 Fed. Reg. 50,510, 50,519
(Aug. 2, 2002) (same), and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Public
Hearing; Golden Parachute Payments, 67 Fed. Reg. 7630, 7635 (Feb. 20, 2002)
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sury expressly asserted one or more of the APA-specified exceptions
92
from notice and comment only 23 times, or 9.87% of the total.
TABLE 2. ASSERTIONS OF APA SECTION 553(b) INAPPLICABILITY

Number of
Projects 93

Position Asserted by Treasury

Percentage
of Projects

Interpretative Rule Exception

1

0.43%

Procedural Rule Exception

1

0.43%

21

9.01%

190

81.55%

20

8.58%

233

100.00%

Good Cause Exception
Claim of Inapplicability-No Reason Given
Silent as to Applicability
Total

Of course, if Treasury follows the traditional APA steps of issuing
an NPRM and seeking public comment before issuing final regulations, then it hardly matters whether Treasury simultaneously claims
that the APA's procedural requirements do not apply. However, Treasury's assertions of the APA's inapplicability follow a similar pattern in
the projects in which Treasury instead issued temporary regulations or
skipped notice and comment altogether.
TABLE

2A.

ASSERTIONS OF

APA

SECTION

553

INAPPLICABILITY

NPRM

TEMPORARY REGULATIONS ISSUED WITH

Position Asserted by Treasury

Number of

Percentage

Projects

of Projects

Good Cause Exception

15

17.86%

Claim of Inapplicability-No Reason Given

66

78.57%

3

3.57%

84

100.00%

Silent as to Applicability
Total

(same). Accordingly, I counted these three projects as remaining silent regarding
APA § 553(b) applicability on the theory that the drafters considered the final regulations to be legislative, notwithstanding an earlier statement to the contrary in the
NPRM.

92 T.D. 9156 asserted both the procedural rule exception and the good cause
exception from APA section 553(b). Final Regulations; Place for Filing (T.D. 9156),
69 Fed. Reg. 55,743 (Sept. 16, 2004), 2004-2 C.B. 669.
93 The total number of projects in this table exceeds the 232 total previously
reported as studied because T.D. 9156 asserts both the procedural rule exception and
the good cause exception from APA section 553(b).
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INAPPLICABILITY:

FINAL REGULATIONS ISSUED WITHOUT NOTICE AND COMMENT

Number of
Position Asserted by Treasury

Projects

Percentage

94

of Projects

Interpretative Rule Exception

1

8.33%

Procedural Rule Exception

1

8.33%

Good Cause Exception

6

50.00%

Claim of Inapplicability-No Reason Given
Total

4

33.34%

12

100.00%

Treasury's claims of APA inapplicability-whatever the reasonmust mean that Treasury believes that an exception from notice-andcomment rulemaking applies. As already noted, Treasury claims particularly that most of its regulations are interpretative. 9 5 Although
Treasury offers no basis for this conclusion, Treasury's reliance on
specific versus general authority may be relevant to this determination. 96 Treasury relies heavily on its general rulemaking authority as
the basis for its actions. Every single T.D. and NPRM examined cited
I.R.C. § 7805 as authority on which Treasury relied in proposing or
adopting the regulations therein. Treasury did so even when simultaneously citing specific authority, which it did in 95 projects, or 40.9%
97
of the total.
TABLE

3.

SPECIFIC VERSUS GENERAL AUTHORITY

Source of Authority for Treasury Action

Number of
Projects

Percentage
of Projects

95

Specific and general authority
General authority only

137

40.9%
59.1%

Total

232

100.0%

Given the Internal Revenue Manual's characterization of most
Treasury regulations as interpretative, where a T.D. or NPRM claims
94 The total number of projects in this table exceeds the 11 previously reported
in Table 1 in which Treasury issued final regulations without notice and comment
because T.D. 9156 asserts both the procedural rule exception and the good cause
exception from APA § 553(b). See discussion supra note 70 and accompanying text.
95 See discussion supra notes 9, 45 and accompanying text.
96 See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
97 T.D.s 9070 and 9173, which were counted as a single project, cited 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 as authority in addition to I.R.C. § 7805. Because 5 U.S.C. § 552 is a general
statute that does not confer legislative authority upon any one agency, I did not count
this project as relying upon a specific authority grant.
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that APA section 553(b) does not apply, but fails to offer a particular
reason why this is the case, one might infer that Treasury believes that
the interpretative rule exception applies. Yet of the 190 projects for
which Treasury disclaimed applicability of APA section 553(b) without
offering a reason, 74 involve citations to one or more I.R.C. specific
98
authority grants in support of the regulations being promulgated.
TABLE 3A.

SOURCE OF RULEMAKING AUTHORITY WHERE

INAPPLICABILITY CLAIMED WITHOUT REASON

Number of

Percentage

Projects

of Projects

116

61.1%

74

38.9%

190

100.0%

Claim of Inapplicability-No Reason Given
I.R.C. § 7805 only offered as authority

Specific authority grant cited
Total

Correspondingly, where Treasury did not mention APA applicability at all, one might conclude that Treasury accepted that APA section 553(b) applied. Yet of the 20 projects in which Treasury was
silent as to APA section 553(b) applicability, 9 relied solely on I.R.C.
§ 7805 as the source of authority.
TABLE 3B.

SOURCE OF RULEMAKING AUTHORITY WHERE SILENT ABOUT

APA

APPLICABILITY

Silent as to Applicability of APA § 553(b)
I.R.C. § 7805 only offered as authority
Specific authority grant cited
Total

Number of

Percentage

Projects

of Projects

9

45.0%

11
20

55.0%
100.0%

Overall, however, there was little correlation between the procedures followed by Treasury and the source of authority upon which
Treasury premised its actions. Treasury only cited specific as well as

general authority in 1 of the 11 projects in which it skipped pre-promulgation notice and comment altogether. Yet Treasury relied upon
specific as well as general rulemaking authority in 36.5% of projects
and general authority only in 63.5% of projects in which it followed
the traditional process of issuing the NPRM, taking comments, and
then issuing final regulations. When issuing temporary regulations,
Treasury premised its actions upon specific as well as general rulemak98 See discussion supra note 97 and accompanying text. The same assumption
applies to this finding as well.

2007]

COLORING OUTSIDE THE

LINES

1753

ing authority slightly more often than general authority alone: 52.4%
to 47.6%, respectively.
TABLE 3c. PROCEDURES FOLLOWED COMPARED WITH SOURCE OF
AUTHORITY: TRADITIONAL PROCESS FOLLOWED

Number of

Percentage

Projects

of Projects

Under specific and general authority

50

36.5%

Under general authority only

87

63.5%

137

100.0%

NPRM, Then Final Regulations

Total

TABLE 3D. PROCEDURES FOLLOWED COMPARED WITH SOURCE OF

AUTHORITY:. TEMPORARY REGULATIONS ISSUED WITH NPRM

Temporary Regulations Issued in

Number of

Percentage

Conjunction with NPRM

Projects

of Projects

Under specific and general authority

44

52.4%

Under general authority only

40

47.6%

Total

84

100.0%

TABLE 3E.

PROCEDURES FOLLOWED COMPARED WITH SOURCE OF

AUTHORITY: FINAL REGULATIONS ISSUED WITHOUT NOTICE
AND COMMENT

Final Regulations Issued Without Notice

Number of

Percentage

and Comment

Projects

of Projects

Under specific and general authority

1

9.1%

Under general authority only

10

90.9%

Total

11

100.0%

If Treasury does accord any significance to specific as opposed to
general authority grants for purposes of APA compliance, however,
then Treasury either overly relies on the latter or underreports the
applicability of the former.9 9 Citing I.R.C. § 7805 routinely as Trea99 One commenter to this Article suggested that Treasury recognizes the legislative character of its regulations and believes itself to be citing to specific authority
more often than is readily apparent from the T.D.s or NPRMs. Many T.D.s and
NPRMs that lack obvious citation to specific authority nevertheless include three
asterisks after the citation to I.R.C. § 7805 general authority as follows: "Authority: 26
U.S.C. 7805 * * *." See, eg., Final and Temporary Regulations; Uniform Capitalization
of Interest Expense in Safe Harbor Sale and Leaseback Transactions (T.D. 9129), 69

1754

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 82:5

sury does is merely prudent, suggesting that Treasury employs general
authority as a backstop even where a specific authority grant seems to
apply. In several cases, however, the I.R.C. section under which the
regulations fall contains a specific authority grant that Treasury fails to
cite in the T.D. or the NPRM, even where the specific authority grant
seems applicable.
For example, T.D.s 9129 and 9179 respectively adopt first temporary and then final regulations governing the capitalization of interest
expense incurred in sale/leaseback transactions under 263A(f). 1 00
Fed. Reg. 29,066, 29,067 (May 20, 2004) (utilizing the three-asterisk signal); Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking; Special Rule Regarding Certain Section 951 Pro Rata Share
Allocations, 70 Fed. Reg. 49,894, 49,896 (Aug. 25, 2005) (same). Those three asterisks in turn serve as an agreed-upon signal from the I.R.S. to the Office of the Federal
Register (O.F.R.) regarding the authority upon which Treasury is relying in promulgating the related regulations. Specifically, the beginning of each Part of Title 26 of
the C.F.R. lists the rulemaking authority for all Treasury regulations contained within
that Part. Because Part 1 of C.F.R. Title 26 consists of several volumes, each volume
begins with a list of the authority upon which Treasury relied in promulgating the
regulations within that volume. If final or proposed regulations merely amend an
existing regulation, and Treasury relies upon specific authority already listed for that
regulation at the beginning of the relevant C.F.R. volume, then Treasury includes the
three asterisks in the T.D. or NPRM to signal the O.F.R. that no change is required to
that C.F.R. authority citation list. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 6, at
§ 32.1.5.7.4.4 (alluding to this arrangement). The commenter suggested accordingly
that, under such circumstances, Treasury's inclusion of the three asterisks in an
NPRM amending that regulation should satisfy the authority citation notice requirement of APA section 553(b) (2), even if Treasury for other, unspecified reasons simultaneously disclaims the applicability of APA section 553 more generally. This
contention is simply incredible. APA section 553(b) (2) requires agencies to include
reference to supporting legal authority in their NPRMs for the purpose of notifying
ordinary interested parties of the statutory authority supporting the agency's proposed regulations, so that such persons can raise relevant legal issues in their comments. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 3, at 46-47. Whatever I.R.S.
attorneys and the O.F.R. staff understand the three asterisks to mean, few other persons interested in proposed Treasury regulations are likely to appreciate the asterisks'
inclusion in an NPRM as a reference to specific authority cited in the corresponding
volume of the C.F.R. Even beyond the inherently cryptic quality of the three-asterisk
signal, the Internal Revenue Manual's discussions of authority citation and the meaning of asterisks in regulatory preambles fail to mention any relationship with the APA

rulemaking requirements. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 6, at
§§ 32.1.5.7.4.2, 32.1.5.7.4.4, 32.1.5.7.4.6. In short, interested parties have no way of
knowing that Treasury's inclusion of three asterisks in some NPRMs represents an
invocation of specific authority as legal support for regulations proposed. Allowing
the three-asterisk signal to satisfy APA section 553(b)(2) would render that notice
requirement virtually meaningless.
100 See Final Regulations; Uniform Capitalization of Interest Expense in Safe Harbor Sale and Leaseback Transactions (T.D. 9179), 79 Fed. RLeg. 8729 (Feb. 23, 2005),
2005-1 C.B. 707; Final and Temporary Regulations; Uniform Capitalization of Interest
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Section 263A(i) contains a blanket specific authority grant to promulgate regulations "as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the
purposes of this section, including regulations to prevent the use of
related parties, pass-thru entities, or intermediaries to avoid the application of this section ..... ,0" The regulations adopted in T.D.s 9129

and 9179 certainly seem to fit within the broad specific authority grant
contained in the first clause of that excerpt, and would seem to fit the
narrower example specifically noted in the statute.
Several T.D.s adopting consolidated return regulations further
exemplify this particular omission. I.R.C. § 1502 contains an exceptionally broad grant authorizing Treasury to promulgate such regulations, 10 2 such that scholars and practitioners routinely cite this section
as the prototypical legislative authority grant in the I.R.C. 10 3 T.D.
9122 adopted final language under Treasury Regulation § 1.1502-31
guiding the determination of basis in the stock of a former common
parent corporation following a change in the structure of a consolidated group. T.D.s 9118, 9154, and 9155 all issued temporary regulations under I.R.C. § 1502 addressing various overlapping consolidated
return issues, including most prominently the void left by the Federal
Circuit's invalidation in Rite Aid Corp. v. United States'0 4 of a significant

Expense in Safe Harbor Sale and Leaseback Transactions (T.D. 9129), 69 Fed. Reg.
29,066 (May 20, 2004), 2004-1 C.B. 1046.
101 I.R.C. § 263A(i) (2000).
102 I.R.C. § 1502 (West Supp. 2006) provides in total:
The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as he may deem necessary in
order that the tax liability of any affiliated group of corporations making a
consolidated return and of each corporation in the group, both during and
after the period of affiliation, may be returned, determined, computed,
assessed, collected, and adjusted, in such manner as clearly to reflect the
income-tax liability and the various factors necessary for the determination
of such liability, and in order to prevent avoidance of such tax liability. In
carrying out the preceding sentence, the Secretary may prescribe rules that
are different from the provisions of chapter 1 that would apply if such corporations filed separate returns.
103 See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretive Voice, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 2081, 2097
n.73 (2005) (describing I.R.C. § 1502 as "perhaps the most famous legislative delegation" in the I.R.C.); Sheldon I. Banoff, Dealing with the "Authorities":Determining Valid
Authority in Advising Clients, Rendering Opinions,PreparingTax Returns and Avoiding Penalties, 66 TAXES 1072, 1086 (1988) (citing regulations issued under I.R.C. § 1502 as
exemplifying legislative regulations); Don Leatherman, Why Rite Aid Is Wrong, 52 AM.
U. L. REv. 811, 818 (2003) (recognizing regulations under I.R.C. § 1502 as
legislative).
104 255 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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loss disallowance provision of Treasury Regulation § 1.1502-20.105
Among other things, T.D. 9187 finalized the I.R.C. § 1502 regulations
proposed in conjunction with T.D.s 9118, 9154, and 9155.106 T.D.

9192 adopted regulations under I.R.C. § 1502 resolving certain questions raised by the Supreme Court's decision in United Dominion Industries, Inc. v. United States.10 7 Yet in all of T.D.s 9122, 9118, 9154, and
9155, Treasury relied solely on I.R.C. § 7805 as the source of its
authority without any corresponding citation to I.R.C. § 1502; T.D.
9187 cites only I.R.C. § 337(d) for some additional regulations
adopted under that provision; and T.D. 9192 cites I.R.C. § 1502 for a
new Treasury Regulation § 1.1502-28 but not for extensive changes to
10 8
several other regulations under that section.
These findings are consistent with the Supreme Court's observations in Boeing Co. v. United States.'0 9 Boeing concerned the validity of a
Treasury regulation addressing the accounting for research and development expenditures in computing "combined taxable income" for
"domestic international sales corporations" or "DISCs."1 10 As the Boeing Court observed, then-I.R.C. § 994 contained a specific grant of
authority to promulgate the regulations in question."1 On brief in
the case, the government asserted that the regulation at issue conse-

105 Temporary Regulations; Guidance Under Section 1502; Treatment of Loss
Carryovers From Separate Return Limitation Years (T.D. 9155), 69 Fed. Reg. 51,175
(Aug. 18, 2004), 2004-2 C.B. 562; Temporary Regulations; Extension of Time To Elect
Method for Determining Allowable Loss (T.D. 9154), 69 Fed. Reg. 52,419 (Aug. 26,
2004), 2004-2 C.B. 560; Final and Temporary Regulations; Loss Limitation Rules
(T.D. 9118), 69 Fed. Reg. 12,799 (Mar. 18, 2004), 2004-1 C.B. 718; see also Rite Aid, 255
F.3d at 1359-60 (invalidating Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20 in part).
106 See Final and Temporary Regulations; Loss Limitation Rules (T.D. 9187), 70
Fed. Reg. 10,319 (Mar. 3, 2005), 2005-1 C.B. 778.
107 532 U.S. 822 (2001).
108 See Final Regulations, Temporary Regulations, and Removal of Temporary
Regulations; Application of Section 108 to Members of a Consolidated Group (T.D.
9192), 70 Fed. Reg. 14,395, 14,399 (Mar. 22, 2005), 2005-1 C.B. 866, 867; Temporary
Regulations (T.D.9155), 69 Fed. Reg. at 51,176; Temporary Regulations (T.D. 9154),
69 Fed. Reg. at 52,421; Final Regulation; Guidance Under Section 1502; Stock Basis
After a Group Structure Change (T.D. 9122), 69 Fed. Reg. 22,399, 22,399 (Apr. 26,
2004), 2004-1 C.B. 886; Final and Temporary Regulations (T.D. 9118), 69 Fed. Reg. at
12,800.
109 537 U.S. 437 (2003).
110 Id. at 446.
111 Id. at 447-48.
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quently was legislative in character.' 12 Yet in adopting the regulations,
Treasury relied solely on its general authority under I.R.C. § 7805.113
In sum, the only pattern with respect to APA compliance that
emerges from analyzing Treasury's reliance on specific as opposed to
general authority is no pattern at all. Perhaps, notwithstanding the
Internal Revenue Manual's characterization of most Treasury regulations as interpretative, Treasury does not base its claims of APA inapplicability on the interpretative rule exception. For many if not most
projects, such a conclusion leaves the good cause exception as the
only alternative exception from the APA notice and comment requirements. Alternatively, Treasury may not use specific versus general
authority to characterize regulations as legislative rather than interpretative. If this is the case, however, then such a conclusion begs the
question as to Treasury's basis for declaring most of its regulations to
be interpretative.
Finally, regarding the extent to which the public actually participates in Treasury's rulemaking efforts, Treasury's typical practice is to
acknowledge whether comments have been received in connection
with the regulatory project at hand.114 Where T.D.s are issued simultaneously with an NPRM, the public typically has not yet had an
opportunity to comment on the related temporary and proposed regulations, except on those rare occasions when the IRS has previously
issued either an advanced notice of public rulemaking or some other
notice requesting comments in advance of temporary or proposed
regulations. 1 15 Of the NPRMs studied for which Treasury did not
112 See id.; see also Brief for the United States at 19, Boeing, 537 U.S. 437 (Nos. 011209, 01-1382), 2002 WL 31557669.
113 See Boeing, 537 U.S. at 448; see also Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Gross
Income: Allocation and Apportionment of Deductions, 41 Fed. Reg. 49,160 (Nov. 4,
1976) ("The proposed regulations are to be issued under the authority contained in
section 7805 of the Internal Revenue Code .

. . .").

Although noting the issue, the

Boeing Court decided the case before it without resolving the question of the regulation's characterization. Boeing, 537 U.S. at 448.
114 See, e.g., Final Regulation; Testimony or Production of Records in a Court or
Other Proceeding (T.D. 9178), 70 Fed. Reg. 7396 (Feb. 14, 2005), 2005-1 C.B. 708
("No comments were received from the public in response to the notice of proposed
rulemaking. No public hearing was requested or held."); Final and Temporary Regulations; Statutory Mergers and Consolidations (T.D. 9038), 68 Fed. Reg. 3384 (Jan. 24,
2003), 2003-1 C.B. 524 ("No public hearing regarding the 2001 proposed regulations
was requested or held. Nonetheless, a number of written comments were received.").
115 Occasionally Treasury does begin its regulatory process by issuing a Notice or
other less formal guidance requesting initial taxpayer input prior to publishing temporary or proposed regulations in the Federal Register. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 200336, 2003-1 C.B. 992 (requesting comments in anticipation of rulemaking and preceding temporary regulations issued with Final and Temporary Regulations; Guidance
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issue a related T.D. within the three-year period, three NPRMs superseded earlier, related NPRMs and offered revised proposed regulations in response to comments.1 16 Otherwise, those NPRMs
represented Treasury's first notice of a project and request for
comments.
More often than not, Treasury receives significant input from the
public in connection with its regulatory efforts. Of the 232 regulatory
projects evaluated, only 131 had reached a stage at which Treasury
disclosed in the Federal Register whether or not it had received comments; but of those 131, a full 96, or 73.3%, generated at least one
comment raising concerns or suggesting changes. Nevertheless, many
projects do not receive such negative public reaction. For 31 of those
131 projects, or 23.7%, Treasury received no comments whatsoever.
For another 4 of the 131 projects, or 3.1%, Treasury received only
comments expressing approval and/or urging it to finalize the proposed regulations quickly.
TABLE

4.

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN TREASURY REGULATORY EFFORTS

Comments Received
No comments received
Only favorable comments received
Negative comments or suggestions for
change received
Total

Number of
Projects
31

Percentage
of Projects_
23.7%

4
96

3.1%
73.3%

131

100.0%

In at least.31 of the 96 projects in which Treasury received negative comments or suggestions for changes, Treasury received such
input after issuing temporary regulations; but Treasury received no
Regarding the Simplified Service Cost Method and the Simplified Production Method
(T.D. 9217), 70 Fed. Reg. 44,467 (Aug. 3, 2005), 2005-2 C.B. 498); Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking; Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. Reg. 3461 (Jan. 24, 2002) (requesting comments in anticipation of
forthcoming proposed regulations and preceding Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
and Notice of Public Hearing; Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of
Expenditures, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,701 (Dec. 19, 2002), and subsequent final regulations
in Final Regulations; Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures (T.D. 9107), 68 Fed. Reg. 436, 2004-1 C.B. 447); Rev. Rul. 2001-46, 2001-2 C.B.
321, 323 (requesting comments and preceding temporary regulations in Final and
Temporary Regulations; Effect of Elections in Certain Multi-Step Transactions (T.D.
9071), 68 Fed. Reg. 40,766 (July 9, 2003), 2003-2 C.B. 560).
116 See discussion supranote 76 and accompanying text (documenting these three

projects).
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comments whatsoever for 17 projects in which it issued temporary regulations. In short, a substantial percentage of Treasury's regulatory
projects were wholly noncontroversial, generating no negative public
comments whatsoever; but in most projects, the notice-and-comment
process yields public participation.
III.

DOCTRINAL PROBLEMS WITH TREASURY'S ACTIONS

The above analysis demonstrates that Treasury does not follow
the sequence of events mandated by APA section 553 and quantifies
that failure as 40.9% of the projects studied. As noted, the Internal
Revenue Manual maintains that most Treasury regulations are interpretative rules exempt from APA notice and comment requirements; l I7 and the study also documents that Treasury routinely
18
contends in its preambles that APA section 553(b) does not apply."
If Treasury is correct that its regulations are exempt, then its failure to
satisfy the APA's rulemaking requirements would be legally inconsequential. Treasury offers little or no explanation for its exemption
claims, however. The following analysis demonstrates that Treasury's
reliance on the interpretative rule, procedural rule, and good cause
exemptions of APA section 553(b) is misplaced.I' 19

A.

Temporary Regulations

Treasury most habitually deviates from APA rulemaking requirements by promulgating binding temporary regulations in conjunction
with its NPRMs. Treasury and the IRS treat temporary Treasury regu120
lations as legally binding on taxpayers as well as the government.
117 See discussion supra notes 9, 45 and accompanying text.
118 See discussion supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
119 There is no real doubt that the policy statement exception from notice and
comment is inapplicable to Treasury regulations. The APA does not define this
exception. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (A) (2000). However, the Attorney General's Manual
on the Administrative ProcedureAct, generally regarded as an authoritative interpretation

of the APA, defines a policy statement as "issued by an agency to advise the public
prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary
power." ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 3, at 30 n.3; see also Chrysler Corp.

v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979) (giving weight to Attorney General's Manualdefinitions and explanations); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 546 (1978) (same). Treasury regulations clearly do not fit this
description. No one has ever suggested that Treasury regulations are mere policy
statements. Accordingly, there is no need to evaluate in greater depth whether Treasury might reasonably rely upon the policy statement exception in promulgating
Treasury regulations without notice and comment.
120 This is in contrast to Revenue Rulings and Notices, which do not carry the
notes both in Treasury regulations and in the Internal Revenue Bulletin, and which
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By contrast, while the IRS generally is supposed to act consistently
with proposed regulations, 12 1 taxpayers are not bound by proposed
regulations and may only rely upon them if Treasury expressly allows
them to do so via a statement in the NPRM. 122 Moreover, the courts
arguably extend greater deference to temporary regulations than to
123
proposed regulations.
Treasury is not the only agency that promulgates binding regula24
tions in advance of seeking and considering public comments.'
Nevertheless, the courts generally consider regulations issued through
such a process procedurally invalid unless one of the four exceptions
listed in APA section 553 applies. 125 Many if not most Treasury regulations do not fall within the scope of those exceptions.
1. The Interpretative Rule Exception
As already noted, the Internal Revenue Manual contends that
most Treasury regulations are interpretative in character. 126 Elsewhere, in the context of instructions regarding Regulatory Flexibility
Act applicability, the Internal Revenue Manual instructs drafters of
final regulations that they deem interpretative to include in the Special Analysis section of the preamble the conclusory sentence noted
127
above, that APA section 553(b) does not apply to this regulation.
do not carry the legal weight of Treasury regulations. See Treas. Reg.
§ 601.601(d) (2) (v) (d) (as amended in 1987).
121 See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 32.1.1.2.2.
122 See id.
123 See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 CEO. LJ.
833, 846-47 (2001) (discussing applicability of Chevronjudicial deference doctrine to
temporary and proposed regulations).
124 See, e.g., Adoption of Recommendations, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,108, 43,111 (Aug. 18,
1995) (noting that "[a]lgencies have increasingly used a post-promulgation comment
process commonly referred to as 'interim final rulemaking' to describe the issuance
of a final rule without prior notice and comment, but with a post-promulgation
opportunity for comment."); Michael Asimow, Interim-FinalRules: Making Haste Slowly,
51 ADMIN. L. REV. 703, 712-15 (1999) (offering statistics for agency use of interimfinal rulemaking).
125 See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 315 (1979) (noting that postpromulgation comment opportunity does not comply with APA section 553); Sharon
Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding same); Adoption of
Recommendations, 60 Fed. Reg. at 43,111 (acknowledging that interim-final rulemaking is inconsistent with APA rulemaking requirements); Asimow, supra note 124, at
706 (1999) (noting the need for an APA-approved exception before interim-final
rulemaking is permissible).
126 See discussion supra notes 9,45 and accompanying text.
127 See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 32.1.5.4.7.5.4; supra note 88
and accompanying text. Although this instruction relates to Regulatory Flexibility Act
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The Internal Revenue Manual offers regulation drafters no criteria or
other guidance for characterizing their regulations as interpretative,
however.128

Among the projects studied, Treasury did not expressly invoke
the interpretative rule exception in the preambles to its temporary
regulations; 129 but the APA does not require an agency claiming the
interpretative rule exception to say so contemporaneously. 130 Nevertheless, given the Internal Revenue Manual's claim that most of its
regulations are interpretative, one could read the blanket assertion of
APA section 553(b) inapplicability contained in more than 80% of the
projects studied to represent an implicit assertion of that exception
from notice-and-comment rulemaking.
The tax community generally tends to differentiate the two types
of Treasury regulations by calling specific authority regulations "legislative" and general authority ones "interpretative."' 1 31 Even if these
labels were correct, then Treasury would still need to satisfy APA section 553 notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements where it relies
upon specific I.R.C. provisions as authority in support of its regulations. As noted above, at least in the period studied, Treasury cited
specific authority in 40.9% of all of its projects, including 52.4% of
132
those projects in which Treasury issued temporary regulations.
Regardless, the practice of labeling general authority Treasury
regulations as interpretative, while historically based, is of questionable contemporary accuracy, at least for the purposes of APA section
553. In the first part of the twentieth century, the general consensus
among courts and scholars held that a general authority grant that
authorized legally binding regulations would violate the nondelegaanalysis, the instruction offers different language for legislative regulations, and
requires the drafter to assess the legislative versus interpretative characterization of
the regulations in addressing the Regulatory Flexibility Act checklist item. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 6, §§ 32.1.5.4.7.5.4.3, 32.1.5.4.7.5.4.4.
128 See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 6, §§ 32.1.1.6, 32.1.1.7 (reserving
for future guidance the topics of "Legislative Regulations" and "Interpretative
Regulations").
129 See supra Tables 2, 2a, and 2b.
130 Compare 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (A) (2000) (articulating the interpretative rule
exception), with id. § 553(b)(B) (specifying good cause exception requirements).
131 See, e.g., LEDERMAN & MAZZA, supra note 6, § 9.02[A] [1]; MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN,
IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
3.02[3] [a)-[b], at 3-12 to -14 (rev. ed. 2002); Aprill,
supra note 103, at 2097; John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Rulings
in the Chevron Era,64 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 35, 44 (1995); Salem et al., supra note 43, at
728; Vasquez & Lowy, supra note 12, at 249-50.
132 See supranote 97, accompanying text; Tables 3 and 3d, and accompanying text.
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tion doctrine and thus be constitutionally invalid. 13 3 Accordingly,
grants of general authority to promulgate "all necessary rules and regulations" merely recognized inherent executive power to interpret the
laws in the course of enforcing them.13 4 Regulations issued pursuant
to such grants only interpreted existing law and bound government
officials but not the regulated public or the courts. 13 5 When the APA
was adopted in 1946, general authority regulations-whether tax or
136
nontax-were indeed interpretative rules.
The nondelegation doctrine has long since ceased to yield such
results, 137 and, at least outside of the tax area, specific versus general
authority origins no longer distinguish legislative from interpretative
rules.138 Regulations that bind both the government and regulated
parties are legislative, whether promulgated pursuant to specific or
133

See, e.g., Ellsworth C. Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil Case, 40

COLUM. L. REv. 252, 260-61 (1940); Stanley S. Surrey, The Scope and Effect of Treasury

Regulations Under the Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 556, 557-58
(1940).
134 See, e.g., John A. Fairlie, Administrative Legislation, 18 MICH. L. REV. 181, 189
(1920); Surrey, supra note 133, at 558.
135 See, e.g., 1 F. TROWBRIDGE VOM BAUR, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 489
(1942); Alvord, supranote 133, at 260-61; Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative RulesInterpretative,Legislative, and Retroactive, 57 YA L.J. 919, 928-29 (1948); Surrey, supra
note 133, at 557-58.
136 The Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act reflects this
understanding. The Manualdefines legislative regulations (which it calls "substantive
rules") as "rules, other than organizational or procedural ... issued by an agency
pursuant to statutory authority and which implement the statute." ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 3, at 30 n.3; see also discussion supra note 119 (discussing
the significance of the Manual). The Manual notes that such rules carry the force
and effect of law. See ArToRNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 3, at 30 n.3. By contrast, the Manual defines as interpretative rules "rules or statements issued by an
agency to advise the public of the agency's construction of the statutes and rules

which it administers." Cf Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in JudicialDeference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1564-72 (2006) (discussing the
historical understanding at greater length).

137

See, e.g., I

KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE,

§ 3.2, at 150

(2d ed. 1978) (describing nondelegation as a failed legal doctrine); 1 PIERCE, supra
note 2, § 2.6, at 91-93 (discussing the nondelegation doctrine's lack of contemporary
bite); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 12, at 14 (1976) (opining that the
nondelegation doctrine "can not be taken literally").
138 See, e.g., 2 DAVIS, supra note 137, §§ 7.13, 7.15 (documenting judicial blurring
of the old specific versus general authority distinction between legislative and interpretative regulations); Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory
Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 393-401 (noting the declining relevance of the specific
versus general authority distinction).
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general statutory authority. 119 In other areas of administrative law,
regulations adopted under general authority carry the same legal
force and effect as those promulgated pursuant to specific authority. 140 Likewise, Treasury, the IRS, and the tax community at large all
operate under the belief that regulations promulgated under the general authority of I.R.C. § 7805 (a) are just as legally binding on taxpayers as specific authority regulations.14 1 Through I.R.C. § 6662 and the
regulations thereunder, Congress and Treasury impose the penalties
for disregarding both specific and general authority Treasury regulations in filing tax returns. 1 42 Consistent generally with the shift in the
legal weight of general authority regulations, courts and agencies regularly recognize such regulations in other areas of administrative law
139 See Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995) (noting that
interpretative rules do not require notice and comment because they do not have the
force and effect of law); see also Anthony, supra note 32, at 10 (noting that interpretative rules are not legally binding); William Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53
ADMIN. L. REv. 1321, 1324-25 (2001) (recognizing legislative rules as legally binding
and interpretative rules as not); Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DuKE
L.J. 1463, 1464 (1992) (designating regulations that bind both the government and
regulated parties as legislative rules).
Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 609-10 (1991) (recognizing
140 See, e.g.,
general authority grant in 29 U.S.C. § 156 as authorizing legally binding regulations);
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (treating regulation promulgated by EPA under Clean Air Act general authority, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7601 (a) (1), as legally binding on the general public); Nat'l Ass'n of Pharm. Mfrs. v.
FDA, 637 F.2d 877, 879-80 (2d Cir. 1981) (discussing doctrinal shift and holding FDA
general authority regulations to be legislative); Nat'l Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC,
482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (analyzing at length FTC's general rulemaking authority as supporting binding regulations and comparing to general authority grants in
other statutes); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with
the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARv. L. REv. 467, 473, 546-70 (2002)
(documenting the evolution in judicial recognition of rulemaking authority).
141 See, e.g., Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 979 (7th Cir.
1998) (observing that specific and general authority Treasury regulations have the
force of law); United States v. Harvis Constr. Co., Inc., 857 F.2d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir.
1988) (noting that general authority Treasury regulation carries the same binding
effect); Banoff, supra note 103, at 1086 (noting that all Treasury regulations bind the
IRS and taxpayers); Coverdale, supra note 131, at 56. But see Estate of Gerson v.
Comm'r, No. 13534-04, 2006 WL 3019177 (T.C. Oct. 24, 2006) (Vasquez, J. dissenting) (opining that general authority Treasury regulations do not carry the force of
law).
142 See I.R.C. § 6662(a)-(b) (West Supp. 2006) (stating that the 20% penalty for
underpayment of taxes "shall apply to the portion of any underpayment which is
attributable to . . . negligence or disregard of rules or regulations"); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6662-3(b) (2) (as amended in 2003) (defining "rules and regulations" as including
"temporary or final Treasury regulations issued under the [I.R.C.]").
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as subject to the notice and comment requirements 144of APA § 553(b)

and (c).

1 43

Why tax should be different is unclear.

Nevertheless, most courts have acknowledged the tax community's characterization of specific authority regulations as legislative
and general authority regulations as interpretative; but the courts typically have done so either arguendo or without any discussion at all in
considering the extent to which Treasury regulations are entitled to
judicial deference. 14 5 Because taxpayers rarely challenge Treasury
143 See, e.g., Elm Grove Coal Co. v. Director, O.W.C.P., No. 05-1108, 2007 WL
678248, at *10 (4th Cir. Mar. 7, 2007) (recognizing general rulemaking grant of 30
U.S.C. § 936 as authority to promulgate legislative rules through notice-and-comment
rulemaking); Syncor Intern. Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 95 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding FDA publication to be an exercise of general rulemaking authority subject to
notice and comment requirements as a legislative rule); Natural Res. Def. Council v.
EPA, 22 F.3d 1125, 1146-47 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (describing Clean Air Act general
authority provision as authorizing legislative rules subject to notice-and-comment
rulemaking requirements); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231-32
(2001) (noting that "it is true that the general rulemaking power conferred on Customs, see 19 U.S.C. § 1624, authorizes some regulation with the force of law").
144 Thomas Merrill and Kathryn Watts have identified a penalty-based convention
by which Congress signals its intent regarding the force and effect of agency regulations generally and argued that Congress intended for tax to be different from other
areas of administrative law. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 140, at 571-75. I have
argued elsewhere that Merrill & Watts misinterpret the early income tax statute penalty provisions and fail to consider more recent congressional action in that area. See
Hickman, supra note 136, at 1603-05. Merrill and Watts concede more generally
that, whatever Congress intended, commentators and the courts throughout the
twentieth century failed to recognize or give effect to the congressional convention
they claim demarked legislative versus interpretative rules. See Merrill & Watts, supra
note 140, at 503. Accordingly, I believe both that Merrill and Watts are incorrect in
their assertion of tax exceptionalism and that the penalty-based convention that they
identify ultimately supports the conclusion that general authority Treasury regulations are legislative in character.
145 See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, 447-48 (2003) ("Even ifwe
regard the challenged regulation as interpretative because it was promulgated under
§ 7805(a)'s general rulemaking grant rather than a specific grant of authority"
(emphasis added)); Hosp. Corp. of Am. & Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, 348 F.3d 136,
140-41, 145 n.3 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting same language from Boeing in similar spirit
in deference discussion and separately reserving the question of whether Treasury
must utilize notice-and-comment rulemaking in promulgating general authority Treasury regulations); Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 126 T.C. 96, 129 (2006) (recognizing the specific versus general distinction in the course of discussing deference).
Prior to Chevron, the Supreme Court linked the level of deference accorded Treasury
regulations to whether the regulations were issued pursuant to general or specific
authority. See United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24-25 (1982); Rowan
Cos., Inc. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 252-53 (1981). This pre-Chevron delineation
was not limited to the tax context, however, but rather applied across various fields of
administrative law. See, e.g., Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424-25 (1977) (apply-
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regulations on procedural grounds, the courts have had little opportunity to apply contemporary administrative law principles for distinguishing legislative from interpretative rules in the tax context. The
Seventh Circuit has recognized in dicta that general authority Treasury regulations carry the force and effect of law, and thus cannot be
interpretative for purposes of APA section 553(b) .146 Judge Holmes
of the Tax Court recently made a similar observation. 147 Most tax

scholars who have lately considered the matter agree that, by these
modern standards, general as well as specific authority Treasury regulations are most likely legislative and not interpretative in character.1 4
Even if there were any real question about the legal force and
appropriate characterization of general authority Treasury regulations, the actual tests applied by the courts should quickly resolve the
matter. Since the courts have moved away from characterizing legislative and interpretative rules based on the source of their authority,
distinguishing between the two types of rules presents a significant
challenge. 149 Typically the difficulty arises because an agency claims
that a particular rule is not legally binding but in practice treats the
rule as having that effect. 150 The courts give weight to an agency's
ing this rule to health, education and welfare regulations). Notably, however, in both
Vogel Fertilizer and Rowan Cos., the Court never used the "interpretative" label to
describe the regulations in question, but rather merely addressed the issue of deference with respect to regulations promulgated pursuant to I.R.C. § 7805(a). In tax
cases, though not in other areas of administrative law, courts and scholars continue to
disagree over which standard of judicial deference should apply to general authority
Treasury regulations. See Hickman, supra note 136, at 1556-63 (summarizing the disagreement). The characterization of general authority Treasury regulations as legislative or interpretative influences but does not necessarily resolve the deference
question. See id.
146 See Bankers Life, 142 F.3d at 978-79.
147 See Swallows Holding, Ltd., 126 T.C. at 176-77 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Judge
Swift registered his agreement with Judge Holmes's opinion. Id. at 182 (Swift, J.,
dissenting).
148 See Noel B. Cunningham &James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA.
TAx REv. 1, 46 (2004) (acknowledging that general authority Treasury regulations are
legislative under general administrative law standards); Salem et al., supra note 43, at
738-39 (concluding same); see also Banoff, supra note 103, at 1087 (questioning the
ongoing vitality of labeling general authority Treasury regulations as interpretative).
149 See generally Manning, supra note 32, at 894-97 (noting the problem and
attempting to analyze it in terms of judicial manageability).
150 See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, InterpretiveRules, Policy Statements, Guidances,Manuals, and the Like-Should FederalAgencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311,
1327-55 (1992) (illustrating extensively how agencies use nonlegislative rules to bind
the public); Funk, supra note 139, at 1327 (noting that "if the agency is defending a
rule as an interpretive rule, it always claims that the rule is not legally binding").
Thus, the real quandary for the legislative versus interpretative rule inquiry is not
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characterization of its own rules but also recognize that agencies have
an incentive to avoid the burdens of notice-and-comment rulemaking.1 51 Thus, the label the agency attaches to a particular rule is not
dispositive. 52 Instead, the courts have developed standards that delve
beyond the label to evaluate whether a rule is legislative or
interpretative.
The dominant standard, often called the "American Mining Congress test" for the case in which it originated, 5 3 looks for the presence
of any one of several factors that the courts consider conclusive evidence that a rule carries the "force of law" or is "legally binding" 54 :
whether the rule is necessary to support an enforcement action, to
confer benefits, or to impose obligations; 155 whether the statute is too
ambiguous or open-ended to be effectuated only with interpretative
rules;1 56 or whether the rule in question repudiates or amends
evaluating legally-binding regulations like those promulgated under I.R.C. § 7805(a),
but rather categorizing less formal guidance, like revenue rulings or notices, that
Treasury contends are nonbinding but potentially carry penalties as well. Compare
Treas. Reg. § 601.601 (d) (2) (v) (d) (as amended in 1987) (noting that revenue rulings
"do not have the force and effect of Treasury Department Regulations (including
Treasury decisions)"), and INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 32.2.2.10
(same), with Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(2) (as amended in 2003) (extending the
twenty percent underpayment penalty under certain circumstances to taxpayers who
fail to follow revenue rulings and notices).
151 See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2000);
see also Manning, supra note 32, at 915 (making similar observation); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways To Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 83 (1995)
(same).

152 See, e.g., Hemp Indus. Ass'n v. DEA, 333 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003); MejiaRuiz v. INS, 51 F.3d 358, 363-65 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretive Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 547, 555 (2000)
(asserting that the critical question for courts is whether the agency at issue intended
to issue a rule with "force of law").
153 Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
154 Id. at 1109-11; see also Hemp Indus., 333 F.3d at 1087 (applying the standard);
N.Y. City Employees' Ret. Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 13 (2d Cir. 1995) (same); 1 PIERCE,
supra note 2, § 6.4, at 345 (noting that several circuits utilize this standard). The
factors have changed somewhat since the D.C. Circuit first announced the test in
American Mining Congress. See id. § 6.4, at 340-45 (discussing the evolution of its various factors); Anthony, supra note 32, at 16-22 (discussing this test as articulated in
American Mining Congress); Funk, supra note 139, at 1326-32 (describing the different
factors that the courts have considered in connection with this test).
155 Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1109; see also I PIERCE, supra note 2, § 6.4, at
340-45 (discussing the evolution of this factor); Funk, supra note 139, at 1327 (discussing variations of this factor).
156 See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 584-85 (D.C.
Cir. 1997); Hoctor v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 169-71 (7th Cir. 1996); see also
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another legislative rule. 157 Other, less dispositive factors include
whether the agency explicitly invoked legislative authority in promulgating the rule or, to the contrary, told the public that the rule being
issued is interpretative and not legally binding, or whether the agency
has published the rule in the C.F.R.158 Some of these factors aim to
determine whether context requires a legislative rule, while others
focus on the agency's contemporaneous intent. Regardless, application of these factors renders Treasury regulations legislative in
character.
Treasury's expressed reliance in all of its T.D.s on I.R.C.
§ 7805(a)'s clear delegation of authority to promulgate regulations
should be sufficient to render them legislative, given the general
understanding that rules so promulgated are legally binding and the
penalties imposed for failure to follow them. 159 Although the publication in the C.F.R. is merely nondispositive evidence of agency
intent, 60 the fact that Treasury so publishes all of its regulations further mitigates against its claim that any of its regulations are merely
interpretative.
Moreover, many Treasury regulations promulgated solely under
general authority are sufficiently extensive to be essential to sustain an
enforcement action, confer tax benefits, or impose obligations. 1 I
Funk, supra note 139, at 1327 (describing this factor in similar though slightly different terms).
157 Only a legislative rule can amend a legislative rule. See, e.g.,
Am. Mining Cong.,
995 F.2d at 1109-10; see also Hemp Indus., 333 F.3d at 1087 (applying this rule); N.Y.
City Employees, 45 F.3d at 13 (same); 1 PIERCE, supra note 2, § 8.6, at 556-57 (discussing the rule).

Indeed, in Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena L.P., the D.C.

Circuit required a legislative rule to amend an interpretative rule. See Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 586-88. Scholars have criticized this holding as excessive, however.
See, e.g.,
I PIERCE, supra note 2, § 6.4, at 346-48.
158 See also Funk, supra note 139, at 1330 (noting these factors as recognized but
more doubtful).
159 See, e.g., Erringer v. Thompson, 371 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Am.
Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1110) (interpreting this element of American Mining Congress
as including invocations of general authority grants).
160 See Health Ins. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
161 See, e.g.,
Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (as amended in 1995) (interpreting the "intent
of subchapter K"-the partnership anti-abuse regulations); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1
to -3 (as amended in 2006) (interpreting "corporation"-the "check-the-box" regulations); see also Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 588 ("If the statute or rule to be interpreted is itself very general . . . and the 'interpretation' really provides all the
guidance, then the latter will more likely be a [legislative] regulation."). Treasury's
propensity for relying on I.R.C. § 7805(a) even for regulations that arguably are specifically authorized only reinforces this point. See discussion supranote 72 and accompanying text. But see Health Ins. Ass', 23 F.3d at 423 ("The dividing line ... is whether
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Consider one pre-study example: the "check-the-box" regulations of
Treasury Regulation §§ 301.7701-1, -2, and -3, purporting to interpret
the definitions of "partnership" and "corporation" in I.R.C. § 7701.162
I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2) defines the term "partnership" as including (but
not limited to) "a syndicate, group, pool,joint venture, or other unincorporated organization, through or by means of which any business,
financial operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not, within
the meaning of this title, a trust or estate or a corporation." 1 63 I.R.C.

§ 7701 (a) (3) defines the term "corporation" as including (but not
limited to) "associations,joint-stock companies, and insurance companies."'16 4 I.R.C. § 7701 provides no guidance for characterizing certain
state-recognized but unincorporated business entities such as limited
liability companies. For decades, Treasury employed a multi-factor
test for determining whether an unincorporated business entity
should be classified as a partnership or a corporation for federal
income tax purposes. 1 65 In the mid-1990s, however, Treasury promulgated the check-the-box regulations, which replaced the old multi-factor approach with a new elective regime. 1 66 While the multi-factor test
was drawn from judicial opinions, the new check-the-box regulations
were cut from whole cloth. Treasury relied solely on its authority
167
under I.R.C. § 7805(a) in promulgating these regulations.
During the period studied, Treasury promulgated several comparatively significant temporary regulations based solely on general
authority. For example, in T.D. 9038, citing only I.R.C. § 7805(a) as
supporting authority, Treasury issued new temporary regulations
addressing the applicability of the tax-free merger provisions of I.R.C.
§ 368 and related regulations to entities such as single-member limited liability companies that, under the check-the-box regulations, are
disregarded for federal income tax purposes. 168 I.R.C. § 368 exempts
implementing regulations are necessary in order to make a statutory scheme fully
operative .... ").
162 Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -3 (as amended in 2006).
163 I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2) (West Supp. 2006).
164 Id. § 7701 (a) (3).
165 See Steven A. Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the Check-the-Box Election, and the Future of Tax Simplification, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 405, 425-37 (2005).
166 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 to -3 (as amended in 2006); see also Dean, supra
note 165, at 438-41 (describing the check-the-box regulations).
167 See Final Regulations; Simplification of Entity Classification Rules (T.D. 8697),
61 Fed. Reg. 66,584, 66,588 (Dec. 18, 1996), 1997-1 C.B. 215, 219 (adopting these
regulations and citing I.R.C. § 7805 (2000) as providing the requisite authority to do
so).
168 See Final and Temporary Regulations; Statutory Mergers and Consolidations
(T.D. 9038), 68 Fed. Reg. 3384 (Jan. 24, 2003), 2003-1 C.B. 524.
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from taxation various mergers and other restructuring transactions
involving corporations and their shareholders. 169 Prior to T.D. 9038,
no one could be quite certain whether or how I.R.C. § 368 would
70
apply to a merger between a corporation and a disregarded entity.
Under state law, such entities can be structured almost identically to
corporations and engage in the same sorts of transactions as are
exempted from taxation by I.R.C. § 368; but under the check-the-box
regulations, such entities do not exist for federal income tax purposes. 17 1 What are the consequences of merging with something that
does not exist? A savvy tax theoretician can intuit her way to many
results under the I.R.C.; but as Joseph Isenbergh recognized, "there is
no natural law of reverse triangular mergers."' 172 The IRS could not
have enforced the rules adopted by T.D. 9038 as general principles.
Hence, even though these regulations were promulgated pursuant to
the general authority granted by I.R.C. § 7805(a), under the American
Mining Congress force of law test, they are legislative rules.
At least one circuit uses an older standard known as the "substantial impact test." This standard provides that a regulation is legislative
rather than interpretative if it has a substantial impact on regulated
parties. 17 3 The test has been criticized as overly inclusive. 174 Yet, the
Fifth Circuit still applies a variation of the substantial impact test. In
Professionals & Patientsfor Customized Care v. Shalala,175 that court asked
whether the rule at issue was binding in that it imposed "'rights and
obligations"' on regulated parties and also whether the rule "'leaves
the agency and its decisionmakers free to exercise discretion"' or,
conversely, binds the agency as well as regulated parties.17 6 All Treasury regulations, whether specific or general authority, satisfy both
aspects of the substantial impact test. As already noted, I.R.C. § 6662
169
170

I.R.C. § 368(a) (2000).
See generally Richard W. Bailine, When Is an "A"not an "A"? When It's a Fish, 28J.
CORP. TAX'N, 30, 30-32 (2001) (discussing the difficulties in reconciling tax-free reorganizations and disregarded entities).
171 See id. at 30-31.
172 Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. Ci. L. RE\,.
859, 879 (1982).
173 See Funk, supra note 139, at 1326.
174 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Lexington v. Sanders, 946 F.2d 1185, 1189 n.2 (6th
Cir. 1991) (acknowledging questionability of substantial impact test but applying it as
appropriate for the case at bar); see also Funk, supra note 139, at 1326 (noting the
criticism of the substantial impact test).
175 56 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. 1995).
176 Id. at 595 (quoting Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 & n.4
(D.C. Cir. 1987)); see also Tex. Say. & Cmty. Bankers Ass'n v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Bd., 201
F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying test).
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and the regulations thereunder clearly impose penalties for disregarding any Treasury regulation in filing tax returns. 17 7 Treasury regulations have always been binding on government officials, even at a time
when courts and scholars agreed that such regulations could not bind
178
taxpayers or the courts.
Some who defend the interpretative label for general authority
Treasury regulations turn to rhetoric often employed by the courts
that legislative rules "create new law, rights or duties," while interpretative rules merely state "what the administrative agency thinks the
statute means." 179 Applying such language alone, many general
authority Treasury regulations might seem to qualify as interpretative
because they merely clarify the statute's meaning in a way that any
court could likewise discern on its own. In fact, while many Treasury
regulations offer rules that no court on its own could discern from the
I.R.C., it is not at all unusual for Treasury regulations simply to reiterate the related I.R.C. language with some reasonably obvious clarifying language. Consider another example that pre-dates the study,
Treasury Regulation § 1.61-2, elaborating on "compensation for services" as an item of "gross income" under I.R.C. § 61.180
I.R.C. § 61 defines "gross income" as income "from whatever
source derived" and provides a nonexclusive list of income types
including "compensation for services, including fees, commissions,
fringe benefits, and similar items."' 81 Treasury Regulation § 1.61-2
reiterates this statutory language, adds several additional items like
tips and bonuses, and then cross-references some of the subsequent
sections offering exclusions.' 8 2 Even without this regulation, one
could reasonably conclude that a tip or a bonus is compensation for
services, as some courts did before they felt bound by Treasury Regulation § 1.61-2.183 So, in some sense, one might argue that this regulation merely states what Treasury thinks the statute means.
Nevertheless, legislative rules as well as interpretative ones can
interpret and clarify statutes. As currently understood, when Treasury
indicates in Treasury Regulation § 1.61-2 that tips and bonuses constitute gross income as compensation for services performed, Treasury is
177 I.R.C. § 6662 (West Supp. 2006), amended by Pub. L. No. 109-280 § 1219, 120
Stat. 1083; Treas. Reg, § 1.6662-3 (as amended in 2003).
178 See, e.g., Alvord, supra note 133, at 261; Surrey, supra note 133, at 557.
179 Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
180 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2 (as amended in 2003).
181 I.R.C. § 61 (2000).
182 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2 (as amended in 2003).
183 See, e.g., Roberts v. Comm'r, 176 F.2d 221, 223-26 (9th Cir. 1949) (discussing
at length why tips are income).

20071

COLORING

OUTSIDE

THE LINES

1771

not merely offering its interpretation of I.R.C. § 61 to compete before
the courts with other, equally reasonable interpretations. Instead,
Treasury is imposing a definition that taxpayers as well as Treasury are
legally bound to follow. It is in this sense that Treasury Regulation
§ 1.61-2 not only says what Treasury believes I.R.C. § 61 means but
also creates new law.
Judge Vasquez of the Tax Court has taken a different view,
expressing the opinion that Treasury regulations issued under the
general authority of I.R.C. § 7805 (a) do not in fact carry the force and
effect of law.18 4 Judge Vasquez contends that giving general authority
Treasury regulations binding legal force would render specific authority regulations "superfluous," and the courts must construe each section of the I.R.C. "so that one section will explain and support and not
defeat or destroy another section." 18 5 Judge Vasquez's analysis of the
issue is incomplete.
Treating Treasury regulations promulgated under I.R.C.
§ 7805(a) as nonbinding denies full effect to the language of I.R.C.
§ 6662, which does not distinguish among Treasury regulations in
assessing penalties for underpayment of taxes. In addition, as noted
above, many other regulatory statutes contain both specific and general authority grants resembling those in the I.R.C., and the courts
continually treat general authority regulations under those statutes as
legally binding on all parties. Judge Vasquez's analysis would seem to
apply equally to those statutes, yet the courts continually treat general
authority regulations promulgated thereunder as legally binding, and
Judge Vasquez offers no justification for tax exceptionalism.
Moreover, Judge Vasquez's interpretation of I.R.C. § 7805(a)
ignores the many varieties of specific authority grants, some of which
are quite general themselves.1 8 6 For example, I.R.C. § 382(m) contains a list of several specific items for Treasury to address in regulations, such as "the application of [§§ 382 and] 383 in the case of a
short taxable year"' 8 7 and "the application of [§ 3 8 2(g)(4)] where
there is only 1 corporation involved,"' 88 in addition to more general
authority to "prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of' I.R.C. §§ 382 and 383.189 Simi184 See Estate of Gerson v. Comm'r, No. 13534-04, 2006 WL 3019177 (T.C. Oct. 24,
2006) (Vasquez, J., dissenting).
185
186

Id.
See generally N.Y.

STATE BAR ASS'N REPORT,

various types of specific authority grants).

187
188
189

I.R.C. § 382(m)(2) (2000).
Id. § 382(m) (4).
Id. § 382(m) (flush language).

supra note 38, at 2-6 (discussing
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larly, I.R.C. § 197(f) (9), a provision that addresses excessive turnover
or "churning" of intangibles to inflate amortization potential, also
instructs the Secretary to promulgate regulations for "the determination of whether the user of property changes as part of a transaction;" 190 yet I.R.C. § 19 7 (g) more generally gives Treasury the
authority to "prescribe such regulations as may be appropriate to carry
out the purposes of this section." 19' The more general language of
I.R.C. §§ 19 7 (g) and 382(m) arguably gives Treasury no more authority than it already possesses as a result of I.R.C. § 7805(a). Judge Vasquez's argument would seem to apply with equal force to the general
language of those provisions; and it makes little sense to grant legal
effect to regulations issued under I.R.C. § 197(g) or the generalized
language of I.R.C. § 382(m) but not those promulgated under I.R.C.
§ 7805 (a). Yet denying such specific authority regulations the force of
law would be unprecedented and would open a whole new field of
argument over which specific authority language is too general to sustain binding regulations. Indeed, Judge Vasquez seems to draw his
line solely upon I.R.C. § 7805(a), again without differentiating that
provision from more generalized specific authority grants.
An alternative explanation for all of these provisions exists that
better fulfills the canon of construction invoked by judge Vasquez and
effectuates the penalty provisions of I.R.C. § 6662. With specific
authority grants that address a particular issue, Congress identifies
particular ambiguities that exist in a statute and tells the administering agency to address them. With complex regulatory statutes such as,
but not limited to, the I.R.C., however, it is often impossible to appreciate which statutory language is unclear or to anticipate every circumstance to which a given provision might or might not apply. With a
general authority grant like I.R.C. § 7805(a), or more generalized specific authority grants as in I.R.C. §§ 19 7 (g) and 382(m), Congress
acknowledges that there may be other, unforeseen ambiguities and
designates the administering agency as primarily responsible for filling those unanticipated gaps. 192 The Supreme Court accepted as
193
much in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc.,
when it described a general authority grant in the Clean Air Act as an
"implicit" delegation of legislative authority. 194 Under this interpretation, the courts can respect the significance of specific authority
190

191

Id. § 197(f)(9) (A).

Id. § 197 (g).

192 See N.Y. STATE BaR Ass'N REPORT, supra note 38, at 2-6 (explaining generalized
specific authority grants and I.R.C. § 7805(a) similarly).
193
194

467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Id. at 843-44.
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grants yet treat all Treasury regulations as legally binding on taxpayers, fully effectuate the language of I.R.C. § 6662, and avoid conflicts
among different grant provision phraseologies.
In short, all Treasury regulations are legislative rules, whether
they were promulgated under specific authority or I.R.C. § 7805(a)
general authority, for the simple reason that they are legally binding
on taxpayers and the government alike. There was a time when general authority Treasury regulations did not carry such legal force, and
thus such regulations were considered to be interpretative rules, but
that time has long since passed. For many years now, general as well
as specific authority Treasury regulations have carried the force and
effect of law. Consequently, Treasury cannot rely on the interpretative rule exception to excuse its failure to adhere to APA section 553
in promulgating temporary regulations.
2.

The Procedural Rule Exception

As noted above, APA section 553(b) also exempts from noticeand-comment rulemaking "rules of agency organization, procedure or
practice." 195 Unlike interpretative rules, procedural rules may be and
often are legally binding, so the legal force that Treasury regulations
carry does not preclude Treasury from claiming that the procedural
rule exception applies. Treasury did not assert the procedural rule
exception in connection with any of the projects studied that involved
temporary regulations. 19 6 As with the interpretative rule exception,
and in contrast to the good cause exception, however, the APA does
not require an agency to assert the procedural rule exception as a
condition of its applicability. 197 But whereas the Internal Revenue
Manual explicitly discusses both interpretative rules and good cause, it
is silent regarding procedural rules. 198
Subchapter F of Title 26 of the C.F.R. contains Treasury regulations involving procedure and administration. 99 Notwithstanding the
label, many regulations in Subchapter F, such as the check-the-box
195

5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (A) (2000).

196 Treasury skipped notice-and-comment rulemaking altogether in the only project studied for which Treasury contemporaneously asserted the procedural rule
exception. See Final Regulations; Place for Filing (T.D. 9156), 69 Fed. Reg. 55,743
(Sept. 16, 2004), 2004-2 C.B. 669; see also discussion supra notes 92-94 (discussing
T.D. 9156).
197 Compare 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (A) (articulating the interpretative and procedural
rule exceptions), with 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (B) (specifying good cause exception
requirements).
198 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUA a, supra note 6, § 32.1.5.4.7.5.1.

199

Id. § 32.1.1.3.2.3.
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regulations of Treasury Regulation §§ 301.7701-1, -2, and -3, have a
major substantive impact on taxpayers.2 00 Meanwhile, many Treasury
regulations not in Subchapter F are arguably procedural in nature, for
example those instructing taxpayers on the time and manner for making certain statutorily provided elections 20 ' or governing other communications between the taxpayers and the IRS. 2 02 Moreover, among

the projects studied, Treasury often either did not issue temporary
regulations under Subchapter F20 3 or adopted such regulations in
20 4
conjunction with others not under Subchapter F.
Consequently, it seems improbable that Treasury's regular practice of issuing temporary regulations without notice and comment
reflects a belief that the procedural rule exception of APA section
553(b) applies. Nevertheless, in some of the projects studied, Treasury might plausibly claim the procedural rule exception.
The courts apply two separate but somewhat overlapping standards to determine whether a rule is substantive or procedural. One
200 By designating certain entities as per se corporations and providing default
rules for classifying other entities in the absence of an elective filing, the check-thebox regulations dictate the federal income tax consequences for a significant number
of taxpayers. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -3 (as amended in 2006). These regulations also radically overhauled the I.R.C.'s previous approach to entity classification
and departed from Supreme Court precedent on the issue. See Dean, supra note 165,
at 421-51 (describing entity classification before and after check-the-box); see also
supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text (discussing legislative character of checkthe-box regulations).
201 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.43-6 (1992) (providing time and manner for electing
out of I.R.C. § 43 enhanced oil recovery credit); id. § 1.83-2 (1978) (providing time
and manner for electing to recognize income from property transferred in connection with the performance of services in the year of transfer under I.R.C. § 83(b)).
202 See, e.g., id. § 1.6015-5 (as amended in 2002) (providing time and manner for
requesting innocent spouse relief under I.R.C. § 6015).
203 See, e.g., Temporary Regulations; Credit for Increasing Research Activities
(T.D. 9205), 70 Fed. Reg. 29,596 (May 24, 2005), 2005-1 C.B. 1267 (adopting temporary regulations concerning computation and allocation of research credit among
members of a controlled group); Final and Temporary Regulations; Partner's Distributive Share: Foreign Tax Expenditures (T.D. 9121), 69 Fed. Reg. 21,405 (Apr. 21,
2004), 2004-1 C.B. 903 (issuing temporary regulations regarding allocation of partnership expenditures for foreign taxes).
204 See, e.g., Final and Temporary Regulations; Residence and Source Rules Involving U.S. Possessions and Other Conforming Changes (T.D. 9194), 70 Fed. Reg.
18,920 (Apr. 11, 2005), 2005-1 C.B. 1016 (issuing temporary regulations, only partly
under Subchapter F, concerning residency and source of income in connection with
certain U.S. possessions); Final and Temporary Regulations; Guidance Necessary To
Facilitate Business Electronic Filing (T.D. 9100), 68 Fed. Reg. 70,701 (Dec. 19, 2003),
2004-1 C.B. 297 (adopting temporary regulations, only partly under Subchapter F, to
remove regulatory obstacles to electronic filing).
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test asks whether the rule in question has a "substantial impact" on
regulated parties.2 0 5 This test emphasizes the magnitude of the burden imposed by a rule over the rule's actual nature in determining
when to require public notice and comment.2 1 6 Other courts have
moved away from the substantial impact test toward another standard
that asks whether the rule in question "encodes a substantive value
judgment."21 17 By this "value judgment" standard,2"8 procedural rules
may impose great burdens on regulated parties so long as they merely
"alter the manner in which the parties present themselves or their
viewpoints to the agency," as opposed to the parties' substantive rights
20 9
and interests.
The substantial impact and value judgment tests are both frustratingly vague. There is some debate over the extent to which the two
tests overlap in practice. 2 10 Hence, the goal of the courts sometimes is
merely to keep the procedural rule exception from swallowing the
205 See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v.Johnson, 22 F.3d 616, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1994)
(discussing and applying the substantial impact test), modified, 36 F.3d 89 (5th Cir.
1994) (unpublished table decision); U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744
F.2d 1145, 1153 (5th Cir. 1984) (same); Nat'l Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United
States, 268 F. Supp. 90, 96 (D.D.C. 1967) (threejudge court), affd 393 U.S. 18
(1968).
206 See Jeffrey S. Lubbers & Nancy G. Miller, The APA Procedural Rule Exemption:
Looking for a Way to Clear the Air, 6 ADMIN. L.J. Am. U. 481, 485-86 (1992) (describing

the substantial impact test).
207 See Pub. Citizen v. Dep't of State, 276 F.3d 634, 640 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting
the shift); Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (same); see
also RSM, Inc. v. Buckles, 254 F.3d 61, 68-69 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying the value
judgment test).
208 There does not seem to be a common label for this test. Jeffrey Lubbers and
Nancy Miller refer to it as the "encoding" test. Lubbers & Miller, supra note 206, at
487. Tracy Corell Hauser calls it the "substantive value" test. Tracy Corell Hauser,
The Administrative Procedure Act, Procedural Rule Exception to the Notice and Comment
Requirement-A Survey of Cases, 5 ADMIN. L.J. 519, 543-44 (1991). I use the label "value

judgment" here as more descriptive than "encoding" and less likely than "substantial
value" to be confused with "substantial impact."
209 JEM Broad. Co. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 320, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Batterton v.
Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); see also RSM, 254 F.3d at 68-69 (quoting JEM Broadcasting).

210 See RSM, 254 F.3d at 68-69 (applying the value judgment test but using substantial interest language); Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 174 F.3d
206, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (employing both substantial impact and value judgment
language); Hauser, supra note 208, at 544 (suggesting that the value judgment standard is "merely the substantial impact test with a new name"). But see Lubbers &
Miller, supra note 206, at 486 n.31 (disagreeing with Hauser and claiming that the
standards are distinct).
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notice-and-comment rule. 21 1 For example, in JEM BroadcastingCo. v.
FCC,2 12 the D.C. Circuit considered a "hard look" rule that dismissed
without opportuni.y to cure any broadcasting license application that
was not "substantially complete. '' 2 13 Even though the FCC's hard look
rule might operate to "cause the loss of substantive rights," the JEM
court found the rule to be procedural because it "did not change the
substantive standards by which the FCC evaluate[d] license
214
applications."
Similarly, in National Whistleblower Center v. NuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC),2 15 the D.C. Circuit assessed a rule stating that extensions of time to file requests to intervene in nuclear power plant
license renewal proceedings would be granted only "when warranted
by unavoidable and extreme circumstances."2 1 6 Although the NRC's
extension standard functioned to preclude the petitioner from
presenting its views in a particular license renewal hearing, the court
found the rule to be procedural because it did not foreclose thirdparty participation in such hearings altogether, but instead merely
demanded that interested parties offer good reasons for failing to
2 17
meet reasonable deadlines.
Considering both the standards as articulated and examples of
their application, Treasury might plausibly claim the procedural rule
exception for several of the projects studied. For example, T.D. 9175
adopted temporary regulations requiring certain corporate and
exempt organization taxpayers to file their tax returns electronically
but offering a potential hardship waiver provision for exceptional circumstances.2 1 8 These regulations would seem to fall directly in the
procedural rule category, as filing electronically as opposed to in
paper form does not alter any taxpayer's tax liability but merely
changes how that the origins of that tax liability are communicated to
the IRS. Another project, represented by T.D. 9168, adopted regulations providing the time and manner for electing a ten-year write-off
211 See, e.g., JEM Broad., 22 F.3d at 327 (acknowledging but rejecting litigant's
argument from precedent for this reason).
212 22 F.3d 320.
213 Id. at 322-23.
214 Id. at 327.
215

208 F.3d 256 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

216 Id. at 259 (quoting Policy on Conduct of Adjudicatory Proceedings, 63 Fed.
Reg. 41,872, 41,874 (Aug. 5, 1998)).
217 Id. at 262-63.
218 Temporary Regulations; Returns Required on Magnetic Media (T.D. 9175), 70
Fed. Reg. 2012 (Jan. 12, 2005), 2005-1 C.B. 665.
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period for certain tax preference items under I.R.C. § 59(e).2 19
Because the statute provides for the election-and thus the substantive tax consequences-regulations that merely detail the process by
which a taxpayer may make that election seem at least arguably
2 20
procedural.
Nevertheless, most of the temporary Treasury regulations evaluated in the study were not procedural rules. There is simply no good
argument that temporary regulations extending the availability of
22
I.R.C. § 338(h) (10) elections to certain multi-step transactions, '
resolving a circuit split over whether and when changes in computing
depreciation or amortization represent accounting method changes
requiring IRS approval, 222 or providing new ordering rules for asset
basis reductions in bankruptcy
219

2 23

are procedural in character. Such

Final Regulation; Optional 10-year Writeoff of Certain Preferences (T.D.

9168), 69 Fed. Reg. 76,614 (Dec. 22, 2004), 2005-1 C.B. 354.
220 Compare I.R.C. § 59(e) (2000) (establishing the nature and scope of the tax
preference write-off election), with Treas. Reg. § 1.59-1 (2004) (setting forth the time
and manner of election).
221 See Final and Temporary Regulations; Effect of Elections in Certain Multi-Step
Transactions (T.D. 9071), 68 Fed. Reg. 40,766 (July 9, 2003), 2003-2 C.B. 560 (adopting temporary regulations permitting I.R.C. § 338(h) (10) elections for certain multistep transactions). I.R.C. § 338(h) (10) allows a buyer and seller of the stock of a
target corporation that is part of a consolidated group to elect to treat the stock sale
as a liquidation of the target followed by a sale of the target's assets to the purchaser,
thus triggering target-level asset gain recognition prior to the sale but permitting the
target to go forward under the new ownership with a stepped-up basis in its assets for
depreciation and other tax purposes. See I.R.C. § 338(h) (10).
222 See Final and Temporary Regulations; Changes in Computing Depreciation
(T.D. 9105), 69 Fed. Reg. 5 (Jan. 2, 2004), 2004-1 C.B. 419, 420 (adopting temporary
regulations to resolve the circuit split). I.R.C. § 446(e) generally requires a taxpayer
to seek consent of the Secretary of the Treasury before changing accounting methods. See I.R.C. § 446(e). Compare Comm'r v. Brookshire Bros. Holding, 320 F.3d 507,
513 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that an asset classification change and resulting cost
recovery period change was not an accounting method change), O'Shaughnessy v.
Comm'r, 332 F.3d 1125, 1131-32 (8th Cir. 2003) (same), and Green Forest Mfg. Inc.
v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1020, 1024 (2003) (same), with Kurzet v. Comm'r, 222
F.2d 830, 842-45 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that an asset classification change and
resulting cost recovery period change was an accounting method change).
223 See Final and Temporary Regulations; Reduction of Tax Attributes Due to Discharge of Indebtedness (T.D. 9080), 68 Fed. Reg. 42,590 (July 18, 2003), 2003-2 C.B.
696 (adopting temporary regulations providing new ordering rules governing attribute reduction under I.R.C. §§ 108 and 1017 in certain bankruptcy contexts). I.R.C.
§ 108 allows certain bankrupt taxpayers to exclude income from the discharge of
indebtedness from taxable income but requires such taxpayers to correspondingly
reduce tax attributes such as asset basis in accordance with ordering rules provided in
I.R.C. §§ 108 and 1017. I.R.C. §§ 108(a)-(b), 1017. T.D. 9080 reversed earlier, informal guidance regarding basis reduction for assets acquired from certain bankrupt
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regulations did not merely tweak the way that taxpayers interact with
the government. Instead, they elaborated substantive provisions of
the I.R.C. in substantive ways, for example granting tax benefits to
some taxpayers while denying them to others on the merits.
Accordingly, the procedural rule exception does not explain
Treasury's use of temporary regulations generally. Nevertheless, Treasury may be able to rely upon that exception successfully to excuse its
decision to issue temporary regulations in some projects.
3.

The Good Cause Exception

As already noted, APA section 553(b) provides a good cause
exception from notice and comment where an agency finds that process to be "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest."2 24 In almost all of these projects, Treasury's reliance on the good
cause exception presents problems of form, substance, or both.
First, the APA requires an agency invoking the good cause exception to do so expressly and to provide "a brief statement of reasons"
along with the regulations being issued. 2 25 Treasury explicitly
asserted the good cause exception in only fifteen of the eighty-four
projects studied in which it promulgated temporary regulations. 226 In
most of the others, Treasury merely included in the preamble a statement to the effect that "it has been determined that section 553(b) of
the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 5) does not apply
to these regulations." 2 27 The remaining three T.D.s were wholly silent
regarding the APA.
entities. See I.R.S. Field Serv. Advice 200145009 (July 31, 2001). Treasury subsequently issued final regulations narrowing the scope of the temporary regulations. See
Final and Temporary Regulations; Reduction of Tax Attributes Due to Discharge of
Indebtedness (T.D. 9127), 69 Fed. Reg. 26,038 (May 11, 2004), 2004-1 C.B. 1042. See
generally Janara N. Jones & Maryann D'Angelo, Sections 108 and 1017 Regulations: Was
It Really Too Much Candy for the Nickel?, CORP. TAx'N, July/Aug. 2004, at 3, 5-6 (comparing the final regulations with the temporary regulations and the earlier Field Service Advice).
224 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2000); see also discussion supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text (discussing the good cause exception).
225 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B).
226 See, e.g., Temporary Regulations; Guidance Under Section 1502; Treatment of
Loss Carryovers From Separate Return Limitation Years (T.D. 9155), 69 Fed. Reg.
51,175 (Aug. 18, 2004), 2004-2 C.B. 562; Final and Temporary Regulations (T.D.
9071), 68 Fed. Reg. 40,766; Temporary Regulations; Distributions of Interests in a
Loss Corporation from Qualified Trusts (T.D. 9063), 68 Fed. Reg. 38,177 (June 27,
2003), 2003-2 C.B. 510, 511.
227 See Final Regulations; Sickness or Accident Disability Payments (T.D. 9233), 70
Fed. Reg. 74,198, 74,199 (Dec. 15, 2005), 2006-3 I.R.B. 303, 304; see also Final Regula-
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The courts have been inconsistent in requiring agencies to
invoke the good cause exception explicitly. 228

Some courts have

refused to recognize good cause unless the agency contemporaneously and expressly invoked the good cause exception. 229 For example, in Bohner v. Daniels,230 the Bureau of Prisons published interim
final rules concerning an early release program with only the statement that it was "'publishing this change as an interim rule in order
to solicit public comment while continuing to provide consideration
for early release to qualified inmates." 23 ' The court considered this
23 2
language inadequate to assert good cause.
Other courts have recognized as sufficient nonexplicit language
in a preamble, like the blanket disclaimer commonly found in T.D.s
that "[i]t has been determined that section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 5) does not apply to this regulation."23 3 For example, in National Customs Brokers & ForwardersAss'n of
America v. United States,23 4 the court accepted an agency's vague asser-

tion that its regulations were "'not subject to the notice and public

procedure requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 553"' as a claim of good
cause. 235 Similarly, in Utility Solid Waste Activities Group v.

EPA,2 3 6

the

tion; Testimony or Production of Records in a Court or Other Proceeding (T.D.
9178), 70 Fed. Reg. 7396, 7396 (Feb. 14, 2005), 2005-1 C.B. 708, 709 (containing
similar language); Final and Temporary Regulations; Electronic Filing of Duplicate
Forms 5472 (T.D. 9113), 69 Fed. Reg. 5931, 5931 (Feb. 9, 2004), 2004-1 C.B. 524, 525
(same).
228 See, e.g., 1 CHARLES KoCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.14, at 344-45
(2d ed. 1997) (noting judicial inconsistency and citing cases).
229 See, e.g., Buschmann v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 352, 356-57 (9th Cir. 1982);
Bohner v. Daniels, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1176 (D. Or. 2003).
230 243 F. Supp. 2d 1171.
231 Id. at 1176 (quoting Drug Abuse Treatment and Intensive Confinement
Center Programs: Early Release Consideration, 62 Fed. Reg. 53,690 (Oct. 15, 1997)).
232 Id.
233 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 32.1.5.4.7.5.4.3 (suggesting this
language); see also Temporary Regulations; Credit for Increasing Research Activities
(T.D. 9205), 70 Fed. Reg. 29,596, 29,600 (May 24, 2005), 2005-1 C.B. 1267, 1271
(using nearly identical language); Final Regulation; Real Estate Mortgage Investment
Conduits; Application of Section 446 With Respect to Inducement Fees (T.D. 9128),
69 Fed. Reg. 26,040, 26,040 (May 11, 2004), 2004-1 C.B. 943, 944 (same); Final and
Temporary Regulations; Constructive Transfers and Transfers of Property to a Third
Party on Behalf of a Spouse (T.D. 9035), 68 Fed. Reg. 1534, 1536 (Jan. 13, 2003),
2003-1 C.B. 528, 531 (same). But see supra note 91 and accompanying text (hypothesizing from the Internal Revenue Manual that such language intends to invoke the
interpretative rule exception).
234 59 F.3d 1219 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
235 Id. at 1224 (quoting Express Consignments; Formal and Informal Entries of
Merchandise; Administrative Exemptions, 59 Fed. Reg. 30,289, 30,293 Uune 13,
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court held that the agency invoked good cause with a single sentence
in the preamble describing the action in question as "minor, routine
clarifications that will not have a significant effect on industry or the
23 7
public."
Even if Treasury's customary sentence suffices to invoke the good
cause exception, the APA also requires an agency invoking the good
cause exception to provide a contemporaneous explanation of its reasons for doing so. The court in National Customs Brokers recognized
the agency's vague assertion of good cause as adequate largely
because the preamble also included a long and detailed explanation
of the agency's basis for finding good cause. 238 In both Bohner and
Utility Solid Waste Activities Group, by contrast, the courts emphasized
239
the inadequacy of the language offered to satisfy this requirement.
Some courts have been willing to glean good cause from a rule's context; 240 but in general, the courts are unlikely to find Treasury's blan-

ket assertions of APA section 553(b)'s inapplicability sufficient
24 1
explanation to sustain a claim of good cause.
Treasury's more explicit assertions of the good cause exception
are unlikely to fare much better. In evaluating good cause claims, the
courts balance an attitude of deference to agency judgment against a
need to prevent the exception from overwhelming the notice-andcomment rule. 24 2 To achieve that goal, the courts emphasize the

need for specific and particularized explanations of the necessity for
avoiding notice and comment. 243 Correspondingly, the courts typically consider brief and generic declarations of the need for immediate action or guidance inadequate to sustain a finding of good
1994)); see also id. at 1223-24 (accepting agency's assertion that regulations were not
subject to requirements of APA section 553 based upon agency's detailed explanation
of good cause, notwithstanding agency's failure to assert the exception explicitly).
236 236 F.3d 749 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
237 Id. at 754-55.
238 See Nat'l Customs Brokers, 59 F.3d at 1223-24.
239 See Util. Solid Waste Activities Group, 236 F.3d at 754-55; Bohner v. Daniels, 243
F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1176 (D. Or. 2003).
240 See, e.g., Nader v. Sawhill, 514 F.2d 1064, 1068-69 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1975).
241 See I KoCH, supra note 228, § 4.14, at 345 (observing that the trend is toward
requiring and scrutinizing agency explanations).
242 See, e.g., Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 743-56 (2d Cir. 1995); see
also 1 PIERCE, supra note 2, § 7.10 at 506-07 (discussing the good cause exemption

and cases where courts considered its application).
243 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Evans, 316 F.3d 904, 912 (9th Cir.
2003) (requiring context-specific analysis); Consumer Energy Council of Am. v.
FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (requiring contemporaneous explanation
of rationale supporting good cause claim).
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cause. 244 While the length of an agency's explanation is not necessarily determinative, the likelihood of an agency's success in invoking
24 5
the good cause exception correlates to the degree of detail offered.
Conclusory statements of good cause are generally inadequate, while
extensive and fact-specific justifications more often prevail.
Yet where a drafter of Treasury regulations finds notice and comment to be contrary to the public interest, the Internal Revenue Manual recommends only the following explanatory language: "These
regulations are necessary to provide taxpayers with immediate guidance." 246 Several projects studied asserted good cause using only this

language, or something closely resembling it.247 Such projects
included T.D. 9117, which adopted complex temporary regulations
for the applicability of I.R.C. § 108 tax attribution rules in the consolidated group context, 2 48 and T.D. 9048, which promulgated detailed
regulations under I.R.C. § 1502 concerning the deductibility of cer244 See Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 746 ("A mere recitation that good cause exists,
coupled with a desire to provide immediate guidance [or take immediate action],
does not amount to good cause."); see also, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dep't of Energy,
610 F.2d 796, 803 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979) ("It is axiomatic that a mere recital of
good cause does not create good cause. Similarly, a desire to provide immediate guidance, without more, does not suffice for good cause."); Nader, 514 F.2d at 1068
(agreeing with appellants that permitting a conclusory statement to establish good
cause would allow the exemption to the notice requirement to "swallow the rule").
245 Compare, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, 316 F.3d at 906, 912 (rejecting good
cause explanation as insufficiently context-specific), with Or. Trollers Ass'n v. Gutierrez, 452 F.3d 1104, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2006) (approving longer and more detailed
good cause explanation under similar circumstances), petition for cert. filed, 75
U.S.L.W. 3266 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2006) (No. 06-622).
246 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 32.1.5.4.7.5.1. The Internal Revenue Manual's emphasis on the contrary to the public interest prong of the good cause
exception is contradicted by the claim in one prominent treatise that Treasury
promulgates temporary regulations based on the exception's impracticability prong.
See BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS
46.04[1] (3d
ed. 2002).
247 See, e.g., Temporary Regulations; Guidance Under Section 1502; Treatment of
Loss Carryovers From Separate Return Limitation Years (T.D. 9155), 69 Fed. Reg.
51,175 (Aug. 18, 2004), 2004-2 C.B. 562; Final Regulations and Removal of Temporary Regulations; Return of Partnership Income (T.D. 9117), 69 Fed. Reg. 12,069
(Mar. 15, 2004), 2004-1 C.B. 721, 723; Temporary Regulations; Guidance Under Section 1502; Application of Section 108 to Members of a Consolidated Group (T.D.
9098), 68 Fed. Reg. 69,024 (Dec. 11, 2003), 2003-2 C.B. 1248, 1249; Final and Temporary Regulations; Effect of Elections in Certain Multi-Step Transactions (T.D. 9071),
68 Fed. Reg. 40,766 (July 9, 2003), 2003-2 C.B. 560, 561; Final and Temporary Regulations; Guidance Under Section 1502; Suspension of Losses on Certain Stock Dispositions (T.D. 9048), 68 Fed. Reg. 12,287 (Mar. 14, 2003), 2003-1 C.B. 645, 648
248 See Final Regulations and Removal of Temporary Regulations (T.D. 9117), 69
Fed. Reg. 12,069.
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tain subsidiary stock losses after the Rite Aid court invalidated prede249
cessor regulations.
Inadequacies of form are not Treasury's only problem with the
good cause exception, however. The courts at least purport to construe the good cause exception narrowly; and it is unlikely that many
Treasury regulations satisfy the substantive requirements for invoking
the good cause exception.
As originally conceived, the good cause exception was intended
for a limited set of situations. APA section 553(b) provides that the
good cause exception is available where an agency finds the public
notice-and-comment process to be "impracticable, unnecessary, or
contrary to the public interest." 250 APA section 553(b) (B) uses the
disjunctive "or,"' 25 1 so both the Attorney General'sManual on the Administrative ProcedureAct and many judicial opinions assume three separate
and distinct categories under which an agency might establish good
cause. 25 2 Impracticability applies primarily when "due and timely execution of [an agency's] functions would be impeded by" notice and
comment. 25 3 Notice and comment are "unnecessary" if the agency
action in question is "a minor rule or amendment in which the public
is not particularly interested. '254 Finally, the public interest aspect of
the exception applies where "the interest of the public would be
defeated by any requirement of advance notice." 255 In other words,
the good cause exception exists principally to give agencies flexibility
in dealing with emergencies and typographical errors, plus the occasional situation in which advance notice would be counterproductive.
249 See Final and Temporary Regulations (T.D. 9048), 68 Fed. Reg. 12,287; see also
discussion supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing Rite Aid and related
T.D.s, all of which claimed the good cause exception on similar grounds).

250 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (B) (2000).
251 Id.
252 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Evans, 316 F.3d 904, 911-12 (9th Cir.
2003) (discussing and applying impracticability prong); Util. Solid Waste Activities
Group v. EPA, 236 F.3d 749, 754-55 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (analyzing each prong individually); Nat'l Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass'n of Am. v. U.S., 59 F.3d 1219, 1223-24
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (considering agency's separate claims under unnecessary and public
interest prongs); Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 746-47 (2d Cir. 1995)
(recognizing inquiry raised by each prong); ATToRNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note
3, at 30-31 (discussing good cause exception as three separate categories); see also
discussion supra note 119 (noting the authoritative weight that the courts give the
Attorney General's Manual in interpreting the APA).
253 A-roRNEv GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 3, at 30.
254 Id. at 31.
255 Id.
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In actual application, cases considering agency invocation of the
good cause exception are sufficiently fact-specific as to render easy
categorization difficult. For example, expressions of "generic timeliness concerns" and/or complaints about the difficulty in meeting congressionally imposed deadlines are inadequate to sustain a claim of
impracticability; 25 6 but such rationales accompanied by specific details
may be sufficient. 25 7 As noted, the courts are often skeptical of
generic assertions of the need for immediate guidance; 258 yet courts
have been sympathetic to agency claims of the need for quick action
in the face of suddenly changed circumstances, 259 particularly where
the rules adopted are interim in nature and the agency simultaneously
seeks public comment and considers such input in subsequently issuing final rules. 2 60 Airline pilot certification regulations in the months
after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks qualified for the good
cause exception, 261 as did air safety regulations following a spate of
fatal air tour accidents. 262 The good cause exception applied to
interim final regulations promulgated to resolve a federal court split
regarding county employee overtime pay that created an "enormous
unforeseen liability of [State and local] governments" that potentially
263
"threaten [ed] their fiscal integrity."
The circumstances in which Treasury issues temporary regulations typically are not particularly dire. For example, in 2003, Treasury issued T.D. 9089 with temporary regulations governing the
reduction of tax attributes within consolidated groups upon the exclu-

256 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, 316 F.3d at 912; Cal-Almond v. U.S. Dep't of
Agric., 14 F.3d 429, 441-42 (9th Cir. 1993); Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Dep't of
Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1990), vacated by 498 U.S. 1023 (1991).
257 See, e.g., Or. Trollers Ass'n v. Gutierrez, 452 F.3d 1104, 1125 (9th Cir. 2006),
petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3266 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2006) (No. 06-622); Xin-Chang
Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 746 (2d Cir. 1995); Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v.
Shalala, 38 F.3d 1225, 1236-37 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
258

See supra note 244 and accompanying text.

259 See, e.g.,
Jifrey v. FAA, 370 F.3d 1174, 1179-80 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Haw. Helicopter Operators Ass'n v. FAA, 51 F.3d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1995).
260 See, e.g.,
Nat'l Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass'n of Am. v. United States, 59
F.3d 1219, 1223-24 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
261

Seefifrey, 370 F.3d at 1179-80.

262

See Haw. Helicopter Operators, 51 F.3d at 214.

263 Service Employees Intern. Union, Local 102 v. County of San Diego, 60 F.3d
1346, 1352 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Exemptions From Minimum Wage and Overtime Compensation Requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act; Public Sector
Employers, 56 Fed. Reg. 45,824, 45,825 (Sept. 6, 1991)).
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sion by a member of debt forgiveness income under I.R.C. § 108.264
These regulations were drafted to elaborate the consequences of the
Supreme Court's decision two years earlier in June 2001 in United

Dominion Industries,Inc. v. United States265 on that topic. With one of its
more elaborate good cause explanations, Treasury claimed that
" [c]urrent circumstances have made the application of section 108 in
the consolidated group context an issue that needs to be addressed at
this time" and that "consolidated groups may be taking positions that
are inconsistent with the policies underlying section 108 and the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in" United Dominion.266 Yet, in
the more than two years between United Dominion and T.D. 9089, consolidated groups had been filing returns, perhaps misinterpreting the
Court's murky United Dominion analysis, or perhaps not. Treasury
offered no argument that failing to address United Dominion immediately through binding regulations would imperil the fisc; and the
delay in Treasury's reaction to United Dominion raises some doubt as to
the sudden need for immediate guidance two years later.
Similarly, in T.D. 9158, Treasury adopted temporary regulations
that provided a methodology for treating a contingent nuclear power
plant decommissioning liability assumed in connection with a bulk
asset acquisition as part of the purchase price to be allocated as basis
among the assets acquired. 267 Treasury again asserted the good cause
exception on the ground that the regulations were necessary immediately "to remove an impediment to such transactions." 268 Yet the IRS
had been issuing private letter rulings to taxpayers for years in such
269
transactions, admittedly with a different approach to the problem.
The IRS's past practice in handling the matter through informal guidance and Treasury's delay in addressing the issue render suspect
Treasury's claimed need for immediate guidance in T.D. 9158.
Occasionally, a court has upheld a claim of good cause in lessthan-emergency circumstances. In National Customs Brokers & Forward264 See Temporary Regulations; Guidance Under Section 1502; Application of Section 108 to Members of a Consolidated Group (T.D. 9089), 68 Fed. Reg. 52,487 (Sept.
4, 2003), 2003-2 C.B. 906.
265 532 U.S. 822 (2001).
266 Temporary Regulations (T.D. 9089), 68 Fed. Reg. 52,487.
267 See Final and Temporary Regulations; Treatment of Certain Nuclear Decommissioning Funds for Purposes of Allocating Purchase Price in Certain Deemed and
Actual Asset Acquisitions (T.D. 9158), 69 Fed. Reg. 55,740 (Sept. 16, 2004), 2004-2
C.B. 665.
268 Id.
269 See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-21-028 (May 25, 2001); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
200049021 (Dec. 8, 2000); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-04-040 (Jan. 28, 2000).
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ers Ass'n of America v. United States, 2 70 the court upheld a claim of good
cause for temporary Customs Service regulations concerning the
importation of merchandise valued at $200.271 The agency persuaded
the court that pre-promulgation notice and comment was both unnecessary because Congress directed the regulations' promulgation in
legislation enacted only six months previously and contrary to the
public interest because the public would benefit from resulting savings and efficiencies. 27 2 None of the temporary regulations evaluated
seem precisely to fit this scenario, but future temporary regulations
might.
Another area in which Treasury might plausibly assert good cause
for issuing temporary binding regulations without the benefit of
notice and comment is in its efforts to combat abusive tax shelters. In
explaining the public interest prong of the good cause exception, the
Attorney General's Manual on the AdministrativeProcedureAct offers price
controls as a situation in which "the interest of the public would be
defeated by any requirement of advance notice." 2 73 The rationale is
obvious: Advance public knowledge of price controls would distort the
market and undermine the goals that the government seeks to accomplish in imposing the controls. Similarly, Treasury might plausibly
argue that temporary regulations are necessary to combat tax shelter
abuse by demonstrating that issuing proposed regulations alone
would prompt taxpayers merely to execute their abusive transactions
before Treasury could finalize the regulations. Treasury's ability
under I.R.C. § 7805(b) to make Treasury regulations retroactively
2 74
applicable may undercut such an argument, however.
In the projects evaluated for the study, Treasury attempted a few
times to make such a claim, but did so only in the most general terms.
For example, T.D. 9062 issued temporary regulations intended to
combat a series of tax shelters that exploited an ambiguity in the
I.R.C. regarding the treatment of liabilities transferred in connection
with property to a partnership in exchange for a partnership interest.2 75 In issuing the temporary regulations, Treasury asserted the
good cause exception, but with only a brief, conclusory statement that

270 59 F.3d 1219 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
271 Id. at 1220-21.
272 Id. at 1223-24.
273 ArORNv GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 3, at 31.
274 See I.R.C. § 7805(b) (2000).
275 Temporary Regulations; Assumption of Partner Liabilities (T.D. 9062), 68 Fed.
Reg. 37,414 (June 24, 2003), 2003-2 C.B. 46.
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the regulations were "necessary to prevent abusive transactions." 2 76
Moreover, in the case of T.D. 9062, Treasury adopted the temporary
regulations a full two years after issuing a nonbinding notice condemning the same transaction. 27 7 Nevertheless, T.D. 9062 explained
at length the transaction the regulations being promulgated were
intended to combat; 27 8 and Treasury might be able to persuade a
court of the need for legally binding temporary regulations to prevent
taxpayers from consummating transactions while final regulations
were pending.
In short, if Treasury is relying on the good cause exception to
justify generally its promulgation of temporary regulations in many of
its regulatory projects, then Treasury is making a big gamble. On
occasion, circumstances may exist around which Treasury could plausibly argue that good cause exists for seeking comment only after
promulgating temporary regulations, but usually that is not the case.
Even where such conditions may be present, however, Treasury leaves
its good cause claims susceptible to legal challenge by not asserting
the exception clearly or explaining its reasoning with specificity and
particularity.
4.

Summary

In summary, Treasury's frequent use of temporary regulations
with only post-promulgation opportunity for comment is potentially
problematic and leaves many of Treasury's regulations open to legal
challenge as adopted inconsistently with the rulemaking requirements
of APA section 553. Treasury's position that most of its regulations
are interpretative and therefore exempt is based on an anachronistic
understanding of the exception and misguided in light of modern
legal doctrine. A few Treasury regulations evaluated in the study
might qualify for the procedural rule exception, but not very many.
Treasury only explicitly invoked the good cause exception as required
by APA section 553(b) (B) in a small number of projects. Even where
it did, Treasury's findings of good cause were usually inadequately
explained, if indeed such justification actually existed. The exceptions from APA section 553 rulemaking requirements do not support
Treasury's utilization of temporary regulations without notice and
comment.
276 Id.; see also I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255 (describing the abusive transactions which T.D. 9062 addresses).
277 Temporary Regulations (T.D. 9062), 68 Fed. Reg. 37,414; I.R.S. Notice 200044, 2000-2 C.B. 255.
278 Temporary Regulations (T.D. 9062), 68 Fed. Reg. 37,414.
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Straight to FinalRegulations (or Good Cause, Redux)

Unfortunately, temporary regulations are not Treasury's only procedural weakness. As noted above, Treasury skipped the notice-andcomment process altogether in eleven projects. In one such project,
reflected in T.D. 9224, Treasury contemporaneously invoked the
interpretative rule exception, 279 which is inapplicable to Treasury regulations for the reasons discussed above. 280 In another project studied for which Treasury bypassed notice and comment, represented by
T.D. 9156, Treasury contemporaneously asserted the procedural rule
exception. 28 1 With T.D. 9156, Treasury amended regulations regarding the place for filing tax returns and other taxpayer documents to
reflect changes in the IRS's organizational structure. 28 2 For example,
the revised regulations instruct corporate taxpayers to deliver their
returns to "any person assigned the responsibility to receive returns"
in the relevant local IRS office rather than "the district director" for
the applicable IRS district. 283 As discussed above, regulations such as

28 4
these may indeed qualify for the procedural rule exception.
As with the temporary regulations, however, in most of the
projects in which Treasury did not pursue notice and comment at all,
Treasury either explicitly asserted the good cause exception as the reason for doing so 28 5 or merely asserted the inapplicability of APA section 553(b) without explanation. 28 6 As discussed above, the

279 See Final Regulations; Updating Estimated Income Tax Regulations Under Section 6654 (T.D. 9224), 70 Fed. Reg. 52,299 (Sept. 2, 2005), 2005-2 C.B. 688 (adopting
regulations updating rules and procedures for estimated income tax payments).
280 See supra Part III.A.1.
281 See Final Regulations; Place for Filing (T.D. 9156), 69 Fed. Reg. 55,743 (Sept.
16, 2004), 2004-2 C.B. 669. Treasury also asserted the good cause exception, discussed in Parts III.A.3 and III.B, as an additional basis for bypassing notice and
comment.
282 Id.
283 Treas. Reg. § 1.6091-2(b) (as amended by Final Regulations; Place for Filing
(T.D. 9156), 69 Fed. Reg. 55,743 (Sept. 16, 2004), 2004-2 C.B. 669).
284 See supra Part III.A.2.
285 See Removal of Temporary Regulation; Transitional Rule for Vested Accrued
Vacation Pay (T.D. 9138), 69 Fed. Reg. 42,559, 42560 (July 16, 2004), 2004-2 C.B. 160;
Final Regulations; Confidential Transactions (T.D. 9108), 68 Fed. Reg. 75,128, 75,129
(Dec. 30, 2003), 2004-1 C.B. 429, 430; Final Regulations; Information Statements for
Certain Substitute Payments (T.D. 9103), 68 Fed. Reg. 74,847, 74,848 (Dec. 29, 2003),
2004-1 C.B. 306, 306; Removal of Final Regulations; Installment Payments (T.D.
9096), 68 Fed. Reg. 67,595, 67,595 (Dec. 3, 2003), 2003-2 C.B. 1222, 1222; Final Rule;
Amendment of 26 C.F.R. 301.6103(n)-i to Incorporate Taxpayer Browsing Protection
Act (T.D. 9044), 68 Fed. Reg. 11,739, 11,740 (Mar. 12, 2003), 2003-1 C.B. 690, 691.
286 See Final Regulations; Low-Income Housing Credit Allocation and Certification
(T.D. 9228), 70 Fed. Reg. 67,355, 67,355 (Nov. 7, 2005), 2005-2 C.B. 972, 973; Final
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interpretative rule exception does not apply to excuse Treasury's decision not to pursue notice-and-comment rulemaking. The procedural
rule exception may apply to excuse a few more projects, such as T.D.
9228, which allows taxpayers eligible for the low-income housing
credit to file a required form once every fifteen years rather than
yearly. 28 7 For many of these projects, however, the procedural rule
exception clearly will not apply. That leaves good cause as the only
exception available to justify Treasury's actions.
Treasury's reliance on the good cause exception in promulgating
final regulations without notice and comment raises many of the same
issues of form noted above with respect to temporary regulations. 28 8
Where Treasury did not assert the good cause exception explicitly but
merely denied the applicability of APA section 553(b) in conclusory
fashion, Treasury ignored the express requirement of APA section
553(b) (B). Where Treasury clearly claimed good cause, Treasury
offered only very brief explanations.
In some cases, Treasury's minimalist style seemed appropriate.
For example, T.D.s 9174, 9138, and 9096 simply removed Treasury
regulations that Congress rendered obsolete when it repealed the
related statutes twenty years ago. 28 9 Treasury explicitly asserted the
good cause exception in T.D.s 9138 and 9096, and its explanation in
each was brief but to the point: "Because this rule merely removes
regulatory provisions made obsolete by statute, prior notice and comment and a delayed effective date are unnecessary and contrary to the
public interest." 29 0 For other projects, however, good cause is more
doubtful. For example, in T.D. 9108, Treasury skipped notice and
Rule; Delay of Effective Date; Exclusions from Gross Income of Foreign Corporations
(T.D. 9218), 70 Fed. Reg. 45,529, 45,530 (Aug. 8, 2005), 2005-2 C.B. 503, 504; Final
Regulations; Substantial Understatement of Income Tax Liability (T.D. 9174), 70 Fed.
Reg. 704, 704 (Jan. 5, 2005), 2005-1 C.B. 629, 629; Final Regulations; Low-Income
Housing Credit Allocation Certification; Electronic Filing (T.D. 9112), 69 Fed. Reg.
3826, 3826 (Jan. 27, 2004), 2004-1 C.B. 523, 523; Final Regulations; Earned Income
Credit for Taxable Years Beginning After December 31, 1978 (T.D. 9045), 68 Fed.
Reg. 10,655, 10,656 (Mar. 6, 2003), 2003-1 C.B. 610, 610.
287 See, e.g., Final Regulations; Low-Income Housing Credit Allocation and Certification; Revisions (T.D. 9228), 70 Fed. Reg. 67,355. (Nov. 7, 2005), 2005-2 C.B. 972.
288 See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
289 See Final Regulations; Substantial Understatement of Income Tax Liability
(T.D. 9174), 70 Fed. Reg. 704 (Jan. 5, 2005), 2005-1 C.B. 629; Removal of Temporary
Regulation, Transitional Rule for Vested Accrued Vacation Pay (T.D. 9138), 69 Fed.
Reg. 42,559 (July 16, 2004), 2004-2 C.B. 160; Removal of Final Regulations; Installment Payments (T.D. 9096), 68 Fed. Reg. 67,595 (Dec. 3, 2003), 2003-2 C.B. 1222,
1222.
290 Removal of Temporary Regulation, Transitional Rule for Vested Accrued Vacation Pay (T.D. 9138), 69 Fed. Reg. 42,559, 42,560 (July 16, 2004), 2004-2 C.B. 160;
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comment in promulgating final regulations that modified tax shelter

reporting regulations by narrowing the definitions that render transactions reportable.2 9 1 Given Treasury's propensity for temporary regulations, it is unclear why they issued these amendments in final form.
T.D. 9108 solicited comments regarding the impact of the amendments and offered to hold a public hearing if affected parties
expressed sufficient interest. 29 2 The amendments offered some relief
from the burden of the existing regulations, so they were likely popular among regulated parties. Nevertheless, Treasury could face a challenge from someone facing an enforcement action whose burden was
not relieved and who could assert that the amendments thus did not
go far enough.
In sum, most of the projects in which Treasury issued final regulations without the benefit of notice and comment seem to be good
candidates for either the procedural rule exception or the good cause
exception. A few of these projects, such as T.D. 9108, may raise issues,
and Treasury's form (or lack thereof) in invoking the good cause
exception either explicitly or implicitly may be problematic, even if
the circumstances otherwise render that exception appropriate. Nevertheless, Treasury's utilization of temporary regulations remains a
much bigger problem than Treasury's failure to undergo notice-andcomment rulemaking altogether.
C.

Corrective Amendments (or Good Cause III)

Finally, one more implicit and questionable use of the good cause
exception arises with respect to Treasury's issuance of corrective
amendments. This was not an item that I set out to track in the study,
but rather one that I occasionally observed that merits mentioning.
Ordinarily, an agency cannot change a legislative regulation
promulgated through notice and comment without pursuing a new
notice-and-comment rulemaking for the changes. 293 It is not unusual
for agencies to issue corrective amendments to final regulations withRemoval of Final Regulations; Installment Payments (T.D. 9096), 68 Fed. Reg. 67,595,
67,595 (Dec. 3, 2003), 2003-2 C.B. 1222.
291 See Final Regulations; Confidential Transactions (T.D. 9108), 68 Fed. Reg.
75,128 (Dec. 30, 2003), 2004-1 C.B. 429.
292 Id.
293 See, e.g., Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106,
1109-10 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Nat'l Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass'n v. Sullivan,
979 F.2d 227, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Homemakers N. Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832 F.2d
408, 412 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Asimow, supra note 138, at 396 nn. 72-74 (citing
additional cases).
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out notice and comment, however. 294 Such amendments frequently
correct typographical errors, and thus clearly fall within the scope of
295
Most of
the "unnecessary" prong of the good cause exception.
Treasury's corrective amendments clearly fall into this category, correcting obvious minor grammatical or cross-referencing errors 296 or
making other non-substantive language adjustments. 29 7 Whether or
not the agency explicitly makes a finding of good cause in issuing a
corrective amendment, it seems highly improbable either that anyone
would challenge such fixes, let alone that a reviewing court would give
credence to such a challenge.
Where so-called technical or corrective amendments affected substantive changes in the applicability of final regulations and changed
the responsibilities or obligations of regulated parties, the courts have
been much less willing to allow the agency to make changes without
notice-and-comment rulemaking. For example, in Utility Solid Waste
Activities Group v. EPA, the agency issued a "minor technical amendment[ ]" replacing one unit of measure with another in a regulatory
298
provision to correct what was described as a word processing error.
294 See, e.g., Final Rule: Clarifying and Corrective Amendments; Licenses for Industrial Radiography and Radiation Safety Requirements for Industrial Radiographic
Operations, 63 Fed. Reg. 37,059 (Jul. 9, 1998) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 34) (amending earlier final NRC regulations); Correcting Amendments; Emergency Alert System
Correcting Amendments, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,174 (Dec. 17, 2002) (codified at 47 C.F.R.
pt. 11) (amending earlier FCC regulations).
295 See, e.g., Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 746-47 (2d Cir. 1995); N.
Arapahoe Tribe v. Hodel, 808 F.2d 741, 751 (10th Cir. 1987); S. REP. No. 79-752, at 14
(1945).
296 See, e.g., Correction to Final Regulations; Value of Life Insurance Contracts
When Distributed from a Qualified Retirement Plan, 70 Fed. Reg. 57,750 (Oct. 4,
2005) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (replacing preamble reference to "§1.79-(d)" with
"§1.79-1(d)"); Correcting Amendment; Residence and Source Rules Involving U.S.
Possessions and Other Conforming Changes, 70 Fed. Reg. 32,489 (June 3, 2005)
(codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 301) (replacing "election filed" with "election is filed" in
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.935-IT(e) (1) (ii) and "(c) (4) (B)" with "(c) (4) (i) (B)" in Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.937-1T(c) (4) (ii) (B), among other changes).
297 See, e.g., Correction to Final Regulations; Sickness or Accidental Disability Payments; Correction, 71 Fed. Reg. 4042 (Jan. 25, 2006) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pts.
31-32) (replacing preamble language "for Federal Insurance Contributions Act
(FICA) purposes payments made on" with "for FICA purposes payment made on" and
"[t] he Service has" with "[t] he IRS has"); Correction to Final Regulations; Tax Shelter
Regulations (T.D. 9046), 68 Fed. Reg. 15,942 (Apr. 2, 2003), 2003-1 C.B. 614 (replacing old OMB numbers with new OMB numbers); Correction to Final Regulations;
Guidance Necessary To Facilitate Electronic Tax Administration (T.D. 9040), 68 Fed.
Reg. 24,644 (May 8, 2003), 2003-1 C.B. 568 (correcting error in published RIN
number).
298 Util. Solid Waste Activities Group v. EPA, 236 F.3d 749, 752 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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Because the change altered the obligations of regulated parties, the
court refused to allow it to be made without notice and comment,
299
notwithstanding the agency's assertion of typographical error.
Some of Treasury's correcting amendments to T.D.s appear
arguably to be more than nonsubstantive changes. For example, an
amendment to T.D. 9083 regarding golden parachute payments
changed language in Treasury Regulation § 1.280G-1, A-11 defining
"payment in the nature of compensation" as including the right "to
receive cash, or a transfer of property" to include instead the right "to
receive cash (including the value of accelerated vesting under Q/A24(c)), or a transfer of property."30 0 Another amendment to T.D.
9194, concerning U.S. taxation of residents of the U.S. Virgin Islands,
301
altered the expression of a formula in a regulatory example.
Neither of these changes seems as pivotal as the one in Utility
Solid Waste Activities Group. Most likely, such corrections will never face
legal challenge. Nevertheless, it is difficult to characterize either of
these changes as either wholly non-substantive or merely fixing obvious typographical errors.
D.

The Harmless Error Rule

The APA offers one more provision that might operate to excuse
at least some of Treasury's failures to adhere to the procedural
requirements of APA section 553. Recognizing that "[n] o administrative agency is perfect," 30 2 APA section 706 instructs courts reviewing
agency action to take "due account . . . of the rule of prejudicial
error. '"303 The courts occasionally employ this "harmless error" rule to
30 4
excuse deviations from APA rulemaking requirements.
Absent good cause or some other APA section 553(b) exception,
the harmless error rule will not save the regulations from those
projects in which Treasury skips notice and comment altogether. The
notice-and-comment requirements are the very heart of APA section
553. Thus, several circuits hold an agency's "failure to provide notice
and comment [to be] harmless only where the agency's mistake
299 Id. at 753.
300 Correction to Final Regulations; Golden Parachute Payments; Correction, 68
Fed. Reg. 59,114 (Oct. 14, 2003) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt.1).
301 Residence and Source Rules Involving U.S. Possessions and Other Conforming
Changes; Corrections, 70 Fed. Reg. 32,489 (June 3, 2005) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1,

301).
303

T. O'REILLY, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING § 16.04, at 316 (1983).
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).

304

See, e.g.,
Riverbend Farns, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479, 1487 (9th Cir.

302

1992).
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clearly had no bearing on the procedure used or the substance of
decision reached." 30 5 The D.C. Circuit follows a rule that "an utter
failure to comply with notice and comment cannot be considered
harmless if there is any uncertainty at all as to the effect of that failure."30 6 Under such circumstances, the degree of uncertainty
30 7
It
required to defeat an agency's harmless error claim is not great.

is simply too difficult to prove that pursuing the notice-and-comment
process would have made absolutely no difference. Even where agencies can demonstrate that interested parties have been given the
opportunity to present their concerns in other ways, the courts generally have been reluctant to excuse agencies from APA notice and
3 08
comment.
Treasury's extensive reliance on temporary regulations with only
post-promulgation notice and comment is not much more likely to
represent harmless error. The courts have not looked favorably upon
agency use of temporary or interim final rulemaking. 30 9 The point of
the APA's notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements is "to assure
305 City of Sausalito v. O'Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1220 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing
different standards for different kinds of agency procedural errors); see also Silverton
Snowmobile Club v. U.S. Forest Serv., 433 F.3d 772, 786 n.6 (10th Cir. 2006) (articulating the same standard for failure to provide notice and comment); Paulsen v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 999, 1006 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Riverbend Farms, 958 F.2d at 1487)
(applying the same standard); Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 360 F.3d 21, 29 (1st
Cir. 2004) (same).
306 Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 904 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting
Sugar Cane Growers Coop. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2002)); Sprint
Corp. v. FCC, 315 F.3d 369, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Sugar Cane Growers Coop.,
289 F.3d at 96).
307 See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce, 443 F.3d at 904 (noting that " [t] he court has not
required a particularly robust showing of prejudice in notice-and-comment cases");
Sugar Cane Growers Coop., 289 F.3d at 97 (stating that the appellants need not articulate considerations they would have raised in a comment procedure to demonstrate
prejudice); McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1324 (D.C. Cir.
1988) ("Even if the challenger presents no bases for invalidating the rule on substantive grounds, we cannot say with certainty whether petitioner's comments would have
had some effect if they had been considered when the issue was open."). The courts
occasionally have found an agency's failure to pursue notice and comment to be
harmless, but typically in circumstances that do not at all resemble Treasury regulation promulgation. See, e.g., Cal-Almond, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 14 F.3d 429,
441-42 (9th Cir. 1993), abrogated by 521 U.S. 1113 (1997) (holding failure to pursue
APA notice and comment to be harmless error where regulated parties had alternative notice and opportunity to participate and in fact did join weekly meetings to
discuss the pending rules).
308 See Sugar Cane Growers Coop., 289 F.3d at 96-97.
309 See supra note 125 and accompanying text (citing cases).

2007]

COLORING

OUTSIDE

THE LINES

1793

fairness and mature consideration of rules of general application" 310

and to allow parties who would be "prejudiced by the absence of an
opportunity" to "mount a credible challenge" 3 11 to a proposed rule to

312
have an opportunity to present their case first before the agency.

Where an agency has promulgated a legislative rule and cannot claim
the good cause exception, the courts have been reluctant to apply the
harmless error rule. 313 In those situations where Treasury receives no

comments in response to its NPRM, finalizes its regulations without
change, and could make its final regulation retroactive in any event,
Treasury's inappropriate utilization of temporary regulations might
represent harmless error. 3 14 Under such circumstances, it is difficult
to see how any party could demonstrate prejudice from Treasury's
deviation from APA rulemaking procedures. Nevertheless, as noted
above, more often than not, Treasury receives some or even many
negative comments when it adopts temporary regulations in conjunc315
tion with a NPRM.
Recognizing the potential harm from delays caused by the inefficiencies of the notice-and-comment process, the now-disbanded
Administrative Conference of the United States once recommended
that leniency for interim final regulations with post-promulgation
notice and comment. 3 16 Another potentially analogous scenario
exists where Treasury solicits comments before issuing temporary regulations. For example, with T.D. 9038, Treasury promulgated temporary regulations only after issuing two successive NPRMs and
evaluating comments received in response thereto.3 1 7 Those tempo310 NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969).
311 Util. Solid Waste Activities Group v. EPA, 236 F.3d 749, 755 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
312 See, e.g., id.; see also Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Hodel, 790 F.2d 760, 765 (9th
Cir. 1986) (excusing failure to follow Federal Land Policy and Management Act
notice and comment requirementsby analogy to APA harmless error rule).
313 See, e.g., Util. Solid Waste Activities Group, 236 F.3d at 755.
314 See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (analyzing Treasury's authority
under I.R.C. § 7805(b) to give its regulations retroactive effect).
315 See supra Table 4 and accompanying text.
316 See Notice; Administrative Conference of the United States, Adoption of Recommendations, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,108, 43,111 (Aug. 18, 1995).

317 See Final and Temporary Regulations; Statutory Mergers and Consolidations
(T.D. 9038), 68 Fed. Reg. 3384 (Jan. 24, 2003), 2003-1 C.B. 524; see also Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Public Hearing; Statutory Mergers and Consolidations, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,400 (Nov. 15, 2001) (announcing proposed regulations to

define the term "statutory merger or consolidation"); Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
and Notice of Public Hearing; Certain Corporate Reorganizations Involving Disordered Entities, 65 Fed. Reg. 31,115 (proposed May 16, 2000) (announcing proposed

regulations to determine
reorganization").

whether "certain transactions

qualify as corporate
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rary regulations were issued without the full benefit of the notice-andcomment process, as Treasury was still reviewing and evaluating comments, did not address all of the significant comments received at that
time, and subsequently altered the regulations further both before
and upon finalization. 3 18 Yet the temporary regulations in T.D. 9038
were issued with the benefit of public participation via the earlier two
NPRMs.
In some cases, however, the courts of appeals have rejected such
an approach on the ground that "[i]t is antithetical to the structure
and purpose of the APA for an agency to implement a rule first, and
then seek comment later. '31 9 The court in Federal Express Corp. v.
Mineta3 20 was more sympathetic. That case involved a series of final
rules involving the airline industry, adopted by the Department of
Transportation (DOT) without notice and comment, in the aftermath
of the 9/11 crisis. 32 1 The first set of rules was adopted pursuant to the
good cause exception, but interested parties were given the opportunity subsequently to submit comments. 322 The agency adopted second, third, and fourth versions of the rules similarly. 323 Regulated
parties challenged particularly the third and fourth sets of rules on
the ground that they had not been given notice and opportunity for
comment prior to finalization. 3 24 The court agreed that DOT should
have pursued notice and comment before finalizing the regulations,
but decided not to invalidate the regulations on the ground that DOT
gave regulated parties the opportunity to comment before declaring
the regulations set in "'bureaucratic stone.' "325 Under the circum318 In January 2005, Treasury issued one more NPRM, amending the January 2003
proposed regulations but not Temporary Treasury Regulation § 1.368-2T. See
Amendment of Previously Proposed Regulations and Notice of Public Hearing; Statutory Mergers and Consolidations, 70 Fed. Reg. 746 (proposed Jan. 5, 2005) (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). Finally, in January 2006, Treasury finalized its temporary
and proposed regulations with "certain technical changes" as the new Treasury Regulation § 1.368-2. Final Regulations; Statutory Mergers and Consolidations (T.D.
9242), 71 Fed. Reg. 4259 (Jan. 26, 2006), 2006-7 I.R.B. 422. Because this T.D. was
published after 2006, it is not officially part of the study except as the ultimate resolution of the temporary regulations issued with T.D. 9038.
319 See, e.g., Paulsen v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 999, 1005 (9th Cir. 2005).
320 373 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
321 Id. at 113-14.
322 Id. at 114.
323 Id.
324 Id. at 115-16.
325 Id. at 120 (quoting Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Block, 655 F.2d 1153,
1157 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
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stances, the court noted that remanding for the agency to take further
3
comments "would serve no useful purpose whatsoever."

26

Treasury should not rely upon the harmless error rule to support
its habit of failing to follow the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures of APA section 553. The courts concede harmless error sparingly, and an agency that depends upon such a rule to justify regular
noncompliance is playing with fire. Nevertheless, the harmless error
rule exists, and Treasury may justifiably invoke it under certain narrow
circumstances.
E. Summary
In summary, the 40.9% of Treasury regulation projects for which
Treasury failed to follow the proper notice-and-comment sequence as
required by APA section 553 are unlikely to qualify for any of the
exceptions from those procedures. Contrary to Treasury's claim, most
if not all Treasury regulations are legislative rather than interpretative
rules as modern doctrine interprets those categories for APA purposes. Some Treasury regulations may be procedural rules. For a few
others, Treasury may have a colorable argument that good cause
existed for disregarding the requirements of APA section 553. Even
where the good cause might arguably be present, however, Treasury's
frequent failure to assert the exception explicitly and explain with
specificity why it applies may render it inapplicable. Treasury may
face similar problems with some of its corrective amendments. The
harmless error exception of APA section 706 is unlikely to offer Treasury much, if any, relief. Altogether, therefore, a substantial percentage of the projects studied present APA compliance issues that render
the resulting Treasury regulations susceptible to legal challenge on
procedural grounds.
IV.

WHY TREASURY DOES WHAT IT DOES: ONE
POSSIBLE

EXPLANATION

The APA is the law. The judicial doctrines elaborating the
requirements of APA section 553 are fairly settled, even if they permit
the courts some flexibility in their application. Treasury knows that
the APA applies to its regulatory activities, even if Treasury would like
to be able to claim exemption from notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Treasury and IRS attorneys enjoy reasonably good reputations among
the tax community for their regulatory efforts. My own sense has
always been that Treasury and IRS attorneys are conscientious about
326

Id.
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doing the best possible job in promulgating Treasury regulations. So
why do Treasury's practices deviate so significantly from what is fairly
settled doctrine regarding the APA's rulemaking requirements?
This question is more difficult to research. Empirics of the type
employed in connection with this Article cannot be utilized to identify
a clear answer. To gain some preliminary insight into Treasury's
actions, however, I discussed my findings informally with several former Treasury and IRS officials and attorneys and read articles and
interviews by others. 3 27 From these efforts, a story emerged that offers
at least one possible explanation for Treasury's practices.
In the decades immediately following the APA's enactment in
1946, significant responsibility for regulation drafting fell to a small
group of attorneys in the Legislation and Regulation (L&R) Division
of the Office of Chief Counsel of the IRS. 3 28 The L&R Division may

have been influenced by Stanley Surrey, who held the positions of Tax
Legislative Counsel and later Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Tax
Policy), and Randolph Paul, who served as General Counsel at Treasury, both of whom wrote articles addressing issues of agency regulatory authority and regulation characterization. 329 For whatever
reason, the L&R Division attorneys thought about and actively discussed the APA's rulemaking requirements and whether to characterize particular regulations as legislative, interpretative, or procedural.
Congress and Treasury also involved the L&R Division attorneys in
drafting tax legislation. Consequently, Congress addressed more
issues directly in the I.R.C., the I.R.C. contained fewer specific authority grants, and Treasury premised more regulations solely and legiti327 I would like to thank Brian Camp, Sheldon Cohen, Michael Doran, Fred
Goldberg, James Edward Maule, Reginald Mombrun, and Irving Salem for taking the
time to answer my questions and offer their thoughts.
328 The L&R Division consisted of forty-five attorneys in 1965, see Mitchell Rogovin, The FourR's: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and Retroactivity: A View from Within, 43
TAXES 756, 758 n.3 (1965), up to approximately sixty attorneys by the end of the
1980s when the IRS eliminated that office. See Fed. Bar Assoc., Interview with DonaldL.
Korb, Chief Counsel, IRS, SEC TAX'N REP., Fall 2005, at 1, 6. At one time, initial drafting
of many projects started with non-lawyers in the Technical Planning Division under
the Assistant Commissioner (Technical) of the IRS, but initial drafts of regulations so
prepared subsequently underwent exhaustive review by the attorneys in the L&R Division. See Laurens Williams, Preparationand Promulgation of Treasury Department Regulations Under Internal Revenue Code of 1954, in 8 MAJOR TAx PLANNING 733, 748-50

(1956).
329 See generally Randolph E. Paul, Use and Abuse of Tax Regulations in Statutory Construction, 49 YALE L.J. 660 (1940) (arguing that administrative authority should have
"flexible discretion" to promulgate tax regulations, while suggesting a role for courts
in reviewing retroactive application of such rules); Surrey, supra note 133, at 557-59
(explaining how much weight is to be given to Treasury Regulations).
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mately on its general rulemaking authority than is the case today.3 30
Finally, as already noted, the 1950s and 1960s were decades of consensus that general authority regulations throughout administrative law
331
were nonbinding and, therefore, interpretative in character.
Hence, the position that most Treasury regulations were exempt from
APA section 553 rulemaking requirements was both factually accurate
and consistent with prevailing legal doctrine.
The evolution of jurisprudence recognizing general authority
regulations as legislative was gradual, as was Congress's addition of
more and more specific authority grants into the I.R.C. 33

2

Treasury

also first started issuing temporary regulations in the 1970s. At first,
Treasury adopted temporary regulations only to provide the procedures for effectuating various congressionally approved taxpayer elections-regulations that potentially fell within the APA's procedural
rule exception if not the interpretative rule or good cause exceptions.
In the 1980s, however, Congress passed several major tax bills and
reorganized the entire I.R.C. 33 3 As a result, Treasury accumulated a

huge backlog of regulatory projects and started experimenting with
33 4
more substantive temporary regulations to alleviate that burden.
330 Several of the attorneys with whom I discussed my findings expressed this perception. Yet more than one contemporaneous source noted the existence of 1338
specific authority grants in the 1954 I.R.C., see I KENNETH DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 5.04, at 129 (Supp. 1965); Williams, supra note 328, at 736, while current
estimates of specific authority grants are substantially lower. See N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N
REPORT, supra note 38, at 2-6 (claiming and categorizing more than 550 specific
authority grants). The discrepancy may arise at least partly from counting individual
specific authority grants as opposed to sections containing such specific authority,
since some sections include more than one such grant. See supra notes 187-89 and
accompanying text.
331 See supra notes 133-42 and accompanying text (discussing evolution of jurisprudence and APA interpretation).
332 See id. But see discussion supranote 330 (noting potential discrepancy in numbers of specific authority grants over time).
333 Between 1976 and 1986, Congress enacted six separate pieces of significant tax
reform legislation. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2810
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Tax Reform Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.); Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat.
324 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.); Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
334 See Asimow, supra note 12, at 343 (identifying the 1980s as the time and complex new tax laws as the reason for Treasury's increased use of temporary regulations); Vasquez & Lowy, supra note 12, at 252 (same).
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Also in the 1980s, the Office of Chief Counsel of the IRS reorganized its operations to group its attorneys by substantive tax area
rather than function.3 3 5 In so doing, the IRS eliminated the old L&R
Division and dispersed responsibility for regulation drafting across the
new substantive groups.3 3 6 Good reasons supported this reorganization. Treasury had curtailed the L&R Division's involvement in drafting tax legislation. L&R Division attorneys were an elite group, but
highly specialized in the arcana of drafting legislation and regulations
and arguably detached from the realities of tax practice. The IRS
needed to accomplish more with fewer employees, and the new organizational structure promised greater efficiency. Also, the IRS sought
to attract a better pool of job applicants by offering attorneys the
opportunity at a wider range of work in a single substantive area. Nevertheless, when the IRS eliminated the L&R Division, its accumulated
institutional knowledge and regulation drafting culture drifted
away.337

In recent decades, tax lawyers with varying levels of experience
with the tax laws, but little knowledge of administrative law, staff Treasury's Offices of Tax Policy and Tax Legislative Counsel and the IRS's
Office of Chief Counsel. These lawyers draft Treasury regulations,
and in so doing rely heavily on the Internal Revenue Manual's guidance to comply with APA rulemaking requirements. The Internal
Revenue Manual, in turn, touches only briefly on various aspects of
the APA rulemaking requirements while simultaneously telling these
lawyers that the APA's rules rarely apply to them. 338 Further, the
Internal Revenue Manual reduces compliance with the APA down to a
handful of boilerplate statements observed in most T.D.s and
NPRMs. 3 39 Treasury and IRS attorneys decide whether to issue temporary regulations based on perceived taxpayer demand for guidance
with little or no thought of the APA. These attorneys also prefer temporary regulations to less formal guidance formats like revenue rulings and notices because the latter are nonbinding and receive less
deference from the courts. APA compliance review is left almost
exclusively to the end of the process, when a single attorney in Treasury's Office of General Counsel with expertise in administrative law
reviews and approves the regulations.
335 See Fed. Bar Assoc., supra note 328, at 6, 9 (noting Chief Counsel's Office reorganization and elimination of L&R Division in 1980s).
336 See id.
337 See id.
338 See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 6, §§ 32.1.2.3, 32.1.5.4.7.5.1.
339 See id. § 32.1.5.4.7.5.1.
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In drafting Treasury regulations, Treasury and IRS attorneys
value public input, particularly from big firm tax attorneys and organizations like the American Bar Association and New York State Bar
Association Tax Sections. Often, however, such feedback comes informally or even unsolicited before regulation drafting begins. The
attorneys with whom I spoke whose tenure with the government was
more recent did not link public participation in the rulemaking process with the APA notice-and-comment requirements. This contrasts
sharply with representations by IRS officials from the 1950s and 1960s,
3
who did relate the two.

40

In sum, my preliminary hypothesis is that Treasury's inadherence
to the APA is not the result of any particular determination to play fast
and loose with the rules. Instead, the status quo evolved slowly, with
APA noncompliance the unanticipated and unintended consequence
of the well-intentioned pursuit of alternative priorities. Future study
evaluating this theory, in conjunction with the vast literature discussing bureaucratic incentives and their role in the development of government agencies and their attitudes toward regulation, may offer
additional insights into the evolution of Treasury's rulemaking
practices.

34 1

V.

IMPLICATIONS

Regardless of why Treasury regularly fails to follow APA rulemaking requirements, the implications of that failure are substantial. One
obvious consequence is that Treasury regulations promulgated inconsistently with the requirements of APA section 553(b) are susceptible
to invalidation by the courts on that basis. 342 Lawsuits tie up resources
340

See Mortimer M. Caplin, The Role of the Commissioner, 1962 MAJOR TAx PLANNING

1, 12 (discussing efforts to solicit input from taxpayers and tax professionals); Williams, supra note 328, at 753 (describing APA notice and comment as "one of the
most important parts of the whole [regulatory] process").
341 See generally ANTHONY DowNs, INSIDE BuREAucRAcY (1967); WILLIAM A. NisKANEN, JR., BuREAucRAcy AND PUBLIC ECONOMIcs 36-42 (1994); Daryl J. Levinson,
Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REv. 915, 923-37

(2005); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Casefor the Administrative State,
89 GEO. L.J. 97, 106-41 (2000).
342 See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 313 (1979) ("Certainly regulations subject to the APA cannot be afforded the 'force and effect of law' if not
promulgated pursuant to the statutory procedural minimum found in that Act.");
Paulsen v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 999, 1008 (9th Cir. 2005) (" 'Ordinarily when a regulation
is not promulgated in compliance with the APA, the regulation is invalid."' (quoting
Idaho Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1995))); Alaska v.
U.S. Dep't of Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (invalidating rules for lack
of notice and comment); Buschmann v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 352, 355-56 (9th Cir.
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that could be better used in other, more productive ways, and if taxpayers succeed in persuading courts to invalidate Treasury regulations
for procedural reasons, Treasury and the IRS will be forced to expend
even further resources re-promulgating existing regulations rather
than addressing newer issues.
Historically, taxpayers have not often challenged Treasury regulations on procedural grounds. Most members of the tax community
believe that Treasury does a decent job in drafting regulations and
instead focus their grumbling on issues where guidance is lacking.
Perhaps all is well with the tax system, and enforcing APA notice-andcomment rulemaking requirements through the courts is
unnecessary.
I am skeptical that this is the case, however. Several alternative
explanations exist for why taxpayers do not challenge Treasury regulations on procedural grounds more frequently. In my own experience,
members of the tax community tend to know little about administrative law doctrine or the intricacies of APA section 553, so they accept
at face value Treasury's representation that most of its regulations are
interpretative and exempt from APA rulemaking requirements.
Standing and sovereign immunity issues may discourage pre-enforcement challenges of Treasury regulations. 34 3 Remedy limitations may
3 44
deter litigants in tax cases from bothering with APA challenges.
Nevertheless, Treasury may not always escape such challenges. In
other areas of administrative law, regulated parties are quick to contest regulations on procedural grounds. The fact that notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures are legally required and that Treasury
faces potential consequences for not following the law should be reason enough for Treasury to alter its practices.
1982) ("A regulation is invalid if the agency fails to follow procedures required by the
Administrative Procedures [sic] Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553.")
343 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7421 (a) (2000) (precluding the courts from enjoining the
assessment and collection of taxes).
344 For example, interpretations of law advanced in Treasury regulations receive
substantial deference from the courts; but the courts defer to interpretations articulated in less formal formats such as revenue rulings as well. See generally Coverdale,
supra note 12, at 72-92 (discussing judicial deference to Treasury regulations); Hickman, supra note 136, at 1564-72 (same); Salem et al., supra note 43, at 759-76
(same). In post-enforcement litigation, a reviewing court that invalidated a Treasury
regulation on procedural grounds would still need to resolve the matter before it,
including determining the taxpayer's liability for taxes due. Under such circumstances, would the reviewing court still defer to the invalidated regulation, just under
a lesser standard? Would such an outcome provide sufficient incentive for the taxpayer to expend the time and money to litigate the procedural issue?
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Depending upon one's reading of I.R.C. § 7805(b), one might
argue, too, that tax should be different from other areas of administrative law because Congress allows Treasury tremendous discretion in
applying Treasury regulations retroactively, and making a regulation
retroactively applicable to the date the NPRM is issued is not too different from issuing a binding temporary regulation before receiving
34 5
and considering public comments in finalizing that regulation.
There are qualitative differences between the two approaches,
however.
First, taxpayers and their representatives may be discouraged
from making comments by the comparative finality of temporary regulations as opposed to regulations that are merely proposed. Drawing
from cognitive psychology literature, Stephanie Stern has suggested
that the APA's notice-and-comment process itself reduces public participation in agency rulemaking by prematurely committing agency
officials to a single set of proposed rules and increasing perceptions of
34 6
agency bias in favor of one approach to a particular problem.
Assuming that Stern's hypothesis is correct, it is reasonable to infer
that deferring notice and comment until after Treasury publishes
binding temporary regulations would only exacerbate this phenomenon. In fact, the Administrative Conference of the United States
expressed precisely this concern about the practice of interim final
regulations, particularly in the absence of good cause, to discourage
34 7
agency utilization of that model.

Second, the evolution of a few of the projects evaluated in the
study suggests that Treasury's use of temporary regulations may yield
worse results than if Treasury followed the APA. In response to the
Court's 2001 opinion in United Dominion,348 Treasury started its
rulemaking process in September 2003 with T.D. 9089 and a full set of
temporary regulations governing the application of I.R.C. § 108 in the
consolidated group context.3

49

T.D. 9089 was accompanied by an

345 See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (analyzing Treasury's authority
under I.R.C. § 7805(b)).
346 Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and Administrative
Rulemaking, 63 U. Prr. L. REv. 589, 620-30 (2002).

347 Notice; Administrative Conference of the United States, Adoption of Recommendations, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,108, 43,111-12 (Aug. 18, 1995) (providing recommendations from the fifty-second plenary session of the Administrative Conference of the
United States).
348 United Dominion Industries, Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822 (2001).
349 See Temporary Regulations; Guidance Under Section 1502; Application of Section 108 to Members of a Consolidated Group (T.D. 9089), 68 Fed. Reg. 52,487 (Sept.
4, 2003), 2003-2 C.B. 906.
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NPRM seeking public comment in response to these regulations, 350
but Treasury asserted the need for immediate guidance as good cause
for issuing binding temporary regulations. 3 5' Three months later, in

December 2003, based on comments received, Treasury amended
these temporary regulations with T.D. 9098 and made the amendments effective retroactively to the same date as the temporary regulations issued in T.D. 9089.352 Again, Treasury invoked the good cause
exception based on the need for immediate guidance.3

53

After

another three months, in March 2004, Treasury issued T.D. 9117,
again amending the temporary regulations first published with T.D.
9089, and claimed the need for immediate guidance yet again asjustifying its lack of prior notice. 354 Finally, in March 2005, Treasury
issued T.D. 9192, revising and finalizing the United Dominion regulations and removing all of the earlier temporary regulations. In short,
in the eighteen months that it took Treasury to finalize these regulations, taxpayers to whom they applied were forced to deal with four
different sets of regulations. Taxpayers who failed to adhere to these
temporary regulations would be subject to penalties under I.R.C.
§ 6662.
Though it hardly seems possible, Treasury's reaction to the Rite
Aid case may have been even less conducive to considered rulemaking
and meaningful participation. The Federal Circuit invalidated the
loss disallowance rules of Treasury Regulation § 1.1502-20 in October
2001.355 In a notice issued just four months later, Treasury acquiesced
to this decision and notified taxpayers of its intention to issue temporary regulations with a different methodology.3

56

Shortly thereafter,

in March 2002, Treasury issued the first set of temporary and proposed regulations inspired by Rite Aid.35 7 Over the next three years,
350 See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Guidance Under Section 1502; Application of Section 108 to Members of a Consolidated Group, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,542 (Sept.
4, 2003) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.1502-19, -21, -28, -32).
351 Temporary Regulations (T.D. 9089), 68 Fed. Reg. 52,487.
352 See Temporary Regulations; Guidance Under Section 1502; Application of Section 108 to Members of a Consolidated Group (T.D. 9098), 68 Fed. Reg. 69,024 (Dec.
11, 2003), 2003-2 C.B. 1248.
353 Id.
354 Final Regulations and Removal of Temporary Regulations; Return of Partnership Income (T.D. 9117), 69 Fed. Reg. 12,069 (Mar. 15, 2004), 2004-1 C.B. 721,
723-24.
355 See Rite Aid Corp. v. United States, 255 F.3d 1357, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
356 See I.R.S. Notice 2002-11, 2002-1 C.B. 526.
357 See Final and Temporary Regulations; Loss Limitation Rules (T.D. 8984), 67
Fed. Reg. 11,034 (Mar. 12, 2002), 2002-1 C.B. 668; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
and Notice of Public Hearing; Loss Limitation Rules, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,070 (Mar. 12,
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Treasury adopted five more sets of temporary regulations dealing with
Rite Aid issues before promulgating final regulations in March
2005.358 Each successive T.D. addressed one or more sub-issues as
they arose over the course of Treasury's evaluation of its new
approach, sometimes revising earlier T.D.s and sometimes not; yet
whereas the T.D.s addressing the United Dominion issue at least crossreferenced one another, those with respect to the Rite Aid problem
did not, making it even more difficult for interested parties to track let
alone comply with Treasury's actions. 359 All of these T.D.s invoked
the good cause exception from pre-promulgation notice and comment based on the need for immediate guidance.
Whether or not Treasury's use of temporary regulations chilled
public participation in these rulemaking efforts, the piecemeal development of the United Dominion and Rite Aid regulations is wholly
inconsistent with the APA's goal of a careful and considered rulemaking process with meaningful public participation. Moreover, the
2002); see also I.R.S. Notice 2002-18, 2002-1 C.B. 644 (announcing temporary and proposed regulations while also soliciting public comment).
358 See Final and Temporary Regulations; Loss Limitation Rules (T.D. 9187), 70
Fed. Reg. 10,319 (Mar. 3, 2005), 2005-1 C.B. 778; Temporary Regulations; Guidance
Under Section 1502; Treatment of Loss Carryovers From Separate Return Limitation
Years (T.D. 9155), 69 Fed. Reg. 51,175 (Aug. 18, 2004), 2004-2 C.B. 562; Temporary
Regulations; Extension of Time To Elect Method for Determining Allowable Loss
(T.D. 9154), 69 Fed. Reg. 52,419 (Aug. 26, 2004), 2004-2 C.B. 560; Final and Temporary Regulations; Loss Limitation Rules (T.D. 9118), 69 Fed. Reg. 12,799 (Mar. 18,
2004), 2004-1 C.B. 718; Temporary Regulations; Guidance Under Section 1502;
Amendment of Waiver of Loss Carryovers From Separate Return Limitation Years
(T.D. 9057), 68 Fed. Reg. 24,351 (May 7, 2003), 2003-1 C.B. 964; Final and Temporary Regulations; Guidance Under Section 1502; Suspension of Losses on Certain
Stock Dispositions (T.D. 9048), 68 Fed. Reg. 12,287 (Mar. 14, 2003), 2003-1 C.B. 645.
359 Compare Final Regulations; Temporary Regulations, and Removal of Temporary Regulations, Guidance Under Section 1502; Application of Section 108 to Members of a Consolidated Group (T.D. 9192), 70 Fed. Reg. 14,395, 14,395-96 (Mar. 22,
2005) (summarizing project background including cross-reference to earlier T.D.s),
and Temporary and Final Regulations; Guidance Under Section 1502; Application of
Section 108 to Members of a Consolidated Group (T.D. 9117), 69 Fed. Reg. 12,069,
12,069 (Mar. 15, 2004), 2004-1 C.B. 721 (same), and Temporary Regulations; Guidance Under Section 1502; Application of Section 108 to Members of a Consolidated
Group (T.D. 9098), 68 Fed. Reg. 69,024, 69,024 (Dec. 11, 2003), 2003-2 C.B. 1248
(same), with Temporary Regulations; Guidance Under Section 1502; Treatment of
Loss Carryovers from Separate Return Limitation Years (T.D. 9155), 69 Fed. Reg.
51,175, 51,175-76 (Aug. 18, 2004) (modifying temporary regulation adopted with T.D.
9048, but not mentioning T.D. 9048), and Temporary Regulations; Extension of Time
To Elect Method for Determining Allowable Loss (T.D. 9154), 69 Fed. Reg. 52,419,
52,420-21 (Aug. 26, 2004) (modifying temporary regulations adopted with T.D. 9057,
but not mentioning T.D. 9057).
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uncertainty created by multiple versions of legally binding temporary
regulations issued in a short time frame contradicts Treasury's own
stated goal of providing meaningful taxpayer guidance.
Treasury regulations are not the only means by which Treasury
and the IRS can provide taxpayers with substantive guidance. The IRS
can issue revenue rulings to offer its interpretation of the I.R.C., Treasury regulations, and case law as applied to hypothetical fact patterns. 360 Treasury can issue notices to articulate its interpretations
and policies on a variety of issues. 36 1 In fact, Treasury has at times in
the past utilized notices to offer draft rules and authorize taxpayers to
rely upon them while awaiting formal proposed and final regulations. 362 In Notice 2003-12, for example, Treasury issued detailed
guidelines concerning the utilization of the nonaccrual-experience
method of accounting by accrual basis taxpayers under I.R.C.
§ 448(d) (5).363 Treasury used the notice essentially as an advanced
notice of public rulemaking, requesting comments on the guidelines
offered and using those guidelines as a basis for proposed regulations
offered in an NPRM issued later that year.3 64 In so doing, however,

Treasury also provided taxpayers with guidance and at least temporary
certainty in their efforts to comply with the tax laws.
Revenue rulings and notices are not legally binding on taxpayers
in the same way as final or even temporary regulations. 365 Hence, it is
360 See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 32.2.2.3.1 (defining revenue
ruling).
361 See id. § 32.2.2.3.3 (defining notice). For example, in I.R.S. Notice 2000-29,
2000-1 C.B. 1241, the IRS requested public comments.
362 See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2003-12, 2003-1 C.B. 422 (offering detailed guidelines
concerning the nonaccrual experience method of accounting). The guidelines
issued in Notice 2003-12 were superseded by temporary Treasury regulations promulgated in T.D. 9090, issued simultaneously with an NPRM. SeeTemporary Regulations;
Limitation on Use of the Nonaccrual-Experience Method of Accounting Under Section 448(d)(5) (T.D. 9090), 68 Fed. Reg. 52,496, 52,497 (Sept. 4, 2003), 2003-2 C.B.
891.
363 I.R.S. Notice 2003-12, 2003-1 C.B. 422.
364 See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Limitation on Use of the NonaccrualExperience Method of Accounting Under Section 448(d)(5), 68 Fed. Reg. 52,543
(proposed Sept. 4, 2003) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). Notably, however, these
proposed regulations were simultaneously adopted as temporary Treasury regulations, raising several issues discussed in this Article. See Temporary Regulations (T.D.
9090), 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,497.
365 See INTE'RNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 32.2.2.10. A ten percent
underpayment penalty may still apply to taxpayers who disregard notices and revenue
rulings, but under a significantly more, lenient standard than applies to Treasury regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b) (1) (as amended in 2003). A taxpayer who disregards a revenue ruling or notice in preparing its tax return will not be penalized for
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generally accepted that they are not subject to notice-and-comment
rulemaking. 366 Nevertheless, most taxpayers are inclined to adhere
even to informal IRS interpretations of the law rather than risk an
enforcement action. Accordingly these formats serve Treasury's oftexpressed purpose of providing immediate guidance to taxpayers. To
the extent that Treasury believes necessary, I.R.C. § 7805(b)(1)(B)
arguably allows Treasury to make final regulations retroactively appli3 67
cable to the date they were proposed in the Federal Register.
Finally, if Treasury has a bona fide concern about tax arbitrage potential while final regulations are pending, the good cause exception is
still available-with the requisite contemporaneous articulation of the
basis for claiming good cause.
Finally, adhering to procedural requirements serves loftier democratic goals as well. Agencies are a necessary component of modern
governance. In a society that relies as heavily as ours on federal governmental action, Congress simply lacks the resources to do the job
alone. Hence, Congress has no choice but to delegate substantial
responsibility to agencies like Treasury and the IRS, but congressional
reliance on the regulatory apparatus comes at a price. Agencies enjoy
great discretion over the statutes that they administer. As noted
above, scholars debate over the motivations and incentives that guide
agency behavior.3 68 Yet relative to Congress, though not to the courts,
agencies lack political accountability and thus democratic legitimacy.
APA rulemaking requirements, combined with judicial review,
are part of an effort to gain the benefits of agency manpower and
expertise yet guard against the worst elements of agency behavior.
Procedural requirements are perhaps most important when agencies
act to dictate or restrict the actions of regulated parties with the force
and effect of law, as through binding regulations. Legislative regulations are practically indistinguishable from the statutes under which
they are promulgated, yet they are not derived from the same legisladoing so "if the contrary position has a realistic possibility of being sustained on its
merits." Id. § 1.6662-3(b) (2). By contrast, a taxpayer filing a return inconsistent with
a Treasury regulation must not only satisfy that threshold but must also file a special
form with the return disclosing the contrary position taken in the return in order to
avoid the underpayment penalty. See Id. § 1.6662-3(c).
366 See, e.g., Linda Galler, JudicialDeference to Revenue Rulings: Reconciling Divergent
Standards, 56 OHIo ST. L.J. 1037, 1044-45 (1995); Dale F. Rubin, Private Letter and
Revenue Rulings: Remedy or Ruse?, 28 N. Ky. L. REv. 50, 52 (2001).
367 I.R.C. § 7805(b) (1)(B) (2000); see also supra notes 47-52 and accompanying
text (discussing authority under the I.R.C. for retroactive application of Treasury
regulations).
368 See supra note 341 and accompanying text (noting just a few representative
pieces of this vast literature).

18o6

NOTRE

DAME LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 82:5

rive process as statutes. Instead, the notice-and-comment procedures

imposed by the APA on such regulations, with their emphasis on public participation, are an important if imperfect proxy for a more democratic legislative process.
Judicial review serves to enforce adherence to these procedures
and guard against arbitrary and capricious agency action.3 69 Doctrines of judicial deference toward agency findings of fact and legal
interpretations at least theoretically preclude judges from intruding
too heavily into policy choices that agencies are better equipped (or at
least congressionally preferred) to make. But heavy judicial scrutiny
of agency adherence to APA procedural requirements ensures that
procedures designed to at least approximate the legislative process
function as intended. Judges accomplish the greatest good in policing agency action by emphasizing adherence to procedural requirements while de-emphasizing the "rightness" or "wrongness" of agency
policy choices.
It is axiomatic that federal government agencies are bound to follow the laws that govern them. Among government agencies, however, Treasury and the IRS ought to be particularly sensitive to the
importance of adhering to the APA's rules. Many taxpayers regard
the federal tax laws and the government's administration thereof with
skepticism, suspicion, and even disdain. Under such circumstances,
one would expect Treasury and the IRS to seek the legitimacy conferred by the APA's notice-and-comment rulemaking process. There
is a huge demand for guidance from Treasury regarding the proper
interpretation of the tax laws; but taxpayer demand alone cannot justify Treasury's failure to follow the APA in issuing legally binding
regulations.
CONCLUSION

In promulgating regulations interpreting the I.R.C., Treasury
does a poor job of following the APA's procedural requirements.
Treasury's regular use of temporary regulations and occasional promulgation of final regulations without notice and comment is inconsistent with the default requirements of APA section 553. Although
the procedural rule exception may apply to excuse some such failures,
Treasury's position regarding the interpretative nature of most of its

regulations is untenable, and its occasional invocations of the good
369 See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 313 (1979) (emphasizing the
courts' role in "ensuring that agencies comply with the 'outline of minimum essential
rights and procedures' set out in the APA" (quoting H.R. REP. No. 79-1980, at 16
(1946))).

2007]

COLORING OUTSIDE

THE LINES

1807

cause exception are often inappropriate and generally insufficiently
justified to survive judicial review. Treasury's lapses in this area are
too routine and significant to constitute harmless error.
In making these findings, I do not mean to suggest that Treasury
and the IRS are intentionally manipulating the rules to accomplish
nefarious ends. Even assuming the best of intentions, however, Treasury's practices at least contradict the democratic impulses driving the
APA and may lead to less effective guidance. Even where strict adherence would not change the outcome, however, Treasury's lack of
adherence to APA rulemaking procedures renders its regulations susceptible to judicial invalidation on procedural grounds and puts Treasury in the position of demanding that taxpayers follow the law while
declining to do so itself. Treasury has been fortunate thus far to avoid
widespread legal challenges for its failure to adhere to APA rulemaking requirements. Treasury may not always be so lucky.
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